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Summary
Agriculture (including shing) was from the onset of the Neolithic Revolution to the eve of
the Industrial Revolution the dominant sector around the globe. By the early 19th century,
manufacturing had overtaken agriculture in the United Kingdom, from where the Industrial
Revolution gradually spread to other parts of Europe and the English speaking world. The
transition out of agriculture was accompanied by economic growth unprecedented in human
history. All countries that have failed to accomplish the transition have also failed to grow,
and remain poor in the present day. Understanding the role of agriculture in the economy
is consequently crucial to the understanding of economic development. It is also important
for an understanding of political development. The historical prominence of agriculture in the
economy gave special interests in the agricultural sector a substantial and lasting impact on
political institutions.
This Ph.D. thesis contributes to the understanding of the interplay between agriculture
and both economic and political development. The thesis consists of three separate research
articles.
The rst article, Structural transformation in the 20th century: A new database on agri-
cultural employment around the world, is motivated by the many empirical questions about
economic growth and development that are left open by the lack of long time series of reliable
GDP estimates. In the article, I argue that the share of the labor force employed in agriculture
can ll this gap. Agricultural employment shares are highly correlated with GDP per capita,
less prone to measurement errors, and data are available for longer periods than existing GDP
estimates.
The article describes a new database on agricultural employment in 169 countries for the
period 1900-2010. In years where no employment data are available, urbanization rates are
used to estimate agricultural employment shares. Some of the many potential uses of the data
are discussed.
In the second article, Skill complementarity and the dual economy, I turn to the theoret-
ical relationship between agricultural employment, national income, and human capital. A
signicant contributor to the low income levels observed in developing countries is their large
iii
agricultural sectors that are relatively unproductive compared to other parts of the economy.
In developed countries, by contrast, sectoral productivity di¤erences are relatively small. In
the article, I estimate that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers
is higher in agriculture than in nonagriculture, and show that this di¤erence is an important
explanation for the relatively unproductive agrarian sectors observed in developing countries.
To illustrate the argument, I simulate a simple two-sector model in which heterogeneous elas-
ticities of substitution a¤ect the sectoral allocation of human capital, and therefore relative
productivity levels. Calibrated to match data from the United States, the model predicts siz-
able agricultural productivity gaps in countries where the share of highly educated workers in
the labor force is low.
The third article, Irrigation and autocracy, is joint work with Jeanet Bentzen and Nicolai
Kaarsen. In the article, we investigate how the type of agriculture a country have been depen-
dent on historically can have a lasting impact on its political institutions. We focus on irrigated
agriculture, which has traits that the resource curse literature associate with rent-seeking and
poor institutional outcomes. These traits include spatial concentration, high yields, and de-
pendence on a controllable water source.
We hypothesize that regions with a long history of irrigation-based agriculture are more
likely to be autocratic today than regions with rainfed agriculture. The hypothesis is conrmed
empirically. To deal with endogeneity, we use an exogenous measure of how much irrigation
potentially can increase yields above the yields obtained from rainfed agriculture. The measure
of irrigation potential is based on geographic an climatic factors.
At the national level, we show that areas with a higher irrigation potential are more likely
to be ruled by an autocratic regime today. At the sub-national level, including country-xed
e¤ects, we nd that irrigation potential is associated with less favorable views on democracy.
Last, we nd that premodern societies, surveyed by ethnographers, were more likely to develop
a hierarchy based on elite stratication if their agriculture was based on irrigation.
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Resumé (summary in Danish)
Landbrug (inklusiv skeri) var fra den Neolithiske Revolution til den Industrielle Revolution
den altdominerende økonomiske aktivitet i alle afkroge af verden. Men i starten af det 19.
århundrede overhalede fremstillingsindustrien landbruget i Storbritannien, hvorfra den Indus-
trielle Revolution gradvist spredtes til resten af Europa og den engelsktalende verden. Transi-
tionen fra landbrugssamfund til industrisamfund skete samtidig med en hidtil uset acceleration
i den økonomiske vækst, og, med tiden, en hidtil uset velstand. De lande, der i dag ikke har
formået at gennemføre transitionen, er fortsat fattige. At forstå landbrugets rolle i økonomien
er derfor væsentligt for at forstå økonomisk udvikling. Det samme gælder for den politiske ud-
vikling. Landbrugets historiske rolle i økonomien betyder, at særinteresser i landbrugssektoren
har haft en stor og varig indydelse på landes politiske institutioner.
Denne Ph.d. afhandling bidrager til forståelsen af samspillet mellem landbruget og både
økonomisk og politisk udvikling. Afhandlingen består af tre indbyrdes uafhængige forskn-
ingsartikler.
Den første artikel, Structural transformation in the 20th century: A new database on agri-
cultural employment shares around the world, er motiveret af de mange spørgsmål omkring
økonomisk udvikling som grundet en mangel på lange, pålidelige tidsserier for BNP, stadig er
åbentstående. I artiklen argumenterer jeg for, at andelen af arbejdsstyrken beskæftiget i land-
bruget kan afhjælpe denne mangel. Beskæftigelsesandelen i landbruget er højt korreleret med
BNP per indbygger, indeholder færre målefejl, og data er tilgængeligt i længere tidsperioder
end BNP data.
Artiklen dokumenterer en database over landbrugsbeskæftigelsen i 169 lande i perioden
1900-2010 som jeg har indsamlet. I år der ikke ndes data for landbrugsbeskæftiglsen, berergner
jeg den ud fra urbaniseringsrater. Artiklen diskuterer også mulige anvendelser af databasen.
Den anden artikel, Skill complementarity and the dual economy, kredser om den teo-
retiske sammenhæng mellem landbrugsbeskæftigelse, national velstand og humankapital. Et
væsentligt bidrag til de lave indkomstniveauer i udviklingslande kommer fra deres store land-
brugssektorer, som er langt mindre produktive end resten af økonomien. I udviklede lande er
der derimod ingen større forskelle mellem sektorernes produktivitetsniveauer. I artiklen viser
v
jeg empirisk, at substitutionselasticiteten mellem højt- og lavtuddannet arbejdskraft er større
i landbruget end i resten af økonomien, og argumenterer for, at den forskel er en afgørende
forklaring på den relativt uproduktive landbrugssektor i udviklingslandene. For at illustrere
argumentet simulerer jeg en simpel to-sektor model hvori forskellige substitutionselasticiteter
i de to sektorer påvirker allokeringen af humankapital, og følgeligt de relative produktivitet-
sniveauer. Modellen forudsiger store produktivitetsforskelle mellem sektorerne i lande med
relativt få højtuddannede når dens parametre er kalibreret til at passe med amerikanske data.
Den tredje artikel, Irrigation and autocracy, er skrevet i samarbejde med Jeanet Bentzen
and Nicolai Kaarsen. I artiklen viser vi, at den form for landbrug, der historisk har været
praktiseret i et land, kan have en varig inydelse på landets politiske institutioner. Fokus er
på landbrug baseret på overrisling, en produktionsform som har lighedspunkter med olie og
andre naturressourcer, der ofte kædes sammen med kleptokrati og udemokratiske institutioner.
Lighedspunkterne omfatter geogrask koncentration, højt afkast, og afhængighed af en kon-
trollerbar ressource: vand fra en od eller sø. Vores hypotese er, at regioner, der i århundreder
har været afhængig af overrisling er mere autoritære end regioner, hvor landbruget har været
baseret på nedbør. Vi bekræfter hypotesen empirisk. For at håndtere mulige endogeneitet-
sproblemer, anvender vi et eksogent mål for hvor meget overrisling potentielt kan øge mængden
af afgrøder. Målet er baseret på geograske og og klimatiske faktorer.
Resultaterne viser, at lande med højt overrislingspotentiale har en større sandsynlighed
for at være styret af autoritære regimer. På sub-nationalt niveau har personer, bosiddende i
regioner med højt overrislingspotentiale, et mindre favorablet syn på demokrati end personer,
bosiddende i andre regioner af samme land. Endelig viser vores resultater, at præ-moderne
samfund, undersøgt af etnografer, i højere grad udviklede et hierarki baseret på ejerskab af
jord hvis de var afhængige af overrisling i landbruget.
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Structural transformation in the 20th century: A new
database on agricultural employment around the world
Asger Moll Wingender
Abstract
Many empirical questions about economic growth and development are left open due
to the lack of long time series of reliable GDP estimates. The share of the labor force
employed in agriculture can ll this gap. Agricultural employment shares are highly
correlated with GDP per capita, less prone to measurement errors, and data are available
for longer periods than existing GDP estimates.
This paper describes a new database on agricultural employment covering 169 coun-
tries for the period 1900-2010. Some of the many potential uses of the data are discussed.
1 Introduction
Why are some countries rich and some countries poor? It is arguably one of the most important
question in macroeconomics, and it often shows up in introductions to papers on economic
growth. No answer to the question is forthcoming without a reliable yard stick for measuring
income di¤erences between countries. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is an obvious
choice of yard stick, as GDP is designed to be an empirical counterpart to aggregate output in
a macroeconomic production function. Indeed, the aim of an ever growing empirical literature
is to explain di¤erences in growth rates or levels of GDP using regression analysis or accounting
techniques.1
1Surveys of the two literatures can be found in Barro (1996) and Caselli (2005) respectively.
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GDP has its shortcomings, however. It is a statistical concept rather than an observable
quantity, and extensive information on production and prices, as well as complicated statistical
methods, are required to estimate GDP. Many developing countries do not have the necessary
statistical capacity to do so, and their GDP estimates are consequently unreliable.2 The
unreliability is illustrated by the recent upward revisions to GDP in Ghana and Nigeria of 62
and 89 percent respectively. Both revisions followed a change of base year for the price indecies
used to calculate real GDP. As discussed in Section 6.5, equally big revisions in many poor
and middle income countries have been caused by base year changes for the purchasing power
parities (PPPs) used in international comparisons.
Another issue is that the modern concept of GDP was not formalized until the rst System
of National Accounts was published by the United Nations in 1953, and many countries did
not publish o¢ cial GDP estimates until decades later. Historical GDP estimates do exist for
some countries thanks to the valuable work of economic historians, notably Angus Maddison
and other researchers a¢ liated with University of Groningen Growth and Development Centre
(GGDC). But the lack of raw historical data on prices and production means that such GDP
estimates often su¤er from high margins of error, not unlike data from present day Africa.
While much has been learned from the empirical growth literature, no clear prescription
for spurring growth in developing countries has emerged. It is certainly plausible that no such
prescription exists. But missing and unreliable GDP data may also make it hard to distinguish
useful policies from useless ones.3
That is the motivation behind the data collecting project underlying this paper. As an alter-
native to the GDP data, I have compiled a comprehensive database of agricultural employment
shares for the period 1900-2010. Agricultural employment is closely related to national income.
Poor countries tend to have almost the entire labor force employed in the elds, whereas agri-
culture is a negligible source of employment in rich countries.The database, available online,
covers 169 of the 177 independent countries that had more than 250,000 inhabitants in 2010.
I use urbanization rates to extend the database to periods where no employment data are
available. Agriculture is, almost by denition, a rural activity, whereas cities are more favorable
2See Jerven (2013) for a book-length survey of the quality of national accounts in sub-Saharan Africa.
3This point is forecefully made by Ciccone and Jarocin´ski (2010).
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for most other economic activities. There is a close and stable empirical relationship between
agricultural employment shares and urbanization rates, and I show that this relationship can
be used to accurately estimate agricultural employment shares.
Agricultural employment shares are useful as an alternative to GDP data for several rea-
sons. First and foremost, the share of the labor force engaged in agriculture is closely related
to productivity and national income through Engels Law. A subsistence food requirement
increases the consumption share of agricultural goods in countries with low productivty levels,
and hence low national income. To satisfy the high relative demand for food, more workers
are needed in agriculture in poor countries than in countries with high productivity levels.
An alternative would be to import the required food, but poor countries rarely do so on a
su¢ cient scale. Low income levels are therefore reected in sectoral employment rather than
international trade. Empirically, the correlation between GDP and agricultural employment is
0.9 in a cross section of 158 countries in 2000, and, as shown in Section 6, the relationship has
been stable over time despite rapid globalization.4 The link between agricultural employment
and income is a well-known stylized fact of development economics, and have been analyzed
extensively. Useful overviews of the literature cen be found in Gollin (2010) and Herrendorf
et al. (2014).
Agricultural employment shares have additional advantages over GDP data. They are
much simpler to measure, and consequently less prone to measurement errors. Moreover,
governments have usually carried out censuses or labor force surveys before they were able
to accurately calculate GDP, or before GDP was even invented. Agricultural employment
shares are, for instance, readily available for a number of countries from the 19th century and
onwards. Examples are shown in Table 1.
The present study is not the rst to be motivated by lacking and uncertain GDP estimates.
Other researchers have looked for alternative income measures for the same reasons. Chen and
Nordhaus (2011, 2014) and Henderson et al. (2012) use the intensity of night lights measured
from space by satellites as a proxy for GDP. IMF (2006) use growth in electricity consumption
to show that GDP growth in Jamaica was probably 3.1 percent per annum from 1991-2000
4Sources: Penn World Table 8.0 compiled by Feenstra et al. (2013), and the agricultural employment share
data documented in this paper.
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Table 1: Earliest census with employment data
Europe and North America Other regions
Country Year Country Year
Finland 1774 Brazil 1872
Iceland 1801 Japan 1872
Norway 1801 Argentina 1895
United States 1820 Mexico 1900
United Kingdom 1841 India 1901
Belgium 1846 Taiwan 1905
Netherlands 1849 Indonesia 1905
Denmark 1850 Egypt 1907
France 1856 South Africa 1911
Sources: Mitchell (1993, 1998a,b), Minnesota Population Center (2008).
rather than the o¢ cial estimate of 0.3 percent. Young (2012) shows that the living standards in
sub-Saharan Africa, according to consumption data from the Demographic and Health surveys,
have grown by three-and-a-half to four times faster than GDP per capita, indicating that GDP
may be underestimated. Consistent with this result, I show in Section 6 that GDP in sub-
Saharan Africa also appears to be underestimated when it is compared to the regions falling
agricultural employment shares. To demonstrate that it is the African employment data that
give the more accurate picture of income levels, I show that income levels predicted by lights
from space correspond to the ones implied by agricultural employment shares rather than the
o¢ cial GDP estimates. Lights data are not available before 1992, but it seems reasonable to
assume that result would be similar in earlier periods if data had existed.
Other cases of measurement errors are also visible when comparing the GDP data to agri-
cultural employment shares. An example is the well-know overestimation of GDP in the USSR
and Eastern Europe during communism. To go beyond case studies, I show in Section 6.5 that
agricultural employment data can predict revisions to GDP following changes of base year for
the PPP calculations. By implication, agricultural employment shares contain information on
true income levels not fully reected in the PPP adjusted GDP data.
This paper is mostly concerned with the relationship between agricultural employment
and national income. But beyond being an alternative to GDP in, e.g., cross country growth
regressions, agricultural employment shares are useful for studying many issues not necessarily
4
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related to national income. Changed sectoral employment patterns may, for instance, a¤ect
fertility, mortality, institutions, and cultural and social norms. The database can also be used
to test theoretical models of structural change, investigate the spread of industrialization, or to
study the mechanics of dual economies (i.e., economies where large unproductive agricultural
sectors coexists alongside small and productive modern sectors). I leave these possibilities as
topics for future research.
The paper is structured as follows. The theoretical and empirical links between agricultural
employment and GDP are reviewed in Section 2, and measurement errors in the two variables
are discussed. The sources of employment data are described in Section 3. There are a number
of existing databases, notably the ones maintained by The International Labor Organization
(ILO), GGDC, Oxford Latin American Economic History Database, OECD, and the Interna-
tional Historical Statistics by Mitchell (1993, 1998a,b). I merge these databases, and extend
the resulting data set with information from numerous other sources, including data collected
from national statistical o¢ ces, various issues of the Yearbook of the League of Nations, and
research by economic historians.
Urbanization data are for most countries available in earlier periods than employment data.
In Section 4, I describe how I use urbanization rates to estimate agricultural employment in
periods when employment is unobserved. The coverage of the resulting data set is described
in Section 5, and, in section 6, I compare the evolution of agricultural employment in the 20th
century to the evolution of GDP per capita. Section 7 concludes by discussing potential uses
of the database, and avenues for further research.
2 Agricultural employment and national income
The rationale for using agricultural employment shares to study economic development, made
in the introduction, is spelled out in further details in this section. Agriculture (including
shing) was from the onset of the Neolithic Revolution to the eve of the Industrial Revolution
the dominant sector around the globe. By the early 19th century, manufacturing had overtaken
agriculture in the United Kingdom, from where the Industrial Revolution gradually spread to
other parts of Europe and the English speaking world, albeit delayed by almost a century. The
5
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transition out of agriculture was accompanied by economic growth unprecedented in human
history. Productivity increases outpaced fertility to an extent that fewer workers in the elds
were needed to feed the population.
This development can be formalized in a very simple model. Let preferences be of the
Stone-Geary variety, such that the utility function of the representative individual takes the
form:
u (ca; cn) =
8<: ca if ca  caln (cn) + ca if ca > ca
9=; ;
where ca is consumption of agricultural goods (food), and cn is consumption of nonagricultural
goods.5 An extreme version of Engels Law holds in this formulation of preferences. Consumers
only care about their calorie intake when food consumption is below the satiation point ca.
Above the satiation point, only nonagricultural goods increase utility.
Labor is the only input in production in the two sectors, and output is proportional to a
common productivity level Z, which include technology, physical capital, human capital etc.
Agricultural production per capita is consequently given by ya = Z  AES; where AES is the
agricultural employment share. Nonagricultural production per capita is similarly given by
yn = Z  (1  AES) :
Let the economy be closed such that ca = ya. It follows that AES = min

ca
Z
; 1
	
, so
countries with low productivity levels have large fractions of their workforce employed in agri-
culture. The productivity level, Z, is the only source of possible variation in aggregate income
across countries, and agricultural employment shares are therefore proportional to GDP per
capita.
The reality is, of course, innitely more complicated than the model above. But the rela-
tionship between agricultural employment and income is also a feature of more realistic models.
Recent examples include Lucas (2009), Lagakos andWaugh (2013), Gollin and Rogerson (2014)
and Wingender (2014a).
It is no coincidence that theoretical two-sector models predict a high correlation between
agricultural employment shares and income. They are build to match that relationship, as it
5This formulation of preferences is used in Laitner et al (2000) and Gollin et al (2002).
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Figure 1: Agricultural employment shares and log GDP per capita 2000
is one of the most robust stylized empirical facts of economic development. It is illustrated in
Figure 1, which shows log GDP per capita as a function of the agricultural employment share
for a cross section of countries.
The regression line in Figure 1 has an R2 of 0.8, and as shown in Section 6, the goodness of
t is similar in earlier periods. While the observed relationship between GDP and agricultural
employment is close, it is not perfect due to measurement errors, and errors introduced by the
simplicity of the model. I discuss errors in details in the next two subsections. One conclusion
that emerges is that measurement errors in GDP, while hard to quantify, are likely to be
substantial. The implication is that agricultural employment shares are even better predictors
of unobserved true income than of observed GDP per capita.
2.1 Measurement errors
GDP is a complex statistical concept. To compute GDP, detailed statistics on production
and prices are required, as well as a sizeable number of statisticians and computers to process
the raw data. Neither are available in developing countries. Raw data are often non-existing,
as data collection is costly, and little is known about economic activity in the large informal
7
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sector. Furthermore, limited resources are allocated to process the raw data that do exist.
Jerven (2013) describes how one single person in the Central Statistical O¢ ce in Zambia was
responsible for calculating all the income and growth statistics when he visited in the end of
the 2000s. Visits by Jerven to other statistical o¢ ces in Sub-Saharan countries showed that
Zambia is by no means unique in this respect.
Lack of data on prices is especially a worry. The recent large revisions to GDP in Ghana
and Nigeria, mentioned in the Introduction, were caused by changes in the national base year
used to calculate real GDP in constant prices. Both countries changed their base year to 2008,
from 1993 in Ghana and 1990 in Nigeria. GDP calculated using constant prices is biased
if relative prices move.6 Price movements are often dramatic in economies where structural
change happens quickly, as in Ghana and Nigeria, and the measurement error accumulates the
further in time from the base year GDP is estimated.
Major GDP revisions following base year changes are no longer common in the developed
world where chain-weighting is used to calculate real GDP. Chain-weighting requires detailed
annual data on the price structure of the economy, and the method is not feasible in developing
countries where price surveys are not carried out on a regular basis. The constant price
approach is used instead. But unlike Ghana and Nigeria, many developing countries still use
base years from the 1990s or 1980s, with huge implications for the accuracy of their o¢ cial
estimates of real GDP.
GDP levels need to be adjusted for di¤erences in national prices to be comparable across
countries. To this end, most researchers use PPP adjustment factors published by the Interna-
tional Comparison Program (ICP). The PPPs are calculated in a base year, and extrapolated
using national price indecies. Changes in base year for the PPPs often cause signicant revi-
sions to relative GDP levels for the same reason as changes of base year in the national price
data. Moreover, 22 countries did not submit price data for one or more component of the
national accounts in the 2011 round of the ICP program, and their PPPs therefore contain
imputed or estimated values. I discuss PPPs in further details in Section 6.5 where I show
that agricultural employment shares can be used to detect measurement errors in the PPPs.
6This is known as the Gershenkron e¤ect. The sensitivity of GDP to the choice of base year is explained in
details in Nuxoll (1994).
8
Chapter 1: Structural transformation...
Historical GDP data su¤er from many of the same problems as GDP data from developing
countries today. Countries that are currently developed, were relatively poor a century ago,
and did not systematically collect data on production and prices. Moreover, the concept of
GDP was developed in the middle of the 20th century, and adopted decades later by many
countries. Data collection in earlier periods was not aimed at constructing GDP, and historical
estimates of GDP therefore contain a mixture of actual observations, estimates, and guesswork.
Knowledge about prices prior to World War II is, for instance, limited in all but a few
countries. As in developing countries today, historical GDP numbers are based on constant
prices with distant base years rather than chain-weighting. An exception is the United States.
When the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the United States recalculated the o¢ cial GDP
estimates using chain weights rather than constant prices, the average annual growth rate
between 1929 and 1950 increased from 2.6 percent to 3.5 percent. By implication, the initial
level of GDP was lower. A consequence of the revision is, as Maddison (2003) points out, that
labor productivity in the United States was lower than in the United Kingdom in 1913. That
amounts to a major reinterpretation of economic history. It is, however, not clear how much
the GDP level in the United Kingdom would change if it was recalculated using chain weights,
so the comparison makes little sense.
Many other criticisms have been raised against GDP. Nordhaus (1996) argues that the gains
from technological breakthroughs are not fully captured by GDP, and gives lighting technology
as an example. Other authors complain that both levels and growth rates of GDP di¤er widely
across data sources (e.g., Maddison (2010), Penn World Tables, World Development Indicators
or national statistics o¢ ces), and even from update to update of a given data source.7 For
example, Ciccone and Jarocin´ski (2010) demonstrate that the Penn World Table version 6.2
income estimates leads to substantial changes regarding the role of government, international
trade, demography, and geography than the income estimates in version 6.1.
Agricultural employment is an observable quantity that is relatively easy to dene and
measure. The measurement problem in employment data is consequently smaller than in GDP
data. Of course, measurement errors are still present in the employment data. Census data
7E.g., Breton (2012), Johnson et al. (2013), Jerven (2013) and Deaton and Aten (2014).
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may be incomplete, and surveys unrepresentative. But such measurement errors are usually
easy to identify by looking at the meta data, which state if some regions or population groups
(e.g., self employed or women) are omitted. Such observations can in practice be adjusted or
discarded, depending on the nature of the problem.
2.2 Model misspecication errors
Even with accurate measurement, the link between agricultural employment and income is
unlikely to be perfect. It breaks down when the national income level is su¢ ciently high, as
rich countries continue to grow after the share of workers engaged in agriculture has fallen
to almost zero. Present day di¤erences between agricultural employment shares in Germany,
Sweden and the United Kingdom tell us little about relative income in the three countries. But
the negligible agricultural employment shares in the three countries tell us that they have fully
completed the transition out of agriculture, which an important characteristic when studying
comparative development.
International trade may alter the link between agriculture and national income, as trade
makes it possible for poor countries to fulll their subsistence needs by exhanging nonagricul-
tural goods for food on the international markets. They will use this option if they have a
comparative advantage in nonagriculture, if transportation costs are su¢ ciently low, and if the
right kind of trade policies are in place. Whether that is the case, and whether international
trade have changed the relationship between income and agricultural employment shares over
time are consequently empirical questions. There is some evidence that developing countries
increasingly tend to be net importers of food, but the traded quantities are not substantial:
Sub-Saharan Africa, the least self-su¢ cient region in the world, produce agricultural goods that
covers 85-90 percent of the calorie intake of its population.8 Moreover, as I show in Section
6, the relationship between measured GDP and agricultural employment shares has actually
been stable over the last century.
While international trade do not introduce any systematic errors, it may exacerbate country
specic idiosyncrasies. A country with a low population density, and plenty of fertile land is
8Source: FAO (2012).
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likely to have many people employed in agriculture if it is able to sell crops on the international
markets. The United States was an example of this until the second half of the 20th century.
Very unequal societies, where the elite depend on resource rents may also be able to attain
relatively high levels of national income even if the majority of the population is employed
in subsistence farming. Equatorial Guinea, one of the biggest oil producers in Africa, is an
example. It has an agricultural employment share of roughly 60 percent, but, according to some
international comparisons, a GDP per capita comparable to Southern Europe.9 It is arguably
the agricultural employment share that gives the most accurate picture of development in
Equatorial Guinea.
The sources of error described above should be kept in mind when employment data are
used to analyze economic development and structural change, but they do not change the
fact that agricultural employment shares are powerful predictors of national income. On that
note, the remainder of this paper is devoted to a description of the database on agricultural
employment shares I have compiled.
3 Employment data
I outline the available sources of agricultural employment data, and the strategy I use to merge
them, in this section. The data appendix provide more details, as does the additional data
documentation in Wingender (2014b).
I limit the database to countries that were fully independent, and had more than 250,000
inhabitants in 2010. Some of these were parts of larger entities in the earlier periods (e.g.,
the USSR and Yugoslavia), but I report agricultural employment shares based on present day
borders. Consistent with many of the data sources I use, individuals employed in shing,
hunting or forestry are categorized as agricultural workers.
The raw data for calculating agricultural employment shares mstly come from national
population censuses, household or labor force surveys. Collecting these from national statistics
9Source: World Development Indicators. Penn World Table 8.0 puts the GDP per capita level of Equatorial
Guinea substantially lower, and roughly equal to that of Columbia. But it is stil substantially higher than
what indicated by the agricultural employment share.
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Table 2: Employment databases
Database Coverage Period Type
FAO World 1980-present Observed and estimates
GGDC EU KLEMS Europe 1950-present Observed and estimates
GGDC Africa Sector Database Africa 1960-present Observed and estimates
GGDC 10-sector Database Asia, Latin America and OECD 1990-present Observed
ILO (KLIM and Laborstat) World 1969-present Observed
International Historical Statistics World 1800-present Observed
OECD OECD 1990-present Observed
Oxford Latin America Economic History Database Latin America 1870-present Observed
Notes: *Mitchell (1993, 1998a,b)
o¢ ces is an immense task. Fortunately, much of the information is already provided by the
international databases listed in Table 2. I use data from all of them. The exception is the
database provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) for
reasons explained below.
The databases do not contain observations from all countries in the regions they cover,
nor do they provide observations for all years. When information is missing (or unreliable), I
augment the data with information from other sources. For the recent decades, that is mostly
done by tracking down the numbers on the websites of the respective national statistical o¢ ces.
I have done so for Albania, Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte dIvoire, Lao,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Kosovo, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, Timor-
Leste, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. Further, I have calculated agricultural employment shares
from micro-level census data obtained from the IPUMS-International database for Brazil, Fiji,
Guinea, Haiti, Peru, South Sudan, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Uruguay.10 Data for the USSR
republics are obtained from Easterly and Fischer (1995). For years prior to World War II, I
rely on various issues of the Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, additional historical
census data, and research by economic historians. The full list of sources is available in the
data appendix.
10The database is compiled by Sobek et al. (2013).
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3.1 Cleaning and merging the databases
Two data source sometimes disagree on the level of agricultural employment for a given coun-
try in a given year. The result of a labor force survey may, for instance, di¤er from the result
of a census. Sometimes the reason for the disagreement can be found in the meta data. A
common cause of discrepancies is di¤erences in geographical coverage. Labor force surveys are
in some cases only carried out in urban areas, and they consequently understate agricultural
employment. The same is true when self-employed are excluded from the survey. Such obser-
vations, which the meta data allows me to identify as inconsistent with the remaining data,
are removed from the data set. Observations that are clearly outliers are similarly removed if
the meta data are missing.
Another cause of discrepancies is that some data sources report estimated rather than
observed agricultural employment shares. As a rule of thumb, I discard all observations that
are based on extrapolation or model estimates, even if no actual observation is available.11 I
do so, as analyses based on such data risk getting into circular arguments, where assumptions
about economic development are tested using data generated from assumptions about economic
development.
In practice, I drop a number of observations in the GGDC Africa Sector Database that are
estimated based on aggregate productivity growth as implied by the national accounts. A large
number of observations in the FAO data set are extrapolated based on a tted logistic growth
path. Moreover, data for a number of countries in the FAO database are pure estimates,
as the do not participate in the FAO agricultural census program, and no other sources of
employment data exists.12 It is in the data set not possible to distinguish actual observations
from estimates, and I therefore disregard the FAO data set completely.
11I make one exception by including the EU-KLEMS data set, which are underpinned by su¢ ciently many
actual observations to be considered accurate. Hungary and Austria are exceptions, and EU-KLEMS is not
used for these two countries.
12 The accuracy of these estimates are questionable. For example, FAO reports an agricultural employment
share of around 70 percent in Djibouti. Yet, roughly 75 percent of the population of Djibouti resides in the
capital, Djibouti city, and an establishment survey show that there were only 1,690 agricultural holdings in the
country in 2006/2007.
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The remaining observations are broadly in agreement about agricultural employment, and
the di¤erent data sources can therefore be merged seamlessly. The few exceptions where
additional adjustments are needed are described in Wingender (2014b).
4 Extending the data set using urbanization rates
Most countries currently collect employment data, but that has not always been the case.
The number of countries with employment data is around 90 in the 1950s, down from 169 in
the 2000s. Fortunately, urbanization rates can be used to estimate agricultural employment
shares in periods when no employment data exist. Agriculture is, almost by denition, a
rural activity, whereas cities are more favorable for most other economic activities. There are
exceptions to this rule, such as mining, but we should nonetheless expect urbanization to be
lower in countries with a high employment share in agriculture.
The expectation is conrmed by the data. Figure 2 shows the close empirical relationship
between agricultural employment shares and urbanization in 1970, one of the earliest year
with a substantial number of observations of both variables. The estimated parameters for
the regression line are shown in Table 3. The table also reports coe¢ cients for regressions
made for a pooled sample of all years, as well as for the individual years 1950 and 2000. The
estimates seem plausible, as they imply that a country with little urbanization will have all of
its population engaged in agriculture (AESi;t =  0:810:82 = 0:99 in the pooled sample). Moreover,
the estimated intercepts and slopes are remarkably constant over time, which is reassuring
when the relationship is used to predict agricultural employment shares out of sample. In the
remainder of this section, I describe the methodology and data sources I use to accomplish this
task.
4.1 Urbanization: Sources and denitions
Censuses not only provide information on the total size if the population, but also its location,
thus allowing urbanization rates to be calculated. The United Nations has collected census
14
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Figure 2: Urbanization and agricultural employment 1970
Table 3: Urbanization and agricultural employment
Sample Pooled sample 2000 1970 1950
Intercept 0:81
(0:00)
0:80
(0:02)
0:80
(0:02)
0:82
(0:03)
Slope (coe¢ cient on AES)  0:82
(0:00)
 0:80
(0:04)
 0:82
(0:04)
 0:83
(0:06)
R2 0.78 0.73 0.79 0.74
Observations 8,689 146 120 77
Notes: The dependent variable is the urbanization rate.
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data on urbanization from all the member countries back to 1950.13 Additional information
from sample surveys and from estimates, made either by national governments or the United
Nations, are used if no census data are available.14
The urbanization rates are not comparable across countries as the denition of urban varies.
Most countries dene urban areas in terms of the number of people living in a given agglom-
eration, but the cut-o¤ ranges from just 200 in Denmark to 10,000 in Italy and Senegal. Some
countries also require agglomerations to be primarily non-agricultural in terms of employment,
to have access to electricity, or to be the administrative centre of a municipality before they
are considered urban in the statistics.
The United Nations make no attempt to harmonize denitions, as they argue that a har-
monization is unlikely to increase comparability.15 A settlement of 5,000 people are often
decidedly rural in terms of economic activity in China and India, whereas it is likely to be a
centre of commerce and industry in Europe. Bairoch (1991) similarly argue that small towns
in Europe historically have been peculiar in a global comparison due to the limited agricultural
activity of their inhabitants. He o¤ers Western Nigeria as an example of the opposite. In the
1952 census, roughly one third of the males living in cities with populations between 5,000 and
80,000 were engaged in agriculture. As it will be shown below, the estimation strategy I use is
not a¤ected by di¤erences in denitions of urban.
Prior to 1950, I urban population data from Eggimann (1999) for Africa, Asia and Latin
America, and from the USSR republics from Lewis et al. (1976). With a few exceptions, Coun-
tries in Western Europe, North America and Oceania have actual employment data back to the
19th century, and urbanization data are therefore not needed. Eggimann (1999) provides pop-
ulation estimates for named cities, not urbanization rates for entire countries. To calculate the
latter, knowledge of total populations is needed. I obtain population data from International
13United Nations (2012a).
14If no obervations are available in 1950, extrapolation is used to extend the data set backwards. For about
10 percent of the countries, the extrapolation is applied to a longer period than decade. Most of these countries
are island nations with populations too small to be included in the data set of this paper (e.g., Palau, Vanatu,
and Tuvalu).
15United Nations (2012b).
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Historical Statistics augmented by various historical census data from other sources.16
The resulting urbanization rates are dened di¤erently than the urbanization rates in the
United Nations (2012a) data from 1950 and onwards. I use the overlapping observations in
1950 and Zipfs law to adjust the pre-1950 data to conform to the post-1950 denition (which
di¤er from country to country).17
4.2 Estimation strategy
It is useful to illustrate where the empirical relationship between urbanization and agricultural
employment comes from before the strategy for estimating agricultural employment out of
sample is reviewed. The starting point is the following accounting equation for the labor force
engaged in agriculture:
LAi;t = AES
u
i;te
u
i;tUi;t + AES
r
i;te
r
i;t (Pi;t   Ui;t) ; (1)
where LAi;t is the number of individuals engaged in agriculture in country i in period t, Pi;t is the
total population, and Ui;t is the number of individuals living in urban areas according to the
national denition. AESui;t and e
u
i;t are the agricultural employment share and the employment
rate in urban areas. AESri;t and e
r
i;t are the similar variables for rural areas.
Equation (1) can be rewritten to yield an expression for the aggregate agricultural employ-
ment share, AES = L
A
L
:
AESi;t =
 
AESui;te
u
i;t   AESri;teri;t

Ui;t + AES
r
i;te
r
i;tPi;t
	 1
Li;t
:
16These include Lewis et al. (1976) for the USSR, McGee (1964) for Malaysia, Karpat (1985) for the Ottoman
Empire, and McEvedy et al. (1978) for Indonesia and the countries on the Indian subcontinent. For Africa, I
rely on population estimates made by Manning (2010), which correct known errors in the colonial records.
17Zipf (1941). The adjustments to the urbanization series are done as follows. Let ux denote the urbanization
rate where the cut-o¤ for urban is cities with x inhabitants. Let uy be dened in the same way. Zipfs
law states that cities are distributed according to a power law. Power laws are scale invariant, and uxuy is
consequently constant and independent of how the aggregate urban population evolves over time. It follows
that ux;t = uy;t
ux;T
uy;T
; where t indexes time, and T is an arbitrary period where the two series overlap. This
relationship allows ux;t to be calculated in periods where only uy;t is available, and vice versa.
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Dene the urbanization rate as URi;t =
Ui;t
Pi;t
, and let ei;t be the aggregate employment rate. It
follows that:
AESi;t =

AESui;t
eui;t
ei;t
  AESri;t
eri;t
ei;t

URi;t + AES
r
i;t
eri;t
ei;t
:
This equation can be rearranged to yield the estimation equation used in Figure 2 and in Table
3:
URi;t = 0 + 1AESi;t + "i;t (2)
Estimates of the two parameters 0 and 1 are are provided in Table 3 in the introduction
to this section. The error term "i;t contains idiosyncracies in agricultural employment shares
and participation rates in rural and urban areas uncorrelated with the aggregate agricultural
employment share. The idiosyncrasies are, in part, driven by di¤erences in the national den-
itions of urban and rural populations. The agricultural employment share in urban areas will,
for example, be larger when the towns dened as urban are smaller.
The uncorrelatedness of "i;t is not su¢ cient to estimate AESi;t out of sample. Additional
assumptions about the error term "i;t are needed.
Growth rates in the agricultural employment share are proportional to growth in the ur-
banization rate if the error term "i;t is assumed to be time invariant ("i;t = "i). The same is
true for expected growth rates if "i;t is i.i.d. However, both assumptions are unrealistic, since
the error term "i;t depends on employment rates and agricultural employment in urban and
rural areas. They are behavioral variables that are likely to evolve over time, but only very
gradually.
Instead, I assume that assume that the ratio "i;t
URi;t
is constant and equal to "i;T
URi;T
in periods
t < T;where T is the earliest year with employment data, and thus the earliest year for which
Equation (2) can be estimated. There are several reasons for choosing this specication. It is
consistent with slow-moving behavioral variables, and the movement of the resiudal is toward
zero, which is reasonable if countries that are closer to an undeveloped steady state are more
likely to be identical in terms of urbanization and agricultural employment than more developed
countries. The variance of the error term should thus be lower when urbanization is lower.
Furthermore, the assumption that "i;t
URi;t
=
"i;T
URi;T
for t < T is essentially a way to impose mean
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reversion in the errors, since urbanization rates generally are increasing over time. Errors will
have this property if there are measurement errors in the employment data in year T: Lastly,
the assumption implies that  > 0 in the following regression:
j"i;tj = URi;t + country fixed effects+ error
That is indeed the case.  = 0:38 with a t-value of 10.87.18
The assumption that "i;t
URi;t
=
"i;T
URi;T
is also practical when estimating the agricultural em-
ployment share out of sample. Substituting the assumption into Equation (2) yields:
URi;t = 0 + 1AESi;t + URi;t
"i;T
URi;T
() URi;t

1  "i;T
URi;T

= 0 + 1AESi;t
() URi;t
dURi;T
URi;T
= 0 + 1AESi;t ;
where dURi;T is the predicted value of the urbanization rate in period T obtained from the
regression in Equation (2). The entire term URi;t
dURi;T
URi;T
corresponds to urbanization in period
t, or dURi;t:Di¤erences in the national denition of urban are contained in the error terms
of Equation (2), and the predicted urbanization rate can therefore be interpreted as being
harmonized according to a denition that depends on the aggregate agricultural employment
share.
The agricultural employment share in period t can be calculated as:
AESi;t =
dURi;t   0
1
; t < T (3)
I use this equation along with the pooled estimates of the parameters, i.e., 0 = 0:81 and
1 =  0:82; to obtain values of AESi;t in years prior to the year where actual employment
data become available. Some countries have not yet published data on agricultural employment
18Estimated for the full sample. The results are similar when the sample is limited to developing countries,
and when the squared residuals are used as dependent variable in the regression.
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shares in the last few years of the sample period, so a similar approach is used to estimate
agricultural employment shares in these years.
4.3 Precision
To test the accuracy of the methodology to estimate AES, I set the starting year T = 2000 for
all countries. I then derive the predicted agricultural employment shares for 1970 and 1950,
and compare the predictions to the observed agricultural employment shares by estimating the
following regressions:
AESi;t = 1 dAESi;t + i;t; (4)
and
AESi;2000   AESi;t = 2
 dAESi;2000   dAESi;t+ i;t; (5)
for t = 1950; 1970. The estimated parameters should be 1 = 2 = 1 if the predicted agricul-
tural employment shares are unbiased, and the prediction errors, i;t and i;t; should be small
if the estimates are accurate. The results are shown in Table 4. For t = 1950; both estimated
parameters are somewhat smaller than one, but not signicantly so at a 95 percent condence
level. For t = 1970, 1 and 2 are are signicantly smaller than one in a statistical sense, but
the di¤erence does not seem substantial in the case of 1.
The estimate of 2 is 0.85, indicating that the estimated changes in agricultural employment
shares may overstate the actual changes. An explanation is that idiosyncratic shocks play a
larger role when the time frame is short, and the estimated 2 is therefore harder hit by
attenuation bias. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated 2 falls further when the
time period is shortened, and the standard error increases despite more observations. For
t = 1980, for instance, 2 = 0:75 with a standard error of 0.06. A small bias in the short run
of this sort is a minor worry, as the aim of the database is to provide a measure of long run
growth. Moreover, the very high R2 indicate that the prediction errors are relatively minor.
Based on the results in Table 4, I therefore consider the estimated agricultural employment
shares to be accurate.
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Table 4: Test of AES estimation
Year 1950 1950 1970 1970
Estimated parameter 1 2 1 2
Estimate 0:98
(0:02)
0:95
(0:03)
0:95
(0:02)
0:85
(0:04)
R2 0:96 0:90 0:96 0:78
Observations 77 77 114 114
Notes: Results of estimating Equation (4) and (5)
5 The nal data set
Three additional steps are taken to increase the coverage of the data set. First, I interpolate
between observations. Census data are, for instance, usually collected once every decade, and
the census year di¤er from country to country. I use a simple linear interpolation to ll the
gaps if no other data source is available. The second step is to place an upper bound on
the estimated agricultural employment shares. The highest agricultural employment share
observed in a census or a survey is 0.94 (Nepal 1971). It seems unlikely that any country have
exceeded that number by much in modern times, since traders, craftsmen and government
administrators exist in even the most underdeveloped nations. I therefore set AESi;t = 0:95 if
the predicted values from Equation (3) are bigger than 0.95.19 The third step is to extrapolate
the agricultural employment shares backward in the eight countries where the upper bound of
0.95 is reached in the rst year of observation.20 The implicit assumption is that this group
of countries are in an underdeveloped steady state. To conrm this assumption, I cross check
with the urban population data in Eggimann (1999). None of the countries for which the
extrapolation is made had any signicant urban development in 1900.
The coverage of the nal database is illustrated in Figure 3. From 1950 an onward, the
database contains information on agricultural employment shares for 169 countries out of the
178 countries in the world with more than 250,000 inhabitants in 2010. The number falls to
19A similar boundary problem can potentially arise when the predicted AESi;t is close to 0. However, all
countries with low employment shares in agriculture are developed at the time of measurement, and have survey
or census data on AES. No estimation is therefore needed.
20The countries in question are Bhutan, Burundi, Lesotho, Nepal, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda and
Zambia.
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116 countries in the beginning of the 20th century. Most of the recent data points are based on
actual employment data, whereas estimates based on urbanization rates are more prominent
in the beginning of the period. All countries have at least one observation based on actual
employment data.
There are about 30 countries with no data prior to 1950. They are spread evenly across
the developing world. The exception is the countries on the Arab Peninsula, where no census
or survey data were collected before World War II.
To track the long run growth process for more countries than what is possible in other data
sets currently available to researchers is a central motivation for constructing the database.
The success criterion is therefore two-fold. The database should have a broader coverage than
existing data sets, and it should be an accurate yard stick of development.
Success on the rst criterion can easily be judged by comparing the data availability to
other data sets containing information on national income or development. By construction, my
database covers more countries in more years than any of the individual sources of employment
data it is based on. One of the most well-known and comprehensive data sets for analyzing
national income over the long run is Angus Maddisons historical GDP data.21 The black line
in Figure 3 shows the number of countries for which Maddison provide GDP estimates.22 It is
below the number of countries in my database for all years, and my database thus compares
favorably with Maddison in terms of coverage.
The comparison to Maddisons GDP data is, obviously, only relevant if the employment
data are useful for analyzing income levels or economic growth. The next section evaluates my
data set along this dimension.
6 The evolution of agricultural employment and GDP
The share of the labor force employed in agriculture in a country today is, as argued in Section
2, a an accurate predictor of its national income. In this section, I show that the same has
21Maddison (2010).
22There are gaps in the Maddison GDP data for many countries. I have counted years where interpolation
makes it possible to ll gaps as observed when assessing the data availability in Maddison.
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been true historically, and, by implication, that agricultural employment shares are suitable to
analyze long run trends in income. I also demonstrate that agricultural employment shares are
able to correctly identify well-known measurement errors in the GDP data. My database can
therefore be a useful alternative to GDP data when studying economic growth and comparative
development, even in periods when GDP data are available.
6.1 Stability
To check whether the link between agricultural employment and income has been stable over
time, I regress Maddison (2010) log GDP per capita on the agricultural employment shares
from my database. The results are reported in Table 5 for di¤erent years. The constant term
seems to be increasing slightly over time, and the coe¢ cient on the agricultural employment
share falls from -2.82 in 1900 to -3.97 in 2000.
Part of the explanation is that the sample changes over time. Data become available for
more and more countries, and the sample of countries becomes more representative in terms of
the stages of development. While the 1900 sample includes all the most developed nations at
the time, only the United Kingdom had an agricultural employment share below one quarter.
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Table 5: Agricultural employment and historical GDP estimates
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000 2000
Constant 9:06
(0:14)
8:86
(0:12)
9:23
(0:12)
9:55
(0:08)
9:51
(0:07)
9:18
(0:11)
Coe¢ cient on AES  2:82
(0:21)
 2:39
(0:19)
 3:06
(0:17)
 3:36
(0:14)
 3:97
(0:18)
 3:38
(0:18)
R2 0.80 0.72 0.71 0.79 0.76 0.67
Observations 48 66 134 157 158 120
Notes: *Countries with AES < 0.1 are excluded. The dependent
variable is log GDP per capita from Maddison (2010).
In 2000, on the other hand, 86 countries had an agricultural employment share below one
quarter. The di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 4 by the data points and regression lines for the
years 1900 and 2000.
The reason why the slope and intercept of the regression change when the sample includes
more highly developed countries is that countries continue to grow after the agricultural em-
ployment share has fallen to near zero. That is the case for the cloud of observations above
the regression line in the upper left corner of Figure 4. To demonstrate the consequence of
the regression estimates, countries with less than ten percent of the workforce employed in
agriculture in 2000 are excluded from the sample in the nal column of Table 5. Compared
to the full sample, the intercept is lower and the slope atter. Moreover, the regression line
is no longer signicantly di¤erent from the one estimated for 1900. The relationship between
Maddisons GDP estimates and the agricultural employment shares therefore seems to have
been fairly stable over time in countries where agriculture still plays a signicant role in the
economy.
6.2 Regional GDP growth
Figure 5 and 6 show the evolution of GDP per capita and agricultural employment in the
20th century for eight regions. In each region, the two variables are population weighted.
Countries with missing observations in parts of the period are left out, but the subsamples
are nonetheless fairly representative for the region. The exception is North Africa and the
Middle East grouping, which does not cover the Arab Peninsula. The scales for agricultural
employment are inverted, and adjusted such that a given value of the agricultural employment
24
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Figure 4: Agricultural employment and real GDP per capita.
share on the left hand y-axis corresponds to the predicted GDP level according to the regression
for 1950 reported in Table 5.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that GDP per capita in Western Europe closely resembles
income as predicted by agricultural employment from 1900 to the 1960s. From then, GDP
has outpaced the decline in the agricultural employment share. The same pattern is found
in the European o¤-shoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States), where
the growth rates in the two variables also decoupled in the 1960s. The decoupling of GDP
from agricultural employment is a sign that the economies have completed the transition out
of agriculture.
Although the trend is as expected, the level of GDP per capita in the European o¤-shoots
prior to 1960 is higher than predicted by their agricultural employment shares. The low
population densities and the vast expanses of fertile land presumably account for this nding.
The high land-to-labor ratios made agriculture, at a given stage of development, more attractive
in the United States and in the other o¤-shoots than in Western Europe.
Before the fall of communism, GDP was higher than indicated by agricultural employment
in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Like the European o¤-shoots, USSR had a low population
25
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density, which could explain the observed pattern. Other explanations are possible, however.
Output, as measured by GDP, declined markedly after the fall of communism. But electricity
consumption declined much less than what should be expected given the size of the contraction,
indicating that the output decline probably is exaggerated in the GDP statistics.23 One source
of inated GDP numbers is overcounting of produced quantities, which were common in the
communist era when factory managers had to reach certain production targets every year.24
Another source of inated GDP numbers is the price data. The heavy industries in the USSR
and Eastern Europe produced large quantities of low quality goods that would have been in
limited demand in a market economy. The o¢ cial prices of these goods before the fall of
communism are likely to have exaggerated their values. And observed market prices after
the fall of communism, when supply was reduced and quality increased, will similarly be too
high. Using either of these alternatives cause the GDP statistics overstate income levels before
the end of communism, but no other price data are available to national accountants. The
comparison with agricultural employment shares in Figure 5 makes the overestimation of GDP
for USSR and communist Eastern Europe clearly visible.
Figure 6 shows agricultural employment shares and GDP per capita in four regions that
largely consist of low and middle income countries. Japan, Singapore and South Korea are
obvious exceptions, but these countries have a relatively small impact on Asia as a whole, given
the large populations in China, Indonesia and on the Indian subcontinent. The scales on the
y-axes are adjusted slightly from the ones in Figure 5 to make the trends in the data more
visible.
GDP per capita has largely evolved as predicted by the agricultural employment share in
Latin America, and in North Africa and the Middle East. The agricultural employment share
in Asia, on the other hand, indicates that incomes were substantially higher in the middle of
the 20th century than what is implied by GDP estimates, and that the subsequent growth
miracle therefore was less dramatic. Explanation this nding is an interesting topic for further
research.
23Eichengreen (2008).
24Åslund (2001).
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Figure 5: Long term growth in GDP/capita and the agricultural employment share (inverted
scale)
27
Chapter 1: Structural transformation...
6.
2
6.
7
7.
2
7.
7
8.
2
8.
7
9.
2
lo
g 
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
.1
.3
.5
.7
.9A
E
S
 (p
er
ce
nt
)
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Panel E: Asia ex former USSR republics
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Panel F: Latin America
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Panel G: Africa
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Figure 6: Long term growth in GDP/capita and the agricultural employment share (inverted
scale)
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Table 6: GDP bias in Africa
Explanatory variable AES Lights/capita
Constant 9:15
(0:11)
10:15
(0:16)
Coe¢ cient on explanatory variable  3:02
(0:27)
0:48
(0:04)
Coe¢ cient on Africa dummy  0:28
(0:11)
 0:25
(0:12)
R2 0:69 0:73
Observations 115 118
Notes: The dependent variable is log GDP/capita from
Maddison (2010). The light data are from Henderson et al. (2012)
6.3 Income in sub-Saharan Africa
The GDP estimates in sub-Saharan Africa also conict with the observed fall in the agricultural
employment share. As it can be seen in Panel G of Figure 6, the two series follow each other
closely from 1950 to the 1970s. In the following to decades, GDP fell, and a sizeable gap to the
income level predicted by agricultural employment and the GDP estimates emerged. Research
by Young (2012) and Jerven (2013) show that GDP estimates in Africa su¤er from a signicant
downward bias. To demonstrate that the bias account for most of the gap observed in Figure 6,
I compare the income level for sub-Saharan Africa implied by agricultural employment shares
to the level predicted by another proxy for income: Night lights measured from space by
sattelites.
To do so, I rst regress measured log GDP per capita on agricultural employment and a
dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa for the year 2000. As in the nal column of Table 5, I
exclude countries with less than 10 percent of the labor force employed in agriculture from the
sample. The results are reported in Table 6. The coe¢ cient on the dummy variable indicates
that the measured GDP level in sub-Saharan Africa is approximately 28 percent lower than
the income level predicted by agricultural employment shares.
The last column of Table 6 shows the results of a similar regression where light intensity per
capita rather than agricultural employment is used as a proxy for true income. Consistent with
the agricultural employment shares, the night lights imply that GDP in sub-Saharan Africa is
underestimated by 25 percent.
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6.4 Convergence and global inequality
The slightly di¤erent growth paths of agricultural employment shares and GDP per capita
have implications for the measured income dispersion between countries. The patterns of
global inequality depend on which of the two proxies for income that is used to compute them.
Figure 7 shows how the standard deviations across countries of agricultural employment shares
and of log GDP per capita have evolved over time. A decline in the standard deviation is known
as -convergence.
Panel A shows convergence for the 49 countries with data available both in Maddison (2010)
and in my database since 1900. The standard deviation of agricultural employment shares is
rescaled to make it directly comparable to the standard deviation of log GDP per capita.25
Both the Maddison GDP data and the agricultural employment shares imply a stable degree of
global inequality in the rst half of the 20th century. From then there has been -divergence,
according to the GDP numbers, and global inequality was at an all-time high around the end
of the century. By contrast, the employment data show -convergence.
A similar conclusion is reached when using GDP data from Penn World Tables 8.0 (Panel
B, 104 countries), whereas the employment data and GDP data from the Barro-Ursua macro-
economic data set, used to study convergence by Barro (2012), are more in agreement (Panel
C, 34 countries).
The di¤erence between the two series in Panel A and B is partly driven by the downward
bias in GDP data for Africa and other developing countries. The most visible sign of this is
the marked -divergence in the Penn World Tables data relative to the -divergence in the
Maddison data, which contain fewer countries from the developing world.
25I use the regression coe¢ cient 1 from the following regression to scale the standard deviations of agricul-
tural employment shares: log (GDP=capita) = 0 + 1AES + error. The regression corresponds to the ones
reported in Table (5), but is estimated for the pooled sample of all years. The implicit assumption is that
1 is stable over time. The results of Table (5) suggest that the assumption is a reasonable approximation
in countries where agricultural employment is still signicant. Admittedly, the point estimate of 1 has been
rising (numerically) over the 20th century. While the rise is not signicant in a statistical sence, it may, if it
reects an actual change in the structural relationship, cause a slight secular tendency to -convergence in the
agricultural employment data. This potential bias strengthen the results presented in this sub-section.
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Figure 7: Sigma convergence
The -convergence in agricultural employment shares is also a consequence of the variable
being bounded between 0 and 1. By construction, global inequality in agricultural employment
shares is also bounded. Such boundedness naturally gives rise to what amounts to a global
Kuznets curve for structural transformation. Inequality was low in the premodern era, where all
countries had most of their labor forces employed in agriculture, and will similarly be low when
all countries have completed the transition out of agriculture. Between these two extremes,
di¤erentiated timing of the transitions out of agriculture imply high degrees of inequality.
The Kuznets curve is clearly visible in Panel D of Figure 7, where the  for the full sample
of countries available in my database is shown. The 1900 sample consists of the 116 countries
with data for the full period, and the 1950 sample is the 169 countries with data available from
1950 and onward. It is interesting to note that peak inequality coincide with the onset of a
new era of globalization.
The presence of a Kuznets curve in agricultural employment shares shows that initially rich
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countries, i.e., countries that had begun the the transition out of agriculture, grew faster than
other countries in the rst half of the 20th century. This is consistent with Unied Growth
Theory, where initial conditions explain di¤erentiated timing in the transition to modern eco-
nomic growth.26 It is, however, at odds with the "iron law" of conditional -convergence,
which states that poor countries will have faster GDP per capita growth than rich ones.
Estimating rates of conditional -convergence is suprisingly di¢ cult, not just because of
measurement errors in GDP. The econometrics is tricky, and a consensus on the best empirical
strategy has yet to emerge.27 Estimates based on GDP data face the additional problem of
limited numbers of observations. Researchers can either estimate the convergence rates from
the large and fairly representative sample of countries with GDP data available from the 1960s
or 1970s ("large N , small T"), or from the much more restricted sample of countries with data
going back to the turn of the 20th century ("small N , large T"). Estimated convergence rates
in the large-N -small-T sample will not pick up possible -divergence in the rst two thirds of
the 20th century. Estimated convergence rates using a longer small-N -large-T sample are, on
the other hand, unlikely to be representative. For example, Barro (2012) nds an upper bound
of the rate of convergence of 2.4 percent since 1870 in the sample of 34 countries also shown here
in Figure 7, panel C.28 Inequality, as measured by dispersion in agricultural employment shares,
was stable or declining (-convergence) among the 34 countries analyzed by Barro in the entire
period. By contrast, inequality was rising until the 1970s in the larger sample of 116 countries
in panel D, and they are more unequal today than in 1900. -divergence do not necessarily
imply conditional -divergence. Still, the rising inequality in the larger sample indicates that
the rate of -convergence estimated by Barro (2012) and others in small-N -large-T samples
may be biased upward due to selection.
My agricultural employment share database provide a sample that is large in both the N
and T dimensions. It is an interesting topic for further research to see if the results of the
convergence literature, and the empirical growth literature more broadly, are robust to using
26E.g., Galor (2005, 2011).
27See Durlauf et al. (2005) for an overview of the debate.
28It is an upper bound, as a nite time period and the presence of xed e¤ects in the regression causes an
upward Nickell (1981) bias in the estimate.
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the larger sample of agricultural employment shares rather than GDP data.
6.5 Predicting GDP revisions with agricultural employment
As shown above, well-known measurement errors in GDP in Africa, USSR and Eastern Europe
are made clearly visible by comparing GDP data to agricultural employment shares. But
agricultural employment shares are in general useful for detecting and correcting measurement
errors in GDP data. To illustrate this, I use my database to predict GDP revisions following
the publication of new benchmark estimates for PPPs. Predicting revisions is equivalent to
predicting measurement errors if the revisions, on average, make GDP estimates more accurate.
The excercise is related to Almås (2012), who use consumption data and Engels Law to correct
PPP estimates.29
The benchmark year for PPPs is changed when the results of a new ICP round is published.
Updates happen infrequently, and often have huge impacts on relative GDP levels. Chinese
real GDP was, for instance, reduced by 39 percent in 2008 following the publication of the
results from the 2005 ICP. Chinas place in the world economy made popular media pay much
attention to this change, but the size of the revision was not unique to the Middle Kingdom.
As shown in Table 7, 24 countries had their estimates of real GDP per capita revised by more
than China. The benchmark PPPs were revised once more when the results of the 2011 ICP
were published in 2014, and the revisions were of the same magnitude as in the 2005 round.
To predict the GDP revisions, I use a two step procedure. In the rst step, I estimate the
following regression (corresponding to the regression lines in Figure 1 and Figure 4):
log
 eyoldi  = 0 + 1 gAESi + "oldi ; (6)
where eyoldi is measured GDP per capita before the revision, gAESi is the measured agricultural
employment share, and "i is an error term. The latter can be decomposed into three parts:
"oldi = "
y;old
i   1"AESi + "modeli : (7)
29Hamilton (2001) and Costa (2001) similarly use Engels Law to correct consumer price indecies in the
United States, with implications for estimates of real GDP growth.
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Table 7: Revisions to PPP adjusted GDP after the 2005 ICP round
Country Revision (%) Country Revision (%)
Congo 188 Ghana -51
Yemen 137 Angola 51
Gabon 94 Ecuador 50
Lebanon 84 Comoros -47
Zimbabwe -74 Cambodia -47
Nigeria 73 Venezuela 47
Kuwait 71 Ethiopia -46
Congo, Dem. Rep. -63 Central African Rep. -45
Gambia -62 Tanzania 44
Guinea -60 Philippines -43
Lesotho -58 Namibia -40
Cabo Verde -51 Togo -40
Source: The World Bank (2008), Appendix G
The rst term on the right hand side, "yi ; is the measurement error in GDP per capita dened
such that the true unobserved income level is given by log (yi) = log
 eyoldi  "y;oldi : The estimated
residuals are thus correlated with the measurement error in the unrevised GDP numbers, and
can be used to correct the GDP estimates by following the approach of Henderson et al.
(2012), who use a weighted average of observed GDP and night lights measured from space as
a measure of true GDP. The correlation is also useful to predict revisions to GDP. A revision
is given by:
"yi = log (eynewi )  log  eyoldi  (8)
= "y;oldi   "y;newi
= "oldi   1"AESi + "modeli   "y;newi
The terms "y;newi ; 1"
AES
i and "
model
i are unobserved, but "
old
i can be obtained from estimat-
ing Equation (6). If the revisions improve the income estimates, meaning that cov

"yi ; "
y;old
i

<
0; then the parameter 1 should be positive in a second step, where the revisions are regressed
on the residuals from Equation (6):
"yi = 0 + 1"
old
i + ui (9)
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Table 8: Predicting PPP revisions
Panel A: Results of regression (6)
2005 2011
^1 (estimated coe¢ cient on AESi) -3.99 -4.43
Standard error 0.21 0.21
R2 0.75 0.76
Observations 130 141
Panel B: Results of regression (9)
2005 2011
^1 (estimated coe¢ cient on "
old
i ) 0.14 0.08
Standard error 0.05 0.02
R2 0.06 0.07
Observations 130 141
Notes: The unrevised 2011 GDP estimates are calculated by
the author using the constant PPP approach.
Sources: The World Bank (2008, 2014) and the United
Nations National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
The results of the rst step are shown in Table 8, Panel A, for both the 2005 and the 2011
ICP rounds. Results from the second step, i.e., the regression in Equation (9), are reported
in Panel B. The estimates of 1 are signicant with p < 0:01 in both years, conrming that
agricultural employment data are useful to predict revisions to GDP, and, by implication,
useful for detecting measurement errors in the GDP data.
The R2 is not particularly high in any of the two regressions in Panel B of Table 8 for three
reasons: Country specic idiosyncrasies a¤ects the relationship between the true income level
and agricultural employment (e.g., high land-to-labor ratios), measurement errors introduce
noise in the agricultural employment data, and the GDP revisions did not remove all of the noise
in the GDP data. The latter is especially important due to the many sources of measurement
errors in GDP discussed in Section 2. It is also underscored by the need for consecutive large
revisions to the PPPs.
The large revisions to the PPPs, and the possibility of predicting them using agricultural
employment shares, emphasize that agricultural employment is a useful proxy for income.
Moreover, both the PPP data, and the other data underlying estimates of real GDP, are likely
to be less accurate further back in time than in the periods analyzed here. The usefulness of
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agricultural employment as an alternative to GDP data is thus likely to increase further back
in time.
7 Concluding remarks and avenues for further research
I have collected and estimated agricultural employment shares for 169 countries in the period
1900-2010. Agricultural employment is closely related to national income, and reliable data
are available for more countries and for longer periods than GDP estimates. The resulting
database, available online, is useful for researchers studying economic growth, comparative
development, economic history, or other related elds.
An obvious application of the database is to test the many theories directly concerned with
agricultural employment, such as models of structural change, theories of how industrialization
spread around the globe, and dual economy models. Other potential applications have been
noted in this paper. Agricultural employment shares are, for instance, useful to detect and
correct measurement errors in GDP. Perhaps more importantly, the availability of long time
series for employment makes it possible to study long run growth and convergence in more
representative samples of countries than the ones usually analyzed in the literature.
The larger sample of countries is likely to matter for the conclusions drawn. Inequality,
measured by the dispersion of agricultural employment shares, was stable in the rst three
quarters of the 20th century among the countries with long time series of GDP data available
in Maddison (2010) and in the Barro-Ursua data set. But among the countries in my larger
sample, inequality rose by 50 percent during that period, corresponding to -divergence. This
nding suggests that existing estimates of -convergence rates may be overestimated as well.
Estimating rates of -convergence based on agricultural employment is an interesting topic for
further research. And more generally, it will be interesting to see if the results of the empirical
growth literature are robust to replacing GDP per capita with agricultural employment shares
as the variable of interest.
Agricultural employment are also linked to many other important outcomes. The transi-
tion out of agriculture may, for instance, reduce fertility as it is harder to raise children when
working outside of the home. It may also change the social standing of women, as nona-
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gricultural work often is less physically demanding. Trade policies may likewise be a¤ected
when the composition of output changes. These are just a few examples. Changed sectoral
employment patterns are likely to correlate with many other demographic, economic, social,
and institutional variables.
It will also be interesting to study how agricultural employment is a¤ected by global macro
trends, such as the introduction of new technologies, lower transportation costs, and climate
change. Understanding how climate change have interacted with agriculture around the world
historically is particularly important, as it will give an indication of the economic consequences
of further emissions of greenhouse gases.
Data collection projects, as the one presented here, are never entirely completed. It is my
intention to update the database if, or when, more data come to light, and it is my hope that
users of the database will contribute to this task.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Carl-Johan Dalgaard for comments and suggestions,
and to David Good for sharing his census data from the Habsburg Empire.
37
Chapter 1: Structural transformation...
Data Appendix
This appendix gives an overview of the database and its underlying sources. More details can
be found in the additional data in Wingender (2014b).
All independent countries with more than 250,000 inhabitants in 2010 are listed in the tables
on the next pages. The second column of the tables contains the rst year with available data.
The third column contains the rst year where the data point is based on employment data
rather than estimated from urbanization rates. The data sources used are listed in the nal
column.
The following abbreviations are used in the nal column for sources of employment data:
 ILO: International Labor Organization
 GGDC: Groningen Growth and Development Centre
 OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
 IHS: International Historical Statistics from Mitchell (1993, 1998a,b).
 EF: Easterly and Fischer (1995)
 OLA: Oxford Latin America Economic History Database
 LoN: Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations
 IPUMS: Calculations based on intregrated public use micro data from Sobek et al. (2013)
 NAPP: Calculation based on micro data from Minnesota Population Center (2008)
 My: Myers and Campbell (1954)
 NSO: Data collected from national statistics o¢ ces
 Good: Census data from the Habsburg empire kindly provided by David Good.
The following abbreviations are used in the nal column for sources used to calculate urban-
ization rates:
 UN: United Nations
 IHS: as above
 Eg: Eggimann (1999)
 Ma: Manning (2010)
 Le: Lewis et al. (1976)
 Ka: Karpat (1985)
 Mc: McEvedy et al. (1978)
The remaining data sources are not abbreviated.
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Country First obs. First AES obs. Sources
Afghanistan 1920 1979 IHS, UN, Eg
Albania 1930 2002 ILO, NSO, UN, IHS
Algeria 1900 1948 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg
Angola 1900 1960 NSO, IHS, Eg, Ma
Argentina 1900 1902 GGDC, OLA, Eg, IHS
Armenia 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Australia 1901 1901 IHS, ILO, OECD, GGDC
Austria 1900 1900 IHS, ILO, OECD, Good
Azerbaijan 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Bahamas 1950 1973 ILO, UN, IHS, Eg
Bahrain 1950 1979 ILO, UN
Bangladesh 1900 1951 ILO, IHS, Eg, Mc
Barbados 1946 1946 ILO, IHS
Belarus 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Belgium 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Belize 1950 1993 ILO, UN
Benin 1900 2003 ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Bhutan 1900 2003 ILO, UN
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 1900 1950 GGDC, ILO, Eg, IHS
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1900 1900 ILO, IHS, My, Almanach de Gotha (1910)
Botswana 1950 1964 GGDC, UN
Brazil 1900 1900 GGDC, IHS, OLA, IPUMS
Brunei Darussalam 1950 1991 ILO, NSO, UN
Bulgaria 1900 1910 ILO, IHS, LoN, Lampe (1975)
Burkina Faso 1900 1985 ILO, IPUMS, UN, Eg, Ma
Burundi 1900 1979 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Cabo Verde 1950 2000 NSO, UN
Cambodia 1920 1962 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg,
Cameroon 1900 1976 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Canada 1900 1900 ILO, IHS, NAPP
Central African Republic 1900 1975 IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Chad 1900 1993 ILO, NSO, UN, Eg, Ma
Chile 1900 1907 ILO, OLA, GGDC, Eg, IHS
China 1900 1980 ILO, IHS, Eg
Colombia 1900 1938 GGDC, ILO, OLA, Eg, IHS
Comoros n.a. n.a.
Congo 1900 2005 ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the 1900 1952 IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Costa Rica 1900 1950 GGDC, ILO, Eg, IHS
Côte dIvoire 1900 1964 NSO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Croatia 1900 1900 ILO, IHS, My, Good
Cuba 1900 1919 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg,
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Country First obs. First AES obs. Sources
Cyprus 1946 1946 KLEM, ILO, IHS
Czech Republic 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS, Good
Denmark 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Djibouti n.a. n.a.
Dominican Republic 1900 1920 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Ecuador 1900 1950 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Egypt 1900 1907 ILO, IHS, Eg
El Salvador 1920 1950 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Equatorial Guinea 1950 1983 ILO, UN
Eritrea n.a. n.a.
Estonia 1900 1922 OECD, GGDC, ILO, EF, Lon, Le
Ethiopia 1900 1971 GGDC, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Fiji 1950 1956 IPUMS, IHS, UN
Finland 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
France 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Gabon 1950 1963 ILO, IHS, Deldycke et al. (1968), UN
Gambia, The 1900 1993 ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Georgia 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Germany 1900 1900 OECD, IHS
Ghana 1900 1960 GGDC, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Greece 1920 1920 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Guatemala 1900 1950 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Guinea 1950 1983 ILO, IPUMS, UN
Guinea-Bissau n.a. n.a.
Guyana 1900 1946 ILO, IHS, Eg
Haiti 1900 1950 OLA, ILO, IPUMS, IHS, Eg
Honduras 1900 1950 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Hong Kong 1920 1974 ILO; GGDC, UN, Eg, IHS
Hungary 1900 1900 OECD, ILO, IHS, Good
Iceland 1900 1900 ILO, LoN, NAPP
India 1900 1901 GGDC, ILO, Eg, Mc
Indonesia 1900 1905 GGDC, ILO, IHS, Eg, Mc
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1900 1956 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg
Iraq 1900 1957 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg
Ireland 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS, LoN
Israel 1948 1948 OECD, ILO, IHS
Italy 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Jamaica 1920 1943 ILO, IHS, Eg
Japan 1900 1872 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Jordan 1950 1961 ILO, IHS, UN
Kazakhstan 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
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Country First obs. First AES obs. Sources
Kenya 1900 1969 GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Korea, Democratic Peoples Republic of n.a. n.a.
Korea, Republic of 1955 1955 OECD, GGDC, IHS, Chung (2006)
Kosovo 1921 1921 NSO, IHS, My
Kuwait 1950 1983 ILO, UN
Kyrgyzstan 1897 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Lao Peoples Dem. Rep. 1950 1995 NSO, UN
Latvia 1900 1925 GGDC, ILO, EF, LoN, Le
Lebanon 1910 1970 NSO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ka
Lesotho 1900 1999 NSO, ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Liberia 1900 1962 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Libya 1900 1964 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Lithuania 1900 1923 GGDC, ILO, EF, LoN, Le
Luxembourg 1907 1907 OECD, GGDC, Deldycke et al. (1968)
Macedonia, the FYD of 1921 1921 ILO, IHS, My
Madagascar 1900 1993 NSO, ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Malawi 1900 1966 GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Malaysia 1920 1947 GGDC, ILO, IHS, Eg, McGee (1964)
Maldives 1950 1990 NSO, ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
Mali 1900 1976 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Malta 1948 1948 KLEMS, ILO, Deldycke et al. (1968)
Martinique 1950 1961 ILO, IHS, UN
Mauritania n.a. n.a.
Mauritius 1900 1952 GGDC, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Mexico 1900 1910 OECD, GGDC, OLA, Eg, IHS
Moldova, Rep. of 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Mongolia 1920 1993 ILO, UN, Eg, IHS
Montenegro 1921 1921 ILO, IHS, My
Morocco 1900 1952 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Mozambique 1900 1950 ILO, IHS, Eg, Ma
Myanmar 1920 1978 ILO, Eg, IHS
Namibia 1950 1960 ILO, IHS, UN
Nepal 1900 1961 NSO, ILO, IHS, UN, Eg
Netherlands 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS, ILO, Smits et al. (1999)
New Zealand 1900 1900 OECD, ILO, IHS
Nicaragua 1900 1940 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Niger 1900 1960 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Nigeria 1900 1960 Adeyinka et al. (2013), GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Norway 1900 1900 OECD, IHS, NAPP
Oman 1950 1993 ILO, UN
Pakistan 1900 1951 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Mc
Panama 1900 1940 OLA, ILO, Eg, IHS
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Country First obs. First AES obs. Sources
Papua New Guinea 1900 2000 ILO, UN, Eg, IHS
Paraguay 1900 1950 OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Peru 1900 1940 GGDC, ILO, OLA, IPUMS, IHS, Eg
Philippines 1900 1939 GGDC, ILO, IHS, Eg
Poland 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, ILO, IHS, Deldycke et al. (1968)
Portugal 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, IHS
Qatar 1950 1997 ILO, UN
Romania 1913 1913 ILO, IHS, UN, Good
Russian Federation 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Rwanda 1900 1978 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Saudi Arabia 1950 1992 ILO, UN
Senegal 1900 1971 GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Serbia 1900 1900 ILO, IHS, My, Good
Sierra Leone 1900 1963 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Singapore 1920 1947 GGDC, IHS, Eg
Slovakia 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, ILO, IHS, Good
Slovenia 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC, ILO, My, Good
Solomon Islands 1950 2009 NSO, UN
Somalia n.a. n.a.
South Africa 1911 1911 GGDC, IHS
South Sudan 1950 2008 IPUMS, UN
Spain 1900 1900 OECD, GGDC; ILO, IHS
Sri Lanka 1900 1946 ILO, IHS, Eg
Sudan 1900 1956 IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Suriname 1950 1973 ILO, UN
Swaziland n.a. n.a.
Sweden 1900 1900 Schön and Krantz (2012)
Switzerland 1900 1900 OECD, ILO, IHS
Syrian Arab Republic 1900 1960 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ka
Taiwan, Province of China 1905 1905 GGDC, ILO, IHS
Tajikistan 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Tanzania, United Republic of 1900 1960 GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Thailand 1900 1937 GGDC, ILO, IHS, Eg
Timor-Leste 1950 2001 NSO, ILO, UN
Togo 1900 1981 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Trinidad and Tobago 1946 1946 ILO, IHS
Tunisia 1900 1956 ILO, IHS, UN, Eg, Ma
Turkey 1900 1927 ILO, IHS, Eg, Ka
Turkmenistan 1900 1970 EF, UN, Le
Uganda 1900 1991 ILO, IPUMS, UN, Eg, Ma
Ukraine 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
United Arab Emirates 1950 1995 ILO, UN
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Country First obs. First AES obs. Sources
United Kingdom 1900 1900 OECD, KLEMS, ILO, IHS
United States 1900 1900 OECD, KLEMS, ILO, IHS
Uruguay 1900 1950 OLA, IPUMS, IHS, Eg
Uzbekistan 1900 1970 ILO, EF, Le
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 1900 1925 GGDC, OLA, ILO, IHS, Eg
Viet Nam 1920 1992 NSO, ILO, UN, Eg, IHS
Yemen 1950 1991 ILO, UN
Zambia 1900 1969 GGDC, UN, Eg, Ma
Zimbabwe 1900 1999 NSO, ILO, UN, Eg, Ma
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Skill Complementarity and the Dual Economy
Asger Moll Wingender
Abstract
I estimate that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is
higher in agriculture than in nonagriculture, and argue that this di¤erence is an impor-
tant explanation for the relatively unproductive agrarian sectors observed in developing
countries. To illustrate the argument, I simulate a simple two-sector model, and show
that heterogeneous elasticities of substitution a¤ect the sectoral allocation of human cap-
ital, and therefore relative productivity levels. Calibrated to match data from the United
States, the model predicts sizable agricultural productivity gaps in countries where the
share of highly educated workers in the labor force is low.
1 Introduction
Many developing countries are dual economies. They have large agricultural sectors with pro-
ductivity levels that trail productivity in the nonagricultural sector by an order of magnitude.
Rich countries, on the other hand, have small and relatively productive agricultural sectors.
Closing the agricultural productivity gap in developing countries will substantially diminish
the income gap between rich and poor countries. This empirical fact was noted by Kuznets
(1971), and is well documented in a series of recent papers by Caselli (2005), Temple (2005),
Chanda and Dalgaard (2008), Vollrath (2009b), Temple and Wößmann (2006), Restuccia et al.
(2008), McMillan and Rodrik (2011), and Gollin et al. (2014).1
1Agriculture is, by empirical necessity, often used as a stand in sector for a backward traditional sector.
Nonagriculture is similarly associated with the modern sectors in the economy. The terminology di¤er from
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The dual economy is reected in the sectoral allocation of human capital. Agricultural
workers tend to have lower educational attainment than their compatriots working in other
sectors, and the di¤erence is larger in countries where the agricultural productivity gap is
large.2
The standard way to model such an allocation of human capital is to assume that workers
with high education levels, or strong cognitive abilities, have a comparative productivity ad-
vantage in nonagriculture.3 The central argument of this paper is that it is easier to substitute
skilled and unskilled workers for each other in agriculture than in nonagriculture, and that
this di¤erence provides an equally simple and empirically relevant mechanism behind the ob-
served allocation of human capital. Moreover, as we shall see below, it provides more plausible
predictions about the return to education. The two mechanisms are complementary, however.
Combined, they generate larger agricultural productivity gaps in countries with few skilled
workers than they do individually.
The idea that skilled and unskilled workers are easier to substitute for each other in agri-
culture is based both on empirical observation and economic intuition. In a sample of 62
countries, I nd that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers in
agriculture is 1.5-2 times larger than in nonagriculture.
Intuitively, many di¤erent types of workers interact in the production processes that lead to
the nonagricultural goods and services we consume. Manufacturing does, for example, rely on
skilled workers for installing and maintaining machinery, accounting, marketing. Such workers
are employed along with a relatively unskilled labor force on the factory oor.
The same pattern do not apply in agriculture. Both history, and the reality of developing
countries today, conrm that agricultural production often take place on small independent
plots of land tilled by a few members of a single household. Farms are larger in terms of
land in developed countries, but not in terms of the number of people employed.4 There is
paper to paper cited here and below, but I use the agriculture/nonagriculture distinction no matter the original
wording in the cited papers.
2Gollin et al. (2014). See also Section 2 below.
3E.g., Caselli and Coleman (2001), Lucas (2004) and Lagakos and Waugh (2013). The extreme version of
this assumption is that human capital do not contribute to productivity in agriculture.
4The average number of workers per farm is 1.5 in the US, 2.0 in the OECD, and 2.4 i countries not in
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thus less scope for interaction between workers of di¤erent types in agriculture. Moreover,
farmers in the developed world are usually well educated, and have an extensive knowledge
of the newest farming technologies, whereas their counterparts in poorer countries often lack
formal education. Yet, both are able to grow the same crops, although with di¤erent e¢ ciency.
It is, by contrast, inconceivable that an electronics manufacturer would be able to produce a
single device without employing any skilled workers. The same logic applies to many other
nonagricultural industries, including services, and points to a greater degree of complementary
between workers in nonagriculture than in agriculture.5
Skill complementarities make it harder to substitute one type of labor for another, and the
marginal products of skilled and unskilled workers thereby become sensitive to the composition
of the labor force. Firms (and farms) will bid up wages for skilled workers when they are in
short supply, and more so when it is hard to replace them with unskilled workers. Equivalently,
at a given wage rate, the demand for skilled workers will be higher.
Labor mobility eliminates any sectoral di¤erences in wages. Given an equilibrium wage
rate, the demand for skilled workers in nonagriculture will, due to the higher skill comple-
mentarity in the sector, be higher than in agriculture in an economy with few skilled workers.
A larger fraction of the skilled labor force will consequently be employed in nonagriculture.
Nonetheless, the demand for unskilled labor will be relatively low in nonagriculture, since the
skill complementarity reduces the number of unskilled workers that are demanded alongside
the skilled workers at a given equilibrium wage rate. The ratio of skilled-to-unskilled workers
will consequently be higher in nonagriculture than in agriculture when skilled workers are few.
The education gap, and hence the productivity gap, narrows when the share of skilled
workers in the population increases, as an increased supply have a disproportional e¤ect on
the marginal products of labor in nonagriculture, where the skill complementarity is higher.
Sectoral di¤erences in skill complementarities do in that sense help to explain both the dual
economy and how an initially backward agricultural sector modernizes when a country accu-
the OECD. Sources: FAO World Agriculture Census 2000, United States Census Bureau (Statistics of U.S.
Businesses 2008), and Bureau of Labor Statistics.
5The argument above is taken to the extreme for illustrative purposes. Taken at face value, it favors perfect
substitution between workers in agriculture.
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mulates human capital.
I build the mechanism sketched above into a simple two-sector model, and calibrate its
parameters to match data from the United States. A reasonable test of the model is to see
how well its predictions fare out of sample, i.e., across developing countries. In the model,
countries only di¤er with respect to the aggregate human capital stock. Depending on how
skilled workers are dened, the model generates relative agricultural productivity levels in the
0.20-0.6 range in a hypothetical country where less than 10 percent of the labor force is skilled.
The lower end of the interval is in line with the agricultural productivity levels observed in
such countries, indicating that the explanatory power of the model is high.
The agricultural productivity gap is in the model caused by both a comparative advantage
of skilled workers in nonagriculture, and by heterogeneous elasticities of substitution. Alone,
heterogenous elasticities lead to relative agricultural productivity levels in the 0.45-0.65 range.
Both channels are thus individually important for the dual economy phenomenon, and the
impact on relative productivity levels is larger when they are combined.
The model also does well in other dimensions, too. It predicts that agricultural employment
is high in countries with few skilled workers. Moreover, the model generates a substantially
lower skill premium in developing countries than a model without heterogenous skill elasticities
does, and it is therefore more in line with the empirical estimates of mincerian returns to
education found in the literature.6
The model does not have any frictions. By contrast, most theoretical dual economy models
have ine¢ cient factor markets, transportation costs, externalities, or other distortions at their
cores.7 Other models rely on a subsistence food requirement that increases the employment
share in agriculture in poor (closed) economies. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) argue, for in-
stance, that many individuals therefore are forced to work in agriculture, although they are
relatively unproductive when performing agricultural tasks. Only the individuals with the
highest productivity levels will work in nonagriculture, and the authors argue that this se-
6See Banerjee and Duo (2005), and the discussions in Sections 2 and 6.
7Examples are Restuccia (2004), Gollin et al. (2004), Graham and Temple (2006), Landon-Lane and Robert-
son (2007), Restuccia et al. (2008), Satchi and Temple (2009), Vollrath (2009a), Rodrik (2009), Adamopoulos
(2011) and Gollin and Rogerson (2014).
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lection mechanism can account for the dual economy. While both frictions and subsistence
needs arguably are present in developing countries, the results of this paper indicate that their
impact on relative sectoral productivity levels may be smaller than what is often assumed.
The dual economy literature is related to papers dealing with structural transformation in
multi-sector models.8 Close to this paper is Caselli and Coleman (2001) and Lucas (2004),
who provide models in which human capital is the main driver of the transition out of agricul-
ture. It is in both models assumed that the acquisition of human capital only increases labor
productivity in the nonagrarian sector. Skilled workers will consequently never choose to work
in the agrarian sector, and the economies are dual in terms of education levels by assumption,
no matter aggregate income levels or human capital stocks. They are in that sense unable to
explain how agriculture catches up to other sectors along this dimension. Adding the mecha-
nism for endogenous allocation of human capital proposed in this paper will allow such models
to make more realistic predictions about the transition out of agriculture, and thus to expand
their explanatory power.
This paper is also closely related to Caselli and Coleman (2006), who estimate the relative
productivity advantage of skilled workers in a cross section of countries. They nd that richer
countries use skilled workers more e¢ ciently than lower-income countries, and interpret their
results as a sign of a skill bias in technology adoption. However, as Caselli and Coleman (2006)
acknowledge, their results are observationally equivalent with a model in which technology is
xed, and the elasticity of substitution is allowed to vary with development.9 The latter is the
case in my model. The higher elasticity in agriculture, combined with an agricultural employ-
ment share that depends on aggregate human capital, imply that the elasticity of substitution
in the aggregate economy varies with development. The model of this paper can thus serve as
a two-sector foundation to the one-sector result in Caselli and Coleman (2006).
Alvarez-Cuadrado and Van Long (2012) study a model in which the capital-labor comple-
mentarity varies across sectors, and show that this mechanism can be a driver of structural
change. Their hypothesis nds empirical support in Herrendorf et al. (2013), who estimate
8E.g., Hansen and Prescott (2002), Gollin et al. (2007), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), Lucas (2009) and
Herrendorf et al. (2014).
9See Diamond et al. (1978) for general statement of this theorem.
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that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in agriculture is 1.58 in the United
States, twice as high as in manufacturing and services. There is a link between these ndings,
and the results presented here. Capital has often been shown to be more complementary to
skilled workers than to unskilled workers, and the estimated elasticity of substitution between
capital and land in Herrendorf et al. (2013) is therefore likely to reect that relatively few
skilled workers are employed in agriculture compared to the other sectors.10 Why we observe
such an allocation of skills is something that the model in this paper can help to explain.
The paper is organized as follows. Some empirical facts about human capital, skill comple-
mentarity, and productivity are reviewed in Section 2. The model is summarized in Section
3. Based on an equation from the model, the relative elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers in agriculture is estimated in Section 4. The model cannot be solved
analytically, and the predictions of the model are therefore illustrated by simulations based on
parameters calibrated to match data from the United States. The calibration and simulations
of the relative agricultural productivity level are shown in Sections 5. Predictions about the
agricultural employment share and the return to education are discussed in Section 6. Section
7 concludes.
2 Human capital and productivity
Some of the empirical ndings that motivate this paper are briey reviewed in this section.
Figure 1 shows agricultural employment shares and ratios of agricultural labor productivity
to nonagricultural labor productivity in a sample of 123 countries compiled by Gollin et al.
(2014). The dual economies are located in the lower right corner, where the employment share
in agriculture is high and the relative productivity level low. The coe¢ cient of correlation
between the two variables is -0.55. Relative productivity in agriculture is above 0.7 in rich
countries such as Australia, Sweden, and the United States, whereas many developing nations
with high employment shares in agriculture have a relative agricultural productivity level of
just 0.1. Closing the sectoral productivity gap (alternatively, lowering the employment share in
10Numerous studies of capital-skill complementarity have been made since it was rst suggested by Griliches
(1969). Notable examples are Fallon and Layard (1975), Goldin and Katz (1998), and Krusell et al. (2000).
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Figure 1: The dual economy
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agriculture to rich-country levels) would therefore have a huge impact on the aggregate income
level of developing countries with dual economies.
The most dual economies in terms of the agricultural productivity gap are also the economies
with the least educated labor force. It is hardly a surprise, since it is well known that aggre-
gate human capital and aggregate income is positively correlated. A more interesting question
is whether there is a quantitatively important link between the sectoral allocation of skilled
workers and relative sectoral productivity levels. The answer seems to be yes. As shown in
Figure 2, there is a positive relationship between relative agricultural productivity and the
average years of schooling completed among agricultural workers relative to workers in other
sectors. The coe¢ cient of correlation is 0.40.
Based on the data in Figure 2 and mincerian returns to education, Gollin et al. (2014)
estimate that roughly one third of the agricultural productivity gap can be accounted for by
sectoral di¤erences in human capital.
Empirical estimates of mincerian returns, including those used in Gollin et al. (2014), show
little variation across countries. In particular, they are only weakly related to the supply of
human capital in a countrys labor force, and are therefore consistent with a productive technol-
ogy in which workers with di¤erent skill levels are close to being perfect substitutes (assuming
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Figure 2: The agricultural education gap
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that productive technology and the quality of education is the same across countries).
Workers with di¤erent skill levels are, however, in many models of economic growth treated
as distinct inputs that are not easily substituted for each other.11 Taken to its extreme, no
matter how many high school drop-outs you put together, they cannot perform the work of a
heart surgeon. This view is supported by the empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between workers with di¤erent education levels found in Johnson (1970) Fallon and Layard
(1975), Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), Murphy et al. (1998), Krusell et al. (2000),
Ciccone and Peri (2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). Most of the studies report an elasticity
close to 1.5. The highest estimates are found in Angrist (1995) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012),
who put the elasticity at 2. Such estimates imply a great deal of complementarity between
workers with di¤erent skill levels, and complementarities makes the return to education highly
sensitive to the supply of human capital. Exactly the opposite of what the empirical estimates
of mincerian returns suggest.
Heterogenous elasticities of substitution across sectors go some way in explaining this ap-
parent inconsistency. Most estimates of the elasticity of substitution are based on aggregate
11E.g., Eicher and Garc¬a-Penalosa (2001), Acemoglu (2002), and Vandenbussche et al. (2006), as well as
many of the papers cited in the introduction.
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data from the US, or other rich countries, with negligible agricultural employment shares.12
The estimates of the aggregate elasticity will therefore correspond closely to the elasticity of
substitution in the nonagrarian sector. Similarly, agriculture is the dominant sector in many
developing countries. If the elasticity of substitution is higher in agriculture, it follows that
the aggregate elasticity of substitution must be higher in developing countries than in the rich
countries studied by the literature, simply because agriculture carries more weight. By impli-
cation, the return to education in developing countries will be lower than what an aggregate
elasticity of 1.5 entails.
3 A Simple Model
Before a further discussion of sectoral di¤erences in the elasticity of substitution between
workers with di¤erent skill levels, it is useful to write down a model. Let there be two types
of workers in the model: highly skilled, H, and unskilled, L. The supplies of the two labor
types are xed and exogenous. The aggregate labor supply is normalized to unity such that
H and L are equal to the shares of skilled and unskilled workers in the total population. The
economy consists of two sectors: agriculture and nonagriculture. Labor inputs and outputs in
the two sectors are labelled with subscript a and n respectively.
The structure of the workforce implies the following supply constraints on the labor market:
Ha +Hn  H ; (1)
La + Ln  L ; (2)
H + L = 1 : (3)
Aggregate production in the two sectors is given by:
Ya = X
 ( (AHa)
 + (1  )La)
1 

12The exception is Angrist (1995), who use a Palestinian labor force survey.
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Yn = P ( (AHn)
 + (1  )Ln)
1

Land, denoted X, is in xed supply, and agricultural production is assumed to exhibit
diminishing returns to labor. I abstract from capital in both sectors, and there is consequently
constant returns to the labor input in manufacturing. 13
The agricultural good is chosen as numeraire, and P is the relative price of manufactured
goods assumed to be set exogenously on the world market. Alternatively, P can be interpreted
as a sector specic TFP term. The open economy assumption is convenient, since I do not
have to take a stand on consumer preferences. A closed economy version of the model where
relative prices set by households optimizing standard utility functions, will lead to conclusions
similar to the ones derived from the simpler structure assumed here.
Skilled workers have the ability to operate the newest technology in production, giving them
a relative productivity level A  1. The absolute productivity advantage A is assumed to be
similar in both sectors. Any comparative advantage of skilled workers in one of the sectors will
in the model be summarized by a higher share parameter for skilled workers. If nonagriculture,
for instance, requires more skilled workers than agriculture, it will translate into  > .
The key parameters of interest are the elasticities of substitution between skilled and un-
skilled workers in the two sectors, given by "a = 11  and "n =
1
1  . If "a = "n = 1, the
production functions collapse into Cobb-Douglas functions.
Perfect mobility in the labor market ensures that workers will earn the same wage in both
sectors, and prot maximization equalize these wage rates with their marginal products. Let
wH and wL denote the wage rates of skilled and unskilled workers respectively. The rst order
conditions from prot maximization yields:
@Ya
@Ha
= (1  )X ( (AHa) + (1  )La)
1  
 AH 1a = wH (4)
13This abstraction does not matter for relative productivty levels if two requirements are met: 1) the elasticity
of substitution between (human capital weighted) labor and capital is one, corresponding to the standard Cobb
Douglas formulation, and 2) the (nonland) capital income share is the same in the two sectors. Valentinyi and
Herrendorf (2008) document that the latter is indeed the case in the United States. The income shares of
capital are, according to their estimates, 0.36 in agriculture and 0.33 in nonagriculture.
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@Ya
@La
= (1  )X ( (AHa) + (1  )La)
1  
 (1  )L 1a = wL (5)
@Yn
@Hn
= P ( (AHn)
 + (1  )Ln)
1 
 AH 1n = wH (6)
@Yn
@Ln
= P ( (AHn)
 + (1  )Ln)
1 
 (1  )L 1n = wL: (7)
The allocation of skilled and unskilled workers follows from the labor market equilibrium
conditions (4)-(7) along with the supply constraints (1)-(3). The allocation cannot be derived
analytically, and numerical methods have to be used.
Labor market mobility implies that the skill premium is the same in agriculture and in
nonagriculture as long as both types of labor are present in both sectors, i.e., that:
wH
wL
=

1  A


Ha
La
 1
=

1  A


Hn
Ln
 1
: (8)
Both types of workers are essential to production when they are imperfect substitutes, as it
is assumed here, and Equation (8) therefore holds by construction.14 However, without further
assumptions, the skill premium may fall below unity, a situation that is clearly unrealistic.
Skilled workers can perform unskilled work, and will choose to do so if the wage for skilled
work fall below the wage for unskilled work.15 I therefore impose that wH
wL
 1: When this
restriction binds, some skilled workers are present in the unskilled occupations, and the supply
constraints Ha + Hn  H and La + Ln  L no longer bind. The supply constraints are
therefore replaced by two constraints on the skill premia when solving for the equilibrium:
14If skilled and unskilled workers were assumed to be perfect substitutes, then the skill premia in the two
sectors would be 1 A and

1 A respectively, and independent on the supply and allocation of skills. That
will lead to an extreme allocation of human capital akin to the one in Lucas (2004) and Caselli and Coleman
(2001), since the two types of workers will select into the sectors where they have a comparative advantage.
Assuming that  < , it implies that skilled workers will only work in agriculture if no unskilled workers are
present in nonagriculture (i.e., when Equation (8) does not bind). While that may serve an illustrative purpose
in a model, I consider such a scenario empirically implausible.
15I assume that when skilled workers lose their inherent productivity advantage A when they are employed
in low skill jobs.
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wH
wL
=

1  A


Ha
La
 1
= 1
and
wH
wL
=

1  A


Hn
Ln
 1
= 1:
The only movable part of the model is the share of skilled workers in the labor force, H.
For given assumptions about the parameters X;A; ; ; P; "a and "n, the allocation of skilled
workers, productivity levels and wages follow from H: The model is nonlinear and has to be
solved numerically based on the assumed parameters.
4 Estimating the elasticity of substitution in agriculture
At the heart of the model is the assumption that workers with high skill levels are distinct from
less skilled workers in the production process. Intuitively, skilled workers can handle advanced
mental or physical tasks that require special training. The two elasticities of substitution, "a
and "n; summarize this intuition.
As mentioned in Section 2, most estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers are close to 1.5 in aggregate data. Plausible values for "n will have to be
in this ballpark, since most of the empirical studies are based on data from the United States
or other countries where employment in agriculture is negligible.
Less is known about "a. The the hypothesis of this paper is that "n < "a, and Equation (8)
allows this hypothesis to be tested formally. The equation can be rewritten into an empirical
counterpart for a country i:
ln

Hn;i
Ln;i

= 0 + 1 ln

Ha;i
La;i

+ ui (9)
where ui is a country specic error term, 0 = 1 1 ln


1 
1 

A 

and 1 =  1 1 =
"n
"a
. An
estimated 1 less than unity indicates that skilled and unskilled workers are indeed easier to
substitute in agriculture than in nonagriculture.
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Following the literature, I use education levels to distinguish between skilled and unskilled
workers. It is, however, not clear at what level of educational attainment the cut-o¤ should
be put. Using aggregate data from the United States, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) estimate the
elasticity of substitution between workers with college education and workers with less than
college to be 2. The estimated elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and
individuals with less than high school is, on the other hand, larger than 25. By implication,
college education seems to distinguish skilled workers from unskilled workers in the United
States.
The United States is one of the leading countries in the world when it comes to education.
An American high school graduate with no college education is likely to work as a waiter,
or in a similar occupation with a low skill requirement. By contrast, a high school diploma
in a developing country, where skills are scarce, are likely to land a relatively skill intensive
job. Moreover, the educational systems in many countries, notably in Europe, place emphasis
on technical and vocational training. While such programs usually do not count as college
(tertiary) education in international education statistics, they are likely to provide graduates
with specialized skills that are not easily substituted for by workers with less education. It is
thus not clear whether the results of Ottaviano and Peri (2012) are externally valid.
I consequently estimate equation (9) based on three denitions of skilled workers. The
results are reported in Table 1. The analysis is based on national census data from a sample
of 62 countries, representing all income levels, and all regions of the world.16 The data set is
provided in an appendix to this paper.
The estimated 1 is 0.66 when skilled workers are dened as having completed secondary
education. The elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is therefore 1.5
times larger in agriculture than in nonagriculture. The t of the model is good, with an R2
of 0.79. The estimated 1 is 0.51 when skilled workers are dened as having completed some
tertiary education, meaning that "a must be twice as high as "n.
38 percent of the labor force in the average country in the sample has completed secondary
education, whereas only 10 percent has completed some tertiary education. In the light of
16The data are downloaded from the IPUMS-International database provided by Sobek et al. (2010). See
data appendix for further details.
61
Chapter 2: Skill complementarity...
Table 1: OLS regressions of Equation (9)
Denition of skilled workers Estimated 1 Std: R2 Obs: Mean share of skilled workers
Secondary edu.completed 0:66 0:04 0:79 62 0:38
Some tertiary edu.completed 0:51 0:03 0:65 62 0:10
Some tertiary edu.or technical edu.completed 0:52 0:04 0:74 62 0:19
Notes: based on national census data from 62 countries. See the data appendix to this paper for details.
the discussion of technical secondary education above, a third denition of skilled workers is
made in Table 1: workers with either some tertiary education, or with completed technical
secondary education. With this denition, the average country in the sample has 19 percent
skilled workers in its labor force, of which 9 percentage points have a technical degree. The
estimated 1 is in this case almost the same as when skilled workers is dened as having
completed some tertiary education. One interpretation of this result is that individuals with
technical secondary education should indeed be categorized as skilled workers, at least for the
purpose of comparing elasticities of substitution in the two sectors. It is, however, not possible
to do so in what follows, since the model is calibrated to t data from the United States, where
formal vocational training is a rarity.
By interpreting the estimates in Table 1 as relative elasticities, it is implicitly assumed
that the productivity parameter A; and the share parameters for skilled workers,  and ; are
independent of both the level and the allocation of human capital. One could, alternatively,
assume that A is a function of the share of skilled workers, as in Caselli and Coleman (2006).
However, as proved by Diamond et al. (1978), it is not possible to estimate technology bias and
variation in the elasticity of substitution in a one-sector model. The corresponding result in
the two-sector model of this paper is that it is not possible to estimate cross country variation
in A,  and/or  without making ex ante assumptions about the elasticities. In fact, a model
with varying A and "a = "m can be observationally equivalent to a model with constant A and
"a 6= "m, a point also made by Caselli and Coleman (2006). Whether the estimated 1 reects
a technology bias, or sectoral di¤erences in the elasticity of substitution, is purely a matter of
interpretation.
In contrast to Caselli and Coleman (2006), I interpret the results in Table 1 as a sign of
heterogenous elasticities of substitution. I do so for the following reasons. First, there is no
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theoretical argument of why the elasticity of substitution should be identical across sectors.
On the contrary, at argued in the introduction to this paper, it seems intuitive that skilled and
unskilled workers are easier to substitute in agriculture than in nonagriculture. It is hard to
imagine a big manufacturing rm operate without both engineers and manual workers. Crops,
the other hand, are grown and harvested by unskilled manual labor alone in many developing
countries, whereas independent farmers in the rich world often are highly skilled.
Second, Herrendorf et al. (2013) estimate that another elasticity of substitution, namely
the one between capital and labor, is twice as high in agriculture as in nonagriculture in the
United States. While falling short of proving that "a > "m, the result is consistent with the
idea that inputs in production are easier to substitute for each other in agriculture than in
other sectors.
Third, the stock of human capital is the only di¤erence between countries in the model
when "a > "m; and A;  and  are constant, and the agricultural productivity gap is generated
by variation along this dimension alone. If the estimated 1 are assumed to reect variation
in A;  and/or , one needs a theory of why countries di¤er with respect to these parameters.
Arguably, it could be due to frictions, such as barriers to technology transfers, or because
human capital matters to innovation as suggested by many models of endogenous growth.
Including one or both these options in the model will increase its complexity substantially, and
it is the parsimonious option to base it on di¤erences in elasticities instead .
5 Calibration and simulation
The model is in this section evaluated based on how well its predictions compare to the agricul-
tural productivity gaps observed in the data. A discussed above, it is not clear which education
level that should be associated with being a skilled worker. I consequently simulate two base-
line scenarios. One, S1, in which skilled workers are dened as having completed secondary
education, and another, S1, in which skilled workers are dened as having completed some
tertiary education. Stars will henceforth signify that the narrow denition of skilled workers
is used.
The calibrated parameter values used in the two scenarios are shown in Table 2. Following
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Table 2: Calibration of baseline scenarios
Parameter name Symbol S1 S1 Source
EoS, nonagriculture "n 1:5 1:5 Literature (see Section 2).
EoS, agriculture "a 2:25 3 Estimated (see Table 1).
Land share, agriculture  0:18 0:18 Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008), based on US data.
Skilled worker share, agriculture  0:77 0:62 Calibrated to US data (see text), depends on "a:
Skilled worker share, nonagriculture  0:92 0:74 Calibrated to US data (see text), depends on "n:
Relative price of nonagricultural good P 2:05 2:43 Calibrated to US data (see text).
Land X 1 1 Normalized (implicitly part of P ).
Relative productivity of skilled workers A 1 1 Normalized (implicitly part of P ).
the empirical literature cited in Section 2, "n is set to 1.5. Combined with my estimates in
Table 1, it follows that "a = 1:5"n = 2:25 in S1, and "a = 2"n = 3 in S1.
The remaining parameters are calibrated to match data from the United States. Valentinyi
and Herrendorf (2008) estimate that the income share of land in agriculture is 0.18, and  is
consequently set to this value. The share parameters,  and , cannot easily be disentangled
from the productivity parameter A. However, A can in both sectors be thought of as a part
of TFP . The production function for manufacturing can, for instance, be rewritten as:
Yn = P (A
 + 1  ) 1 (^Hn + (1  ^)Ln)
1
 ;
where ^ = 
A+1  : An expression for ^ can be found in a similar way. For given elasticities
of substitution, I calibrate ^ and ^ by using information on wages and employment shares in
the two sectors. In the case of nonagriculture:
wHHn
wLLn
=
^
1  ^

Hn
Ln

, ^ = wHHn
wLLM

Hn
Ln

+ wHHn
: (10)
A similar expression for the agricultural sector is used to calibrate ^.
Wage rates and employment shares are aggregated from micro level data from the American
Community Survey 2010.17 The data are summarized in the rst rows of Table 3. Examples
of the implied ^ and ^ are at the bottom of the table for di¤erent values of the elasticity of
substitution. ^ and ^ converge towards wH
wL+wH
(the perfect substitution case) as the elasticity
17Sobek et al. (2010).
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Table 3: Wages, employment shares and implied elasticities of substitution
Secondary edu. completed Some tertiary edu. completed
Ha Hn wH wL Ha Hn wH wL
US data 0:66 0:90 38; 348 15; 000 0:34 0:62 22; 011 44; 694
"a = 1 "a = 1:5 "a = 3 "a = 8 "a = 1 "a = 1:5 "a = 3 "a = 8
Implied ^ 0:83 0:80 0:76 0:73 0:51 0:56 0:62 0:65
"n = 1 "n = 1:5 "n = 3 "n = 8 "n = 1 "n = 1:5 "n = 3 "n = 8
Implied ^ 0:96 0:92 0:84 0:77 0:77 0:72 0:71 0:68
go to innity.
Without loss of generality, I let A and X be subsumed in P by normalizing both variables
to 1. All factors a¤ecting the relative TFP level of nonagriculture are thus summarized by
P . It follows from the nomalization that  = ^ and  = ^, and I will henceforth drop the
hat-notation.
P is, in part, endogenously determined by the elasticities, "a and "n. But P also depends on
factors exogenous to the model, such as the relative demand for nonagricultural goods, and the
stock of land. I therefore calibrate P to make the predictions of the model match the ratio Ya
Yn
in the United States. For example, high school graduates (skilled workers in S1) constitute 90
percent of the labor force in data from the American Community Survey. Agricultural output
is 1.2 percent of nonagricultural output in the United States according to the BEA industry
accounts.18 In S1, P is consequently calibrated such that Ya
Yn
= 0:012 in an economy where
H = 0:90.
5.1 The agricultural productivity gap
The relative agricultural productivity level predicted by S1 is shown in Figure 3 as a function
of the share of the labor force who have completed secondary education. Productivity in agri-
18The share of agricultural output in total output can alternatively be derived from the model as the sum of
all wages paid in agriculture, corrected from the land share, divided by the sum of all wages in nonagriculture.
Reassuringly, when assuming  = 0:18 and using wage and employment data from the American Community
Survey, one also ends out with YaYn = 0:012.
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culture is substantially below productivity in nonagriculture when the share of skilled workers
is low. The productivity gap narrows as the share of skilled workers rise, and agricultural labor
productivity eventually overtakes nonagriculture. The overtaking is a by-product of the lower
labor share in agriculture (i.e.,  > 0).
Data from a cross section of 106 countries are also shown in Figure 3. Each of the grey dots
represent a country. Relative agricultural productivity data are from Gollin et al. (2014), and
data for educational attainment are from Barro and Lee (2013). There is a lot of variation in the
data due to country specic idiosyncrasies and measurement errors. In the model, it is assumed
that every country have the same endowment of land, but population densities, climate and
soil fertility di¤er widely in reality, and the data are not corrected for such variation. Moreover,
productivity data are highly unreliable in developing countries, and may, as Herrendorf and
Schoellman (2013) have shown, even be underestimated in the United States. There may also
be measurement errors in the education data. The length, quality and content of secondary
education varies from country to country, and the distinction between skilled and unskilled
workers in the gure is therefore fuzzy.
No simple model can be expected to capture all these idiosyncrasies, and I focus on the
general trend in the data instead. To lter out the noise, I split the sample into countries with
0-20 percent skilled workers, 20-40 percent skilled workers, and so forth. For each group, I
calculate median relative agricultural productivity. The medians are in the gure represented
by a black dots at the middle of the intervals. There are too few observations with more than
80 percent skilled workers to calculate a meaningful median. Instead, the United States is
highlighted by a black square.19
The model seems to track the general pattern in the data very well. It predicts that relative
agricultural productivity is 0.26 when the share of skilled workers is 10 percent. The median
in the group of countries with 0-20 percent skilled workers is 0.27. The model also conforms to
the fact that relative agricultural productivity only seems to rise slowly with education levels
when the initial share of skilled workers is low.
The close match between the predictions of the model and the data implies that if the
19To be consistent with the calibration, the United States data are based on the American Community Survey
rather than data from the other sources.
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Figure 3: Simulation of S1
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Notes: Skilled workers are dened as having completed secondary education. Productivity data are from Gollin et al. (2014),
and education data are from Barro and Lee (2013). US data are from Sobek et al. (2013), and the basis of the calibration.
Median relative agricultural productivities are calculated for countries with 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, and 60-80 percent skilled workers
respectively, and shown at the midpoint of the intervals.
model is indeed the true model of the economy, no role is left for frictions, subsistence needs,
selection, measurement errors, or other mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature
as explanations for the dual economy. It is a bold claim, and it does not seem entirely plausible.
One way of reducing the predicted agricultural productivity gap is to narrow the denition
of skilled workers. Using secondary education as cut-o¤ may lead to inated productivity
gaps when the model is calibrated to the United States. The abundant supply of high school
graduates in the United States means that some of them are likely to work in basic occupations
where less schooling is required. Figure 4 therefore shows a simulation of S1; in which skilled
workers are dened as individuals who have completed some college.
The model predicts higher relative agricultural productivity when the narrow denition of
skilled workers is used. The reason is that there are fewer workers in the United States who
have competed some college than workers with a high school diploma. The calibrated share
parameters for skilled workers,  and , are consequently smaller. Lower share parameters
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mean that unskilled labor becomes relatively more productive, and the productivity gap be-
tween the two sectors in the model becomes smaller for a given allocation of workers. Still, a
substantial part of the agricultural productivity gap is explained by the model.
Figure 4: Simulation of S1*
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Notes: Skilled workers are dened as having completed secondary education. Productivity data are from Gollin et al. (2014),
and education data are from Barro and Lee (2013). US data are from Sobek et al. (2013), and the basis of the calibration.
Median relative agricultural productivities are calculated for countries with 0-20, 20-40, 40-60, and 60-80 percent skilled workers
respectively, and shown at the midpoint of the intervals.
5.2 Decomposing the productivity gap
The size of the agricultural productivity gap is in the model driven by the share of skilled
workers in the workforce through two channels: heterogenous elasticities of substitution, "a
and "n, and heterogenous share parameters,  and . The individual roles of these two e¤ects
are illustrated in Figure 5, in which scenario S1 is compared to a benchmark scenario, S0,
and to three intermediate steps S1a-S1c. The parameter values for each of these scenarios are
shown in Table 4.
The agricultural sector is in the benchmark scenario, S0; assumed to be identical to the
nonagricultural sector in terms of elasticities and the share parameters, i.e., "a = "n = 1:5,
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and  = : By denition, relative agricultural productivity is constant and equal to 1
1  when
the two sectors are identical.
In scenario S1a, "a is increased to 1:5"n = 2:25, the value assumed in scenario S1. All
other parameters are kept constant at the values from the benchmark scenario S0, so that the
change reects a ceteris paribus increase in the elasticity of substitution in agriculture. The
same exercise is in scenario S1b done for a decrease in the share parameter for skilled workers
in agriculture, . The two comparative statics are combined in scenario S1c. Finally, in S1,
the price level P is allowed to respond endogenously to the changes in the other parameters,
and the calibrated  is likewise allowed to be a¤ected by the higher "a as in Equation (10).
The relative productivity levels predicted by these scenarios show that both a higher elas-
ticity of substitution in agriculture (scenario S1a), and a lower share parameter for skilled
workers in agriculture (S1b), cause signicant productivity gaps in agriculture. The gaps are
of similar size when the share of skilled workers in the labor force is low, but, in the case of
heterogenous elasticities, it is quickly reduced as the number of skilled workers rises. In fact,
agriculture overtakes nonagriculture briey in scenario S1a, since a higher elasticity of substi-
tution, ceteris paribus, increases the marginal product of skilled workers when they constitutes
a large fraction of the labor input.20
The predicted agricultural productivity gap becomes larger when the two mechanisms are
combined, as in scenario S1c. Individually, a lower share parameter in agriculture, and a higher
elasticity in agriculture, predict a relative agricultural productivity level slightly above 0.4 in
a country with very few skilled workers. Combined, they predict a relative productivity level
slightly above 0.2. The two mechanisms should thus be seen as complementary rather than
competing explanations for the dual economy.
20Formally, the relative marginal products of the two types labor is equal to the skill premium, which in S1a
is given by wHwL =

1 

Hi
Li
  1"i
; i = a; n: Unskilled labor is employed in both sectors, and the skill premium
determines the allocation of skilled workers.The skill premium is higher in agriculture than in nonagriculture
when HaLa =
Hn
Ln
> 1 and "a > "n. Labor market mobility equalizes skill premia across sectors, and the
human capital intensity in agriculture, HaLa ; must therefore be above that of nonagriculture,
Hn
Ln
. Productivity
in agriculture is consequently higher than in nonagriculture if the share of skilled workers in the total labor
force is high.
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Table 4: Calibration of scenarios shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6
Parameter name Symbol S0 S1a S1b S1c S0 S1a S1b S1c
EoS, nonagriculture "n 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5 1:5
EoS, agriculture "a 1:5 2:25 1:5 2:25 1:5 3 1:5 3
Land share, agriculture  0:18 0:18 0:18 0:18 0:18 0:18 0:18 0:18
Skilled worker share, agriculture  0:92 0:92 0:80 0:80 0:74 0:74 0:53 0:53
Skilled worker share, nonagriculture  0:92 0:92 0:92 0:92 0:74 0:74 0:74 0:74
Relative price of nonagricultural good P 2:66 2:66 2:66 2:66 2:84 2:84 2:84 2:84
Land X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Relative productivity of skilled workers A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
In S1c; the parameters P and  are kept xed at the calibrated levels from S0 and S1b
respectively, whereas they are allowed to vary with assumptions about other parameters in the
baseline scenario S1. A comparison between the curves for S1c and S1 in Figure 6 shows that
the quantitative results of the model is not driven by this parameter exibility:
Figure 5: Decomposition of S1
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Figure 6: Decomposition of S1*
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The results from a decomposition of the scenario S1, where the narrow denition of skilled
workers is used, are similar (Figure 6). Without heterogenous elasticities of substitution,
the model predicts a relative agricultural productivity level of 0.74 when the share of skilled
workers is 10 percent, whereas the baseline scenario with heterogenous elasticities yields a
relative productivity level of 0.58. So, while the predicted gap is smaller than in the case
with secondary education used as skill cut-o¤, the portion of the gap accounted for by the
heterogenous elasticities is larger.
70
Chapter 2: Skill complementarity...
5.3 Comparative statics
The switch from the broad to the narrow denition of skilled workers (Figure 3 vs. Figure
4), and the decomposition of the gap in the previous subsection, were essentially comparative
statics with respect to the input shares,  and , and the elasticity "a: Comparative statics
with respect to the remaining parameters are reviewed in this subsection, starting with the
elasticity of substitution in nonagriculture.21
The e¤ect of a higher "n is illustrated in Figure 7. In a new scenario, S2, "n is changed from
1.5 to 2, corresponding to the highest empirical estimates of the aggregate elasticity found in
the literature. The ratio "a
"n
is kept constant at 1.5, as in the benchmark scenario. A higher
elasticity of substitution in nonagriculture implies a higher relative agricultural productivity
level for a given value of H. The reason is that substitutability makes output less sensitive to
the composition of the labor force, and the productivity loss from having fewer skilled workers
in agriculture is therefore smaller.
Scenario S3 in Figure 7 shows the opposite situation. "m is now changed to 1, corresponding
to a Cobb Douglas function. The agricultural productivity gap becomes larger in countries
with few skilled workers as a consequence.
Figure 7: Sensitivity to EoS
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Figure 8: Sensitivity to land share
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This paper is concerned with labor productivity, and a ceteris paribus change in the land
21Se Table 5 for the calibrations used in this subsection
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share  will, for a given share of skilled workers, result in a proportional change in labor
productivity in agriculture. However, the calibration strategy means that the relative price of
nonagricultural goods, P; is positively related to the value of :22 Figure 8 show comparative
statics with respect to the land share in the case where P is allowed to respond endogenously
to these changes.  is in two new scenarios set to 0.1 and 0.3 respectively, as opposed to 0.18
in the baseline scenario.
The relative agricultural productivity level is, by construction, equal to 1
1  when the share
of skilled workers is so high that some of them are employed in jobs where their skills are
not essential. Formally, when wH = wL = w , prot maximization in agriculture leads to the
following relationship: w (Ha + La) = (1  )Ya: Since labor is the only factor of production in
nonagriculture, we have that w (Hn + Ln) = Yn. By combining these expressions, the relative
agricultural labor productivity can be derived as 1
1  . Consequently, as shown in Figure 8, P
matters little when the share of skilled workers is high, and a change in  translates directly
into a proportional change in relative agricultural productivity.
P is important when the share of skilled workers is low. P is 1.48 when  = 0:1; as opposed
to 2.05 in the baseline scenario. A low relative price of nonagricultural goods explains why the
scenario with a low  leads to higher relative agricultural productivity than the others for low
shares of skilled workers. But in any case, the predictions of the model are not particularly
sensitive to the assumption made about .
6 Agricultural employment and the skill premium
The model is now evaluated along two other dimensions than productivity: the agricultural
employment share, and the relative wage rate of skilled workers.
How much the dual economy structure matters for aggregate productivity depends on the
size of the agricultural sector. It would matter little in developing countries, if agriculture did
22Recall that P is calibrated to match the ratio of agricultural output to nonagricultural output in the United
States. Real agricultural output is positively related to , and the relative price P will therefore have to be
higher to keep the output ratio (measured in nominal terms) xed at the level observed in the United States.
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Table 5: Calibration of scenarios shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8
Name Symbol S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
EoS, nonagriculture "n 1:5 2 1 1:5 1:5
EoS, agriculture "a 2:25 3 1:5 2:25 2:25
Land share, agriculture  0:18 0:18 0:18 0:3 0:1
Skilled worker share, agriculture  0:77 0:76 0:80 0:77 0:77
Skilled worker share, nonagriculture  0:92 0:89 0:96 0:92 0:92
Relative price of nonagricultural good P 2:05 2:10 1:99 3:66 1:48
Land X 1 1 1 1 1
Relative productivity of skilled workers A 1 1 1 1 1
not play such a big role in their economies. And important task for any dual economy model
is to replicate this fact.
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the predicted agricultural employment as a share of total
employment in the two baseline scenarios S1 and S1. The predictions are consistent with the
stylized empirical facts. Poor countries with low human capital stocks have a high fraction of
their workforces employed in agriculture, whereas agriculture is a minor sector in developed
countries with high education levels. Both scenarios predict a somewhat higher agricultural
employment share than in most countries in the data (represented by dots in the gures), but
the predictions are still within empirically reasonable values.
Figure 9: Agricultural employment S1
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Figure 10: Agricultural employment S1*
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Turning to the return to education, it is convenient to restate the wage premium of being
a skilled worker as it is given by the model:
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Relative wages depend on the input shares of skilled workers, and, unless they are perfect
substitutes in production, on the relative supply of the two types of workers.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 plot the skill premia implied by the two baseline scenarios. The skill
premium is lower when skilled workers are dened as having completed some tertiary education.
Since this group is smaller than the group of workers with secondary education, the calibrated
values of  and  become smaller, implying a lower input share of skilled workers. The relative
input shares, 
1  and

1  , correspond to productivity advantages of skilled workers. And, as
Equation (11) shows, such productivity advantages directly a¤ect the skill premium.
The input shares  and  are calibrated to match data on wages and employment in the
United States. The predicted skill premium in a country with the same share of skilled workers
as the United States will therefore correspond to what is observed in the American Community
Survey used in the calibration. A reasonable test of the model is how well it predicts the skill
premium "out of sample", i.e., how well its predictions compare to the data from countries
with low levels of human capital.
An individual with at least secondary education can, according to the simulation of S1;
earn an annual income up to 17 times higher than an individual with primary schooling, or
less, when the human capital stock is su¢ ciently low. The corresponding number is around 10
in the case of S1. These magnitudes do not seem implausible in a developing country where
a substantial fraction of the population survives for less than a dollar per day. The mincerian
returns implied by the simulations are, however, in the 25-35 percent range if skilled workers
are assumed to have eight years more schooling than unskilled workers. The mincerian returns
found in the empirical literature are usually smaller: 10 percent per annum, with only a slight
tendency to higher returns in countries with low education levels.23
The discrepancy is, however, substantially smaller in the baseline scenario with heteroge-
neous elasticities of substitution, than when it is assumed that "a = "n. This is illustrated
in Figure 11 by the curve representing scenario S1b from Section 5.2: The implied mincerian
23See, e.g., Banerjee and Duo (2005).
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Figure 11: Skill premium S1
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Figure 12: Skill premium S1*
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returns of this scenario are above 45 percent when the share of skilled workers is low. A
corresponding scenario S1b is shown in Figure 12.
Intuitively, in an economy with a high employment share in agriculture, the economy-
wide elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers will be close to the one in
the agrarian sector. A low level of "a; as in S1b; will consequently translate into a relatively
high skill premium in countries with few skilled workers. Conversely, an economy with a
negligible employment share in agriculture will have an economy-wide elasticity of substitution
close to the one in the nonagrarian sector. This mechanism allows the model parameters to
conform to the empirical estimates of the aggregate elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled workers in developed economies, while making more realistic predictions about
the skill premium in developing countries than a model without the mechanism.
Increasing the relative elasticity of substitution in agriculture beyond what is assumed in
S1 and S1 reduce the gap between the model and the empirical estimates of the mincerian
returns further. The e¤ect is shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 by the curves labelled High
EoS in agriculture. They represent simulations of scenarios identical to S1 and S1; except
that the elasticity of substitution in agriculture is now assumed to be three times higher than
the one in nonagriculture.
Still, the model predicts too high skill premia if the close-to-constant mincerian returns are
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taken at face value. Part of this gap is related to the calibration. The United States is one of
the countries in the OECD with the highest returns to education, and calibrating to another
OECD country will reduce the predicted skill premium.24 Moreover, the skill premium used
in the calibration is based on annual wages, and is thereby inated by the fact that workers
with less education work fewer hours.
The gap may also be bridged from the empirical side. Several studies have shown that
poor countries also tend to have poor schools, and correcting the mincerian returns from
this empirical fact will lead to higher, quality-adjusted returns to education in developing
countries.25 As the model assumes uniform schooling, such e¤ects should be taken into account
when its predictions are compared to the data.
The apparent constancy of mincerian returns across countries may also be slightly mis-
leading. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004), show, for instance, that the average private
return from investing in primary schooling is 23-26 percent no matter the income level of the
country. The return to higher education, on the other hand, drops with income. They nd
a private return of 26 percent from investing in higher education in the poorest countries in
their sample, whereas the return is 12 percent in the group of rich countries. Such di¤erences
may not show up in estimated average mincerian returns for all years of schooling, since most
of the labor force in developing countries do not attain higher education. Average mincerian
returns for these countries will therefore be biased towards the return to primary education,
whereas average mincerian returns will be biased towards the return to secondary and tertiary
education in countries where most workers are highly educated.
In conclusion, the relative high returns to schooling predicted by the model should not be
taken as evidence against it. On the contrary, for realistic values of the aggregate elasticity
of substitution in developed countries, the model predicts more plausible values of the skill
premium in developing countries than a model where the elasticity is assumed to be identical
across sectors.
24OECD (2013), Table A6.1.
25See, e.g., Schoellman (2012) and Kaarsen (2014).
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7 Taking Stock
I have in this paper shown that the elasticity of substitution is greater in agriculture than in
nonagriculture, and I have, based on this insight, developed a model in which sector sizes, the
allocation of human capital, and sectoral productivity levels are pinned down by the share
of skilled workers in the labor force. Calibrated to the United States, the model is able to
generate sizable agricultural productivity gaps when the share of skilled workers in the labor
force is low.
The relative productivity levels are driven by a comparative advantage of skilled workers
in agriculture, and by heterogenous elasticities of substitution across sectors. Individually,
both mechanisms cause a low relative agricultural productivity level when the stock of skilled
workers is low. Combined, they reduce relative agricultural productivity even further.
The size of the agricultural productivity gap predicted by the model depends on the de-
nition of skilled workers. When skilled workers are dened as having completed secondary
education, the model predicts relative agricultural productivity levels as low as 0.2, a level
that conforms with the ones observed in developing countries. By implication, no role is left
for frictions, subsistence needs, selection, or other mechanisms that have been proposed in the
literature as explanations for the dual economy. Setting the cut-o¤ for skilled workers at sec-
ondary education may, however, lead to inated productivity gaps when the model is calibrated
to the United States. The high supply of high school graduates in the United States means
that many of them are likely to work in basic occupations where less schooling is required.
An alternative calibration, where the denition of skilled workers is narrowed to cover only
individuals who have completed some college, yields relative agricultural productivity gaps
slightly below 0.6 in countries where human capital is scarce. This result is more in line with
Gollin et al. (2014), who estimate that roughly one third of the agricultural productivity gap
can be explained by the allocation of human capital.
The calibration based on tertiary education may, however, also be inadequate. Being in
short supply, high school graduates in many developing countries may land jobs with a high
skill requirement. Moreover, educational systems di¤er, and vocational training and technical
secondary programs that provides student with specic skills are common in many countries
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outside the United States. The role of human capital allocation may therefore be understated
when college is a requirement for being a skilled worker. A reasonable conjecture is therefore
that human capital di¤erences cause relative agricultural productivity to be between 0.2 and
0.6 in developing countries, and perhaps closer to the upper bound of the range.
That is somewhat bigger role for human capital than what Gollin et al. (2014) nd. How-
ever, their estimate is based on mincerian returns to education that show very little cross
country variation, and it is implicitly assumed that the return to a year of schooling within a
country is the same at all levels of educational attainment. As argued in Section 6, Gollin et al.
(2014) may therefore underestimate the role of human capital, as the return to achieving the
education levels that dene skilled workers in the model are not fully captured by mincerian
returns.
In general, many of the variables involved are hard to measure and compare across countries.
Productivity data are highly unreliable in developing countries, and it is di¢ cult to make a
distinction between skilled and unskilled workers that is valid globally, since both the structure
and quality of education systems di¤er widely. But all things considered, heterogenous skill
complementarities seem to be a simple, empirically relevant, and quantitatively important
explanation for the dual economy phenomenon. Moreover, the absence of frictions in the
model imply that the dual economy is a Pareto optimal equilibrium outcome. This is not
to say that factor market distortions or externalities necessarily are unimportant in the dual
economies of the real world, or that government intervention is pointless. But the ine¢ ciencies
that need to be addressed by policy makers may be a lot smaller that what a benchmark model
without sectoral di¤erences in skill complementarity would suggest.
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Data Appendix
The data used in the regressions reported in Table 1 are shown below. The numbers are cal-
culated by the author based on national census data from the IPUMS-International database,
collected by Sobek et al. (2013). The newest census (at the time of writing) in the database is
used in each country. Agriculture include shing and forestry. Individuals not in employment,
or with no information on educational attainment, are excluded from the sample. The sample
only includes persons of 15 years of age or older. Countries with missing information on one or
more of there relevant parameters are excluded. Three denitions of skilled workers are used:
individuals with secondary education (skill 1), individuals with technical secondary education
or some tertiary education (skill 2), and individuals with some tertiary education (skill 3).
Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3 Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3
Country Year Ha Hn Ha Hn Ha Hn Country Year Ha Hn Ha Hn Ha Hn
Austria 2001 0.69 0.78 0.68 0.73 0.01 0.08 Fiji 2007 0.15 0.50 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.06
Bolivia 2001 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.08 France 2006 0.33 0.51 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32
Brazil 2010 0.12 0.51 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 Germany 1987 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.01 0.08
Cambodia 2008 0.02 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 Ghana 2000 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.02
Cameroon 2005 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 Greece 2001 0.19 0.68 0.06 0.39 0.02 0.26
Canada 2001 0.58 0.80 0.38 0.60 0.12 0.26 Haiti 2003 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.02
Chile 2022 0.17 0.53 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.08 Hungary 2001 0.61 0.81 0.41 0.47 0.07 0.19
China 1990 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.02 India 2004 0.11 0.35 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.12
Colombia 2005 0.08 0.48 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.15 Indonesia 2010 0.10 0.47 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.09
Costa Rica 2000 0.06 0.39 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.15 Iran 2006 0.10 0.41 0.03 0.23 0.01 0.16
Cuba 2002 0.28 0.64 0.17 0.42 0.03 0.17 Iraq 1997 0.07 0.32 0.05 0.27 0.02 0.12
Ecuador 2010 0.13 0.54 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.15 Ireland 2006 0.45 0.73 0.16 0.40 0.06 0.27
Egypt 2006 0.26 0.62 0.03 0.28 0.02 0.22 Israel 1995 0.60 0.78 0.16 0.37 0.08 0.21
El Salvador 2007 0.04 0.34 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 Italy 2001 0.22 0.55 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.12
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Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3 Skill 1 Skill 2 Skill 3
Country Year Ha Hn Ha Hn Ha Hn Country Year Ha Hn Ha Hn Ha Hn
Jamaica 2001 0.34 0.67 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 Rwanda 2002 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02
Jordan 2004 0.30 0.58 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.21 Saint Lucia 1991 0.08 0.36 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.03
Kyrgyz Rep. 2009 0.85 0.87 0.08 0.36 0.04 0.25 Sierra Leone 2004 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03
Malawi 2008 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 Slovenia 2002 0.53 0.84 0.38 0.52 0.02 0.13
Malaysia 2000 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.13 South Africa 2007 0.23 0.51 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09
Mali 1998 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 Spain 2001 0.15 0.49 0.09 0.36 0.02 0.12
Mexico 2010 0.07 0.40 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.16 South Sudan 2008 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02
Mongolia 2000 0.17 0.70 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.23 Sudan 2008 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Morocco 2004 0.02 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 Switzerland 2000 0.94 0.94 0.65 0.75 0.02 0.10
Nicaragua 2005 0.04 0.35 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.11 Tanzania 2002 0.02 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Palestine 2007 0.17 0.43 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.19 Thailand 2000 0.04 0.37 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.10
Panama 2010 0.11 0.59 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.21 Turkey 2000 0.06 0.44 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.18
Peru 2007 0.24 0.74 0.06 0.40 0.02 0.17 Uganda 2002 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.04
Philippines 2000 0.20 0.62 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.14 United States 2010 0.66 0.90 0.11 0.29 0.11 0.29
Portugal 2001 0.07 0.30 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 Uruguay 2006 0.18 0.42 0.12 0.27 0.03 0.09
Puerto Rico 2005 0.39 0.84 0.05 0.27 0.05 0.27 Venezuela 2001 0.07 0.43 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00
Romania 2002 0.35 0.83 0.32 0.73 0.02 0.15 Vietnam 2009 0.09 0.31 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.14
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Abstract
Irrigated agriculture has traits that the resource curse literature associate with rent-
seeking and poor institutional outcomes. These include spatial concentration, high yields,
and dependence on a controllable water source. We hypothesize that regions with a
long history of irrigation-based agriculture are more likely to be autocratic today than
regions with rainfed agriculture. The hypothesis is conrmed empirically. To deal with
endogeneity, we use an exogenous measure of how much irrigation potentially can increase
yields above the yields obtained from rainfed agriculture. At the national level, we
show that areas with a higher irrigation potential are more likely to be ruled by an
autocratic regime today. At the subnational level, including country-xed e¤ects, we nd
that irrigation potential is associated with less favorable views on democracy. Last, we
nd that premodern societies, surveyed by ethnographers, were more likely to develop a
hierarchy based on elite stratication if their agriculture was based on irrigation.
1 Introduction
Only in the poorest developing countries is agricultural production still the most important
source of income today. Yet, in a historical perspective, most countries have until very recently
been agrarian economies, and their institutions have been shaped by the fact. We argue that
the source of water for agriculture in a society is crucial for the development of institutions
in the society, and that these institutions persist even after agriculture ceases to be the main
economic activity.
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Crops are grown using rain water, water from man-made irrigation systems, or a combina-
tion of the two. Rain is spread evenly over vast areas. Irrigation, on the other hand, depends on
a water source such as a nearby river. Irrigated agriculture therefore tends to be concentrated
in smaller areas than rainfed agriculture, and the allocation of water can be controlled by
dams, canals, and other forms of irrigation infrastructure. Moreover, irrigation allows for more
intensive agriculture than otherwise possible, and may permit multiple harvests per year in
warm climates. Spatial concentration, high value, and ease of control makes rent-seeking both
feasible and economically attractive. Resources with these attributes are classied as "point-
source" resources in the resource curse literature, and often associated with poor institutional
outcomes, oligarchic politics, and autocracy.1
The most notable examples of point-source resources are oil and minerals. While irrigated
agriculture arguably is less "pointy" than oil and minerals, it still provides a better target
for rent-seeking than rainfed agriculture. We hypothesize that irrigation increased the power
of the political and economic elites, who consequently were in a position where they had the
incentives and the means to oppose democracy in order to protect their privileges. That made
democratic institutions less likely to emerge in regions dependent on irrigation than in regions
where agriculture is rainfed.
The hypothesis is about the water source, not the types of crops involved. It is, however,
related to Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997, 2000, 2002, 2005), who argue that suitability for
plantation crops (e.g., sugar, bananas, and cocoa) made slavery attractive in the tropical
Americas. Their argument is essentially that plantation crops are point-source resources,
although they do not use that term explicitly. The temperate parts of the Americas were
more suitable for cereals, and cereal production provided the basis for egalitarian societies
based on independent farmers.2 Slavery, on the other hand, created a marked inequality in
the distribution of power that did not end with the emancipation. This di¤erence put the two
parts of the continent on di¤erent development trajectories.
The idea that irrigation leads to poor institutional outcomes is not new. The link be-
1E.g., Auty (2001), Ross (2001, 2012), Isham et al. (2005), Bulte et al. (2005), Boschini et al. (2007), and
Williams (2011).
2The ideas of Sokolo¤ and Engerman was anticipated by Baldwin (1956) and Earle (1978), and later gen-
eralized by Easterly (2007).
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tween irrigation and repressive institutions was noted by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and
Karl Marx, but it is perhaps most forcefully articulated by Karl August Wittfogel in Oriental
Despotism.3 Wittfogel gives ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, and the Andean and
Mexican civilizations as examples of despotic regimes underpinned by irrigation.4 Oriental
Despotism has been hotly debated and is routinely dismissed by anthropologists and histori-
ans.5 The criticism of Wittfogels theoretical framework may be justied, but we conrm that
he was right about the basic empirical link between irrigation and autocracy.6 We are, to our
knowledge, the rst to test the theory using statistical methods.
Actual irrigation is likely to be endogenous. For instance, more developed societies are
potentially more likely to have developed irrigation, while development at the same time may
also inuence the degree of democracy adopted by the society. To overcome endogeneity, we
use a measure of irrigation potential based on exogenous geographical and climatic variables.
The available quantitative information on the extent of historical irrigation is limited, and we
treat irrigation potential as a proxy for historical irrigation in our main regressions. We do,
however, conrm our results using our measure of irrigation potential as an instrument for
actual current irrigation, and for the limited historical irrigation data we have.
We show that countries with a high irrigation potential are more likely to be autocratic
today as measured by various indices of democratic institutions, such as the Polity IV in-
dex. At the subnational level, we show that respondents in the World Values Survey have a
less favorable view on democracy if they live in districts with high irrigation potential. The
link between irrigation and institutions is also conrmed in premodern societies surveyed by
ethnographers.7
3Smith (1776) book IV, chapter IX, Mill (1848) p. 20-21, Marx (1853), and Wittfogel (1957). While
irrigation is not mentioned explicitly, Smith (1776) discusses the di¤erences between Europe and the great
irrigation-based civilizations in Egypt, India, and China.
4Wittfogel (1957) p. 24.
5See, e.g., Toynbee (1958), Leach (1959), Needham (1959), Mann (1986), or Fukuyama (2011).
6There is a large literature on irrigation and autocracy based on case studies. Examples are Leach (1959) and
Toynbee (1958) along with numerous others. See Mitchell (1973) and Hunt and Hunt (1976) for reviews of the
literature. Wittfogels claim that irrigation was a cause of state formation has been refuted by anthropologists
and archaeologists who have shown that the emergence of the state preceeded large scale irrigation by centuries,
even millenia. See, e.g., Carneiro (1970). The hypothesis we investigate is not about the origin of the state. It
is about whether areas with irrigation based agriculture are more autocratic today.
7This part of the analysis is based on the Ethnographic Atlas compiled by Murdock (1967).
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The results are robust to a wide range of control variables capturing variation in geography,
climate, resource endowments, development, religion, and colonial history. The latter is shown
to dilute the e¤ect of irrigation, consistent with the large literature documenting that European
presence had a long-lasting impact on institutions.8
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the theoretical link between
irrigation and present-day institutions. Section 3 describes the methodological approach used
in the empirical analysis with emphasis on our measure of irrigation potential. We proceed to
test the link between irrigation and autocracy at the country level in Section 4, and at a more
disaggregated level in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The hypothesis
The concept of oriental despotism has existed in one form or another in the European intel-
lectual discourse for millennia. Aristotle, Herodotus, Montesqieu, and Hegel, to name a few,
all considered Middle Eastern and Asian institutions less representative and more despotic
than what they were used to in their native European countries. Karl Marx attributed the
observation to what he called the Asiatic Mode of Production and, inspired by Adam Smith
and other classical economists, argued that the ability to control water was one reason for the
states dominance in the irrigation dependent societies in Asia.9 Expanding on their analysis,
Wittfogel (1957) developed a theory of hydraulic societies, explicitly linking oriental despotism
to large-scale irrigation systems.10
Wittfogel argues that the construction and maintenance of large-scale irrigation systems
required a strong leadership that gradually evolved into despotic states. The control of water
made it possible for the despot to increase suppression of the populace to levels unknown in
Europe without fearing revolt. Wittfogels account of oriental despotism is as sprawling as it
8E.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001), Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Olsson (2009), Dell (2010) and Hariri (2012).
9Marx (1853). See OLeary (1989) for an account of the history of thought on the asiatic mode of production.
10The hydraulic society should be distinguished from what Wittfogel (1957) called hydroagriculture. The
di¤erence is a matter of scale. In the hydraulic society, farmers are dependent on a common irrigation system
of canals and dams. In hydroagriculture, farmers depend on irrigation, but the geographical conditions make
coordination unneccessary or impossible. Wittfogel mentions Japan as an example of the latter. For further
discussion, see Price (1994).
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is speculative. But it does convey one powerful idea that resonates with the modern literature
of the resource curse: valuable and easily controlled resources tend to end up in the hands of
a ruling elite, which use the resources to entrench their power further.
2.1 Irrigation as a point-source resource
Irrigation becomes attractive when the amount of rain is scarce and fertile arable land readily
available, i.e., when the naturally occurring supply of water in the elds falls short of demand.
Irrigation is feasible when a steady water source, such as a river or a lake, exists and when
irrigation infrastructure to control the water is built. High value and controllability is exactly
what denes a point-source resource, and irrigated agriculture is thus an attractive target for
rent-seeking for the same reasons as oil, minerals, and diamonds.
The gain in agriculture from irrigation can be substantial. Fresh water can turn otherwise
barren land into fertile elds. River water is particularly benecial, since it is rich in nutrients
and silt. In warmer climates, irrigation can allow for multiple harvests every year, where none
was possible before. Still, agriculture may not provide as high rents as oil or diamonds. But
total agricultural production has by far outstripped mining output throughout human history,
and it still does so in most countries today. The scope for rent-seeking in agriculture may
therefore be higher, although the rents per production unit may be lower than in mining. The
potential for irrigation to have the same negative e¤ect on institutions should, by implication,
be as quantitatively important as it has been shown to be the case for other point-source
resources.11
A small note on irrigation technology is warranted here. New technologies have reduced the
relative cost of irrigation and many areas today are equipped for irrigation, although it only
provides a slight increase in yields compared to rainfed conditions. Furthermore, the possibility
of pumping ground water from aquifers has presumably made irrigation more di¤use than it was
historically, where it almost exclusively relied on a visible water source and canals, dams, and
similar infrastructure. Our hypothesis is not related to more recent irrigation techniques. We
discuss this issue at further length in Section 3, where we introduce our measure of irrigation
11E.g., Ross (2001), Isham et al. (2005), Bulte et al. (2005), Boschini et al. (2007), and Williams (2011).
91
Chapter 3: Irrigation and autocracy
potential. In what follows, we use the term irrigation as shorthand for traditional irrigation
methods.
2.2 Amplifying mechanisms
Apart from being a point-source resource, irrigation di¤ers from rainfed agriculture in other
aspects that tilt power in favor of a rent-seeking elite at the expense of independent farmers.
Irrigation systems resemble a public good, and construction and maintenance is often expen-
sive. Local land lords or centralized governments are therefore in a better position to nance
the construction of irrigation systems than individual farmers, and consequently to claim own-
ership to them. That conclusion was also drawn by the geographer Commodore B. Fisher who,
observing early 20th century Persia, noted that:
"Because of the expense and the di¢ culty of cooperative e¤ort on the part of
small landowners, these irrigation systems are privately owned and tend to perpet-
uate the feudal system which is well organized in Persia today. A wealthy family
can purchase an extensive tract of desert land, make a large investment in a water
system, and attract hundreds of tenants who are eager to make their homes around
the water supply. Under the need of water and the di¢ culty of securing it, these
tenants are easily reduced to virtual slavery."12
Admittedly, irrigation systems can be built and maintained in a completely decentralized
fashion as Ostrom (1990) shows. Although exceptions can be found, such arrangements are
inherently unstable due to the bargaining process involved and tend to be short-lived com-
pared to centralized systems.13 Rent-seeking elites may also be tempted to claim ownership of
decentralized irrigation systems, especially when existing property rights are insecure.
The ability to monitor production at low cost is one of the essential characteristics of
point-source resources. Besides making agriculture spatially concentrated, irrigation also eases
monitoring by making production more transparent. As pointed out by Mayshar et al. (2012),
12Fisher (1928).
13See, e.g., Ostrom and Gardner (1993), footnote 15.
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the observability of the amount of water allocated to the individual plot in irrigated areas
increases the predictability of yields. This made absentee landlordism based on sharecropping
or serfdom more attractive. The land owner did not need to monitor e¤ort directly. Shirking
could be prevented by promising severe punishment if the tenant or serf failed to produce the
amount of crops predicted by the amount of water allocated to the plots. Large land holdings
were therefore more economically attractive in irrigated societies than in rainfed areas and, as
a consequence, a centralization of land ownership in the hands of an elite or a despotic state
were more likely to occur. The tendency was reinforced by the high xed costs of building and
maintaining irrigation systems as explained by Commodore B. Fisher in the quote above.
Transparency of agricultural production also facilitated taxation. In Egypt, for example,
accurate estimates of yields could be calculated in advance by observing the height reached
by the annual oods, and taxes could be set accordingly.14 Ease of taxation reduced the
bargaining power of the population when the rulers were in need of revenue which, as argued
by Bates and Lien (1985), made the rulers less likely to o¤er representation in return for tax
payments.
2.3 Historical examples
Serfdom and sharecropping seem to have been the norm in the ancient societies that Wittfo-
gel (1957) identied as hydraulic. An interesting case analyzed by Mayshar et al. (2012) is
Mesopotamia. Agriculture in Lower Mesopotamia (Babylonia) was fed by water from Tigris
and Euphrates, and land ownership was concentrated within a small, but powerful elite. In-
dependent owner-occupied farms were, by contrast, prevalent in Upper Mesopotamia where
agriculture was chiey rainfed. A more recent example is documented by Islam (1997), who
show that the correlation between the share of land with canal irrigation and the share of land
tilled by tenants was 0.58 across districts in Punjab in the early 1920s.
Egypt and Mesopotamia are the classic examples of ancient irrigation civilizations. In
addition, Wittfogel (1957) mentions China, the Mayas, the Incas, the Pueblos (Mexico/United
States), and the Chagga (Tanzania).
14Cooper (1976) documents this procedure. See also Mayshar et al. (2012).
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A notable, but less well known, example is a society existing from around 900-1532 AD
in the Pampa de Chaparrí on the north coast of Peru.15 The society was governed by a
hierarchical system of lords, each of whom distributed the water on his/her land to the local
farmers in return for labor. In return for water rights, each lord paid a tribute to another
lord above him. In e¤ect, the society was organized in a pyramid-shaped hierarchy with a
centralized government at the pinnacle. Thus, the state managed to extract considerable rents
even though it did not control the distribution of water in detail. Moreover, the archaeological
evidence presented by Hayashida (2006) indicates that these hierarchical institutions survived
the rule of three di¤erent civilizations (Sicán, Chimú, and Inka).
Another example is the princely state of Hunza in Pakistan, established by Mir Silim Khan
in 1790.16 In earlier periods, the region was split in three smaller city states governed by a Mir,
who mostly held nominal power. That changed when Silim Khan came to power. He ordered
the construction of massive irrigation systems and united the Hunza in one state. This enabled
him to control the allocation of water to each Hunza community and coordinate agricultural
activities in detail. Villagers were presented with an agricultural timetable stating when to
plant, irrigate, and harvest their crops. Farmers who failed to follow these directions were
ned. The irrigation system generated large amounts of revenue for the Mir, who exercised
considerable political power through a hierarchy of o¢ cials.
2.4 Existing institutions
Point-source resource abundance does not always lead to a resource curse. It seems to depend
on the quality of the institutions present in a country or region when the resource is discovered
or becomes feasible to extract.17 Oil discoveries in the North Sea have not turned Norway into
an authoritarian country, just as oil discoveries in Texas and the Mexican gulf have had little
impact on institutions in the United States. Norway and the United States both possessed well
developed and solid democratic institutions when oil was discovered. They had a diversied
economy, with other groups providing democratic opposition to the special interest groups of
15See Hayashida (2006) for further discusson of Pampa de Chaparrí.
16See Sidky (1997).
17See, e.g., Boschini et al. (2007) and Mehlum et al. (2006).
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the oil industry. In poorer countries, where democratic institutions are fragile or non-existent,
ruling elites are in a better position to shape and use institutions to turn such oil bonanzas
into their personal cash cows. The resulting nancial gain can then be used to entrench their
power further. Many of the OPEC member states in the Persian Gulf t this pattern.18
Irrigation is an old technology, mastered already in ancient Mesopotamia. Strong demo-
cratic institutions found in Western democracies are new in comparison. Few places had
institutions present providing checks and balances on the ruling elite when irrigation was rst
introduced. The dramatic increase in the extent of irrigation in the 20th century, however, is
unlikely to have had any detrimental e¤ect on institutional quality in Western democracies.
2.5 Institutional persistence
Institutions are sustained by more than habit. They often accommodate narrow special interest
groups who will ght to keep their privileges. Both the elite and the institutions of irrigation-
based societies may therefore survive, even if agriculture ceases to be an important part of the
economy.
There are numerous examples of such institutional persistence. Following the pioneering
work of Acemoglu et al. (2001), many studies use the transplantation of institutions during
the colonial era as random experiments to identify the e¤ect on present-day institutions. Dell
(2010) shows that the mining mita in Peru, a system of coerced labor abolished in 1812, still
exerts a negative e¤ect on land tenure and public goods provision in the a¤ected areas. Iyer
and Banerjee (2005) and Iyer (2010) use regional variation in the colonial institutions set up
by the British in India and show that it still matters today. And a wide range of studies
use cross-country evidence to establish the importance of colonial institutions on present-day
outcomes.19
Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2000) argue that even when slavery was abolished in the Ameri-
cas, the plantation-owning elites maintained their land ownership and much of their political
power.20 Democracy would disturb this position of power, and the elites consequently sup-
18See Ross (2001), Ross (2012).
19E.g., Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Olsson (2009), and Hariri (2012).
20See also Isham et al. (2005) for a discussion.
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ported autocratic regimes. Even within the United States, slavery had a lasting legacy on
institutions. Lagerlöf (2004) and Soares et al. (2012) show that present-day variation in insti-
tutional quality and income inequality within the United States can be traced to antebellum
slavery.
Inspired by the insights of Sokolo¤ and Engerman, Easterly (2007) use the suitability
for sugar cane relative to wheat as an instrument for present-day inequality. Instrumented
inequality, in turn, predicts poor institutional outcomes and economic underdevelopment. It
also predicts less schooling, consistent with the model and the results reported by Galor et al.
(2009).
The argument in this paper is similar to the argument made by Engerman and Sokolo¤
(2000) and Easterly (2007). The elites in control of the irrigation systems were able to amass
large personal fortunes and political power. Irrigation also barred the entry of independent
farmers, and thus slowed the emergence of a middle class. Both developments made it easier
for the ruling elite to fend o¤ calls for democracy.
3 Methodology and irrigation data
The arguments outlined above lead to the testable implication that societies with a history of
irrigation are more autocratic today. To test this, we would like to estimate a regression on
the form:
institutionsi = 0 + 1irrigationi +X
0
i + ui ; (1)
where i indexes the unit of observation, institutions is a measure of autocracy, irrigation
is a measure of actual historical irrigation, X is a vector of control variables, and u is an error
term. This specication, however, leads to multiple problems.
First of all, irrigation is likely to be endogenous. Higher income could lead to more invest-
ments in irrigation projects. If democratic institutions are conducive to economic development,
this would bias the estimate of 1. Alternatively, strong autocratic regimes may be better at
constructing large irrigation works.21
21This has often been used to criticize Wittfogel (1957), see, e.g., Fukuyama (2011).
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Another issue is the lack of historical irrigation data at the cross-country level. Systematic
surveys of irrigated areas began only in 1961, when the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) started to collect data.22 Reduced costs and new technologies, though, have caused a
vefold increase in the area equipped for irrigation in the 20th century and modern data is
therefore hardly a good proxy for historical irrigation.23
Furthermore, it is not clear that modern irrigation technologies are associated with the
same point-source resource qualities as traditional irrigation methods. Traditional irrigation
relied on an observable water source and costly infrastructure, whereas modern drilling and
pumping technologies have allowed independent farmers to reach aquifers deep beneath the
surface at low costs. Technological and economic progress may therefore have weakened the
contemporaneous link between irrigation and institutional quality.24 The low cost of irrigation
today also means that many areas are equipped for irrigation, even if irrigation only increases
yields marginally. Moreover, in many areas in Europe and the United States, modern irrigation
systems are just a precautionary measure and only used when an occasional draught hits.25
Without a substantial e¤ect on annual yields, irrigation is unlikely to have a substantial e¤ect
on institutions.
3.1 Irrigation impact and irrigation potential
To avoid biases due to endogeneity, and as an alternative to lacking historical data, we use a
measure of the potential for irrigation which is based on geographical and climatic factors. As
a benchmark, this measure is our main explanatory variable. We also run IV regressions where
actual irrigation is instrumented with irrigation potential. However, since the data on land
equipped for irrigation across countries and across subnational regions is a noisy measure of
historical irrigation use, the rst stage becomes weak. In the sample of ethnographic societies,
22Data do exist on estimates of land equipped for irrigation for earlier years, which we elaborate on further
below and also use for robustness checks.
23Freydank and Siebert (2008).
24The Aquastat database has some information on the type of irrigation used, but only for a small sample of
countries where irrigation is widely used. The lack of a control group of countries makes the data unsuitable
for our analysis.
25Freydank and Siebert (2008).
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we have a more reliable measure of historical irrigation and hence the rst stage is strong. To
avoid the problem of weak identication, we use the reduced form as our main specication,
and run IV regressions as robustness checks.
Our irrigation potential variable is based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO)s global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) 2002 database.26 Using geographical and
climatic variables such as soil fertility, precipitation, sunlight hours, and temperature, FAO
computes how much the annual agricultural yield can be expected to increase when an area
is irrigated compared to the yield obtained without irrigation (i.e., under completely rainfed
conditions). Only areas where irrigation is technically feasible are considered, that is, areas
close to a water source. The calculation is done for each 0.083x0.083o (latitude-by-longitude)
grid cell, which corresponds to 9x9 km at the Equator.
The FAO divides the potential gain from irrigation into ve impact classes. Impact class 1
indicates areas where rainfall is su¢ cient and where additional water will not increase yields
(light grey in the map in Figure 1). Impact class 2 is areas where irrigation potentially can
increase yields by 1-20 percent. Impact class 3 is 20-50 percent, impact class 4 is 50-100 percent,
and impact class 5 is more than 100 percent. Impact class 5 is usually found in areas where
irrigation permits multiple harvests or where no agriculture is possible without irrigation. The
geographical distribution of the ve impact classes is shown in Figure 1. Areas which are too
dry to admit rainfed agriculture and which do not have a nearby water source are classied as
unsuitable to agriculture (dark grey areas in the map).
We dene irrigation potential as the area of land in impact class 5 as a fraction of arable
land:
irrigation potential =
impact class 5
arable land
: (2)
Arable land is land that is potentially suitable for agriculture if water is available. That
excludes areas where the terrain is too rugged, the climate is too cold, and the soil too sandy
to grow crops, but uncleared forest is included. Arable land enters the denominator as we
are interested in institutional quality in irrigation dependent areas relative to rainfed areas.
26Our empirical strategy is similar to that of Nunn and Qian (2011), who use agricultural suitability for
growing potatoes as a source of exogenous variation in actual potato cultivation.
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Figure 1: Irrigation impact classes.
Sources: Impact classes: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)s global Agro-Ecological
Zones (GAEZ) 2002 database, hydraulic societies: Wittfogel (1957).
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Moreover, Malthusian dynamics have ensured that population densities are relatively low in
most areas unsuitable for agriculture. The dominating institutions in an area are likely to have
evolved in the areas that hold the greatest number of people, and, by focusing on arable land
only, we get a clearer picture of the circumstances that shaped them in areas. Dividing by
total land instead would introduce a measurement error. The vast deserts of Egypt would, for
example, make the country seem less irrigation dependent that it is actually the case.
We dene arable land as land belonging to either of the 5 impact classes, and irrigation potential
consequently ranges from 0 to 1. Examples of countries with irrigation potential = 1 are
Egypt, Turkmenistan, and Qatar. Examples of countries with irrigation potential = 0 are
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Macedonia.27 Countries with intermediate levels of irrigation
potential include Argentine (0.42), Jordan (0.54), and Namibia (0.56).
We disregard impact classes below impact class 5 for two reasons. First, as we will show in
the next subsection, irrigation potential based on impact class 5 is a better predictor of actual
historical irrigation than a measure that includes one or more of the lower impact classes.
Second, as explained above, mechanization and development of new types of irrigation (e.g.,
sprinkler irrigation) has reduced costs. At the same time, the development of new types of seed,
fertilizer, and pesticides has made the absolute gain from irrigation larger in each impact class,
in e¤ect reducing the relative cost of constructing irrigation systems even further. While it is
protable to adopt irrigation in many areas with impact class 2 or 3 today, it was probably
neither feasible nor protable historically. And historical irrigation is what matters for our
hypothesis.
3.2 Irrigation potential and actual irrigation
In addition to the irrigation impact classes, Figure 1 also shows the location of the societies
which Wittfogel (1957) identied as hydraulic, i.e., autocratic societies dependent on irrigation
27These countries would have a much higher irrigation potential if we used the lowest cut-o¤ level of >0%,
which is in line with the relatively high present day irrigation levels in these countries. This supports the idea
that present day costs related to irrigation are fairly low, meaning that a lower benet is needed in order for
irrigation agriculture to be protable.
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works on a large scale.28 Most of these societies are located in areas with irrigation impact class
5, indicating that our irrigation potential variable is capturing some dimension of historical
irrigation. To validate our measure of irrigation potential systematically, we now compare it
to three data sets with information on actual irrigation.
The Ethnographic Atlas compiled by Murdock (1967) contains historical information on
1167 societies surveyed by ethnographers. The societies are scattered across the globe and
measured at a point in time before contact with Europeans. The societies were observed at
di¤erent points in time, ranging from 1750 BC to 1965 AD. Most of them, however, were
observed in the 19th and early 20th century. 312 of the societies in the Atlas had intensive
agriculture at the time of observation. Of these, 126 had irrigated intensive agriculture.29
Coordinates provided in the Atlas allow us to merge the ethnographic data with our measure
of irrigation potential and other geographical variables.30
Freydank and Siebert (2008) have compiled a comprehensive data set on land equipped for
irrigation in 236 countries. The data covers 1900 to 2003, and is based on numerous sources.
However, data before 1961 when FAO started to collect irrigation data are mainly estimates
based on extrapolation, comparisons with other countries, and qualitative information. Less
than 15 percent of the observations in 1900 are based on actual data compared to 95 percent
of the observations in 2000.
Siebert et al. (2007) provide a disaggregated map of land equipped for irrigation in 2000.
The level of disaggregation is 0.083x0.083o, corresponding to the level of disaggregation in our
irrigation potential data shown in Figure 1.
Table 1 shows the simple correlations between actual irrigation according to the three data
sets, and four measures of irrigation potential. Our baseline measure, based on impact class
5, is in the top row (measures share of arable land where irrigation can more than double
agricultural yields). Irrigation potential (IC 4-5) in the second row includes impact class 4 and
28Also marked on the map is whether Wittfogel identied the societies as loose or compact hydraulic societies.
While both types are hydraulic, the latter were somewhat more hydraulic than the former.
29Seven additional societies with irrigation are placed on small islands where no irrigation potential data is
available. They are left out of the analysis.
30We follow Alesina et al. (2013) and calculate the geographic variables for the area within a 200 km radius
from the coordinates given in the Ethnographic Atlas.
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5 (irrigation can increase yields by at least 50%). Irrigation potential (IC 3-5) includes impact
class 3, 4 and 5 and so on.
The coe¢ cient of correlation is positive and signicant at a 1-percent level, no matter what
irrigation data and which irrigation potential measure we use. But our preferred measure
using only impact class 5 has the highest correlation with actual historical irrigation use. The
correlations with historical irrigation fall gradually as more impact classes are added to the
irrigation potential variable. This is consistent with our expectation that a large potential
yield increase was necessary in order for historical societies to be willing to incur the high costs
of engaging in irrigation.
Table 1. Correlations b etween actual and potentia l irrigation
Actual h istorica l irrigation
a
Irrigation 1900 (estim ate)
b
Irrigation 2000 (actual)
b
Irrigation 2000 (actual)
c
Unit Ethnographic so ciety Country Country 0.083x0.083
o
grid
Irrigation potentia l (IC 5) 0.314*** 0.344*** 0.285*** 0.134***
Irrigation potentia l (IC 4-5) 0.298*** 0.343*** 0.272*** 0.148***
Irrigation potentia l (IC 3-5) 0.272*** 0.292*** 0.239*** 0.147***
Irrigation potentia l (IC 2-5) 0.208*** 0.241*** 0.205*** 0.153***
Observations 312 192 192 841,119
Notes: Actual irrigation in the ethnographic societies is a dummy variable = 1 if agriculture is irrigation-based
and 0 if it is rainfed (column 1), while across countries and grid cells (columns 2-4) it measures land equipped for
irrigation as a share of total arable land. Irrigation potential (IC 5) is the fraction of arable land where irrigation
can more than double agricultural yields, for irrigation potential (IC 4-5), irrigation can increase yields by at least
50%, for irrigation potential (3-5) irrigation can increase yields by at least 20%, and last for irrigation potential (IC
2-5), irrigation can increase yields by at least 1%. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level,
respectively. aSource: Murdock (1967). bSource: Freydank and Siebert (2008). cSource: Siebert et al. (2007).
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4 Empirical results at the country level
Institutional quality is hard to measure, and no quantitative yard stick for democracy is perfect.
The most widely used indicator in quantitative studies of democracy is the polity2 index
from the Marshall et al. (2010) Polity IV database.31 It is composed of two subindices: The
democracy subindex reects constitutional constraints on the executive and the ability of the
population to elect leaders, vote for policies, and participate in the political process. The
autocracy subindex reects the lack of constraints on the executive and the degree to which
the executive can control political participation and select new leaders. Each of these indices
ranges from 0 to 10. The polity2 index is computed as the democracy subindex subtracted by
the autocracy subindex, and thus ranges from -10 to 10 (high values meaning more democratic).
Examples of countries with a score of 10 in the polity2 index is the United States, United
Kingdom, and Sweden. The only countries to score a -10 are Saudi Arabia and Oman, but
Swaziland, North Korea, and Uzbekistan come close with a polity2 score of -9 or less. In the
midrange, we nd a number of Sub-Saharan African countries along with countries such as
Kyrgyzstan, Haiti, and Cambodia.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the relation between irrigation potential and the polity2 index
in 2010. The coe¢ cient from a simple OLS regression is negative and signicant, indicating
that countries with higher irrigation potential are more autocratic.32 Taken at face value, the
estimate implies that a region with no irrigation potential will be 9.5 points more democratic
on the 21 point polity2 scale than a country with full irrigation potential.
We are interested in long-term e¤ects, and using a single year of observation may therefore
introduce noise in the polity2 scores in countries with unstable regimes. We therefore follow
Hariri (2012) and use the average of the polity2 index over the post-Cold War period (1991-
2010) as our main outcome variable in the empirical analysis below. As shown in column (2)
of Table 2, the estimated coe¢ cient is indistinguishable from the single year 2010.
Columns (3)-(6) illustrate that the link between irrigation and autocracy is no new phe-
31The data is available online from www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
32The e¤ect goes through both subindices of the polity2 index. The coe¢ cient on irrigation potential in a
regression with the democracy index substituted for the polity2 index is -5.207. The similar coe¢ cient for the
autocracy subindex is 4.886. Both estimates are signicant at the 1% level.
103
Chapter 3: Irrigation and autocracy
nomenon. While the estimate on irrigation is somewhat lower and the standard errors are
larger due to smaller samples, it is still signicant in all four half-centuries between 1800 and
2000.
Table 2. Various m easures of democracy on irrigation potentia l
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep endent variab le p olity2 p olity2 p olity2 polity2 p olity2 p olity2 fh_avg
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -9 .558*** -9 .726*** -8 .537*** -5 .917** -6 .150*** -3 .887* 2.599***
(1.497) (1 .386) (1 .130) (2 .282) (2 .183) (2 .036) (0 .393)
Observations 158 160 160 77 50 44 177
R -squared 0.216 0.227 0.187 0.069 0.057 0.030 0.155
Period 2010 1991-2010 1950-2010 1900-1950 1850-1900 1800-1850 1991-2010
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(6) is averages of the polity2 index. It measures
how democratic political institutions are and ranges from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). The
dependent variable in column (1) is computed in 2010, in column (2) is an average over the period 1991-2010,
while columns (2)-(6) use di¤erent subperiods of that. The dependent variable in column (7) is an average of civil
liberties (ranges 1-7) and political rights (ranges 1-7) from Freedom House, where a higher score indicates a lower
degree of freedom. Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where irrigation
can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at
the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
In column (7), an alternative measure of democracy is used: The average of the Civil
Liberties and Political Rights ratings by Freedom House.33 ;34 Countries are categorized on a
scale from 1 to 7 according to the amount of political rights and civil liberties they o¤er their
citizens. A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 indicates the lowest.
As expected, citizens living in areas with higher irrigation potential are less likely to enjoy
civil liberties and political rights. In the remainder of this paper, we use the polity2 index as
explanatory variable, but we obtain similar results using the Freedom House measure.
4.1 Geographical control variables
Table 3, column (1) restates the simple relation between the polity2 index averaged over
the period 1991-2010 and irrigation potential. In column (2), continent dummies (Europe,
Asia, North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania) are included in the regression.
33Available online at www.freedomhouse.org.
34In an earlier version of the paper, we used the less popular "freedom indicator" from Freedom House and
obtained similar results.
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The estimate of interest decreases because Africa and Asia have signicantly higher irrigation
potential and, at the same time, are more autocratic than the average country. Ever since it
was suggested by Hall and Jones (1999), the distance from the Equator has been widely used
as a proxy for development or institutional quality. As shown in column (3), countries located
further away from the Equator are indeed more democratic, but the coe¢ cient on irrigation
potential is unchanged and still highly signicant.
Table 3. D emocracy on irrigation potentia l contro lling for geography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -9 .726*** -5 .786*** -6 .546*** -6 .320*** -5 .697*** -5 .990*** -5 .318** -6 .732**
(1.386) (1 .543) (1 .564) (2 .148) (1 .497) (1 .486) (2 .553) (2 .826)
Absolute latitude 0.071** 0.101
(0.033) (0 .066)
Precip itation -0 .378 1.223 5.785** -1 .270
(0.898) (1 .158) (2 .323) (3 .493)
Temperature -0 .097 0.010
(0.067) (0 .125)
Soil constra ints (% ) -5 .941 -4 .896
(4 .963) (4 .804)
Squared precip itation -1 .796* 0.336
(0.935) (1 .208)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
R -squared 0.227 0.480 0.493 0.481 0.489 0.485 0.500 0.452 0.481
Continent dumm ies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. All geographical variables are
computed by averaging over the modern-day borders of the country. Temperature is average daily temperature over
the period 1961-1990 in degrees Celsius. Precipitation is the average daily precipitation over the period 1961-1990
in meters. Soil constraints is the fraction of land with more than few soil and terrain constraints to crop growth.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Irrigation potential is based on numerous geographical and climatic variables. To check
whether it is one of the components of irrigation potential variable (e.g., precipitation), and
not the variable itself, that is correlated with the polity2 index, we include other potentially
relevant geographical variables in our regression. 35 We control for each of these factors one
by one in columns (4)-(6) and simultaneously in column (7). None of these are individually
35Temperature, precipitation, and soil constraints are from FAOs Agro-Ecological Zones Database. Precip-
itation and temperature are averaged over the period 1961-1990. Soil quality is the combination of soil depth,
fertility, drainage, texture, chemical,a dn terrain slope constraints. Specically, the measure is the share of land
which ranges between being unsuitable for agriculture to having few soil constraints. The omitted categories
are no or very few soil constraints.
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Figure 2: AV-plot illustrating the partial e¤ect of irrigation potential on polity2. The speci-
cation corresponds to column (7) of Table 3.
signicant, and their inclusion has negligible impact on the irrigation potential coe¢ cient.
The added-variable plot of column (7) of Table 3 shown in Figure 2 conrms visually that our
nding is not driven by a particular country or group of countries.36
Haber and Menaldo (2010) show that precipitation exerts a non-linear e¤ect on political
institutions with intermediate levels of rainfall being the most conducive to democracy. They
argue that this relationship is a proxy for the climatic suitability for growing cereals, a class
of crops which are storable with only modest returns to scale in production. Storability allows
for an accumulation of surplus which, according to Haber and Menaldo (2010), historically has
permitted trade and specialization. Modest scale returns created a more equal distribution of
property, an argument closely related to ours. Combined, Haber and Menaldo (2010) contend
that these characteristics of cereal production gave rise to stronger property rights, human
36The result also holds if we exclude the 10 countries with irrigation potential = 1; the 44 countries with
irrigation potential = 0; or all 54 countries at the same time. If anything, the level of signicance and the
estimate rise in absolute value.
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capital investments, and the development of representative institutions.
In our regressions, we capture the nonlinear relationship between rainfall and democracy
by adding precipitation and precipitation squared as control variables in Table 3. Column
(8) shows that the nonlinear relationship exists when irrigation potential is excluded from the
regression. However, when we include irrigation potential in column (9), both rainfall terms
become insignicant, individually and jointly.37
The coe¢ cient on irrigation potential is 5-6 in most of the specications in Table 3
indicating that going from no irrigation potential to full irrigation potential will move a
country 5-6 points toward democracy on the polity2 scale. Or, to give an example, Alge-
ria as of 2010 (polity2 = 2; irrigation potential = 0:79) would be as democratic as Turkey
(polity2 = 7; irrigation potential = 0:08) if it did not have a history of irrigation.
A range of other geographical control variables suggested in the literature to inuence
economic development or institutions were also tested. These include: malaria ecology, distance
to coast or navigable river, land within tropics, terrain ruggedness, total area, a dummy for
whether a country is landlocked or not, a measure of the standard deviation of rain, and arable
land as a share of total area. Adding these variables does not change the estimated coe¢ cient
on irrigation potential. The results are reported in Appendix Table A1.
4.2 Natural resource abundance
If irrigation potential is correlated with the presence of other point-source resources that are
not su¢ ciently accounted for in the regressions, our estimates may be biased. One obvious
worry is that the areas suitable for irrigation are also suitable for plantation crops. To check
whether this biases our results, we include the proxy for plantation crop suitability suggested
by Easterly (2007) in the regression. As shown in Column (2) of Table 4, it is insignicant,
and the coe¢ cient on irrigation potential is unchanged.38
The traditional examples of cursed point-source resources are fossil fuels and minerals. In
columns (3)-(5) of table 4, we include three measures of such resources found in the literature.
Only oil production is signicant. Including oil production also reduces the estimated coe¢ cient
on irrigation potential, presumably because a number of the oil producing Middle Eastern
37Conrmed by an F-test with a p-value of 0.897.
38We have more observations than Easterly (2007) as we constructed the wheat-to-sugar mea-
sure using grid level data from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones Database, available online at
http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/. It is the inclusion of continents, not irrigation potential, that renders the
estimate of the wheat-sugar relation insignicant.
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countries have high irrigation potential.
All resource control variables are included simultaneously in Column (6). The main result
pertains: Countries with higher irrigation potential are more autocratic.
Table 4. D emocracy on irrigation potentia l contro lling for resources
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -6 .404*** -6 .597*** -5 .060*** -6 .509*** -6 .376*** -5 .371***
(1.584) (1 .580) (1 .704) (1 .526) (1 .574) (1 .658)
(log) Total area w ith wheat / sugar 3.641 2.352
(2.284) (2 .391)
O il (1000 barrels/day/cap) -5 .521*** -4 .909***
(1.842) (1 .794)
M ineral rents, % of GDP 0.066 0.036
(0.128) (0 .118)
D iamond dummy 1.178 0.837
(1.507) (1 .514)
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152
R -squared 0.491 0.498 0.510 0.492 0.494 0.516
Continent dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
4.3 Development and colonization
Lipset (1959) famously hypothesized that democracy is a consequence of economic modern-
ization. If the theory is correct and if irrigation is correlated with economic development, the
observed e¤ect of irrigation on institutional quality could work through modernization. For
instance, a high irrigation potential could slow democratization if irrigated societies specialized
in agricultural production and failed to develop modern industries.39
As a rst step to check whether that is the case, column (2) of Table 5 includes (the
logarithm of) real GDP per capita in year 2000 from Penn World Tables. As expected, richer
countries are more democratic. But the e¤ect does not seem to work through irrigation, since
the estimated coe¢ cient on irrigation potential is unchanged. Note, however, that including
GDP could lead to an estimation bias due to endogeneity.
In column (3) and (4), we include, respectively, the number of years since the Neolithic
transition, which measures the number of years since the transition from hunting and gathering
39Matsuyama (1992), Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008), and Williamson (2011), among others, argue that
such specialization in agricultural production might explain the unequal global distribution of income today.
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to agriculture, and the State Antiquity Index, which captures the cumulated number of years a
state has been present within modern-day country borders.40 Both measures have been shown
to be correlated to contemporary as well as historical measures of economic development.41 As
shown in columns (3) and (4), the coe¢ cients on both variables are insignicant.
Column (5) includes population density in 1500 AD from MacEvedy and Jones (1978).
Population density is a standard measure of economic development in Malthusian economies
where higher living standards translated into higher fertility and/or lower mortality (see e.g.,
Ashraf and Galor (2011)). In support of Lipset (1959), the coe¢ cient on population density
is positive, indicating that areas which were more developed historically are more democratic
today. At rst, this result seems at odds with the reversal-of-fortune argument put forward
by Acemoglu et al. (2002). They argue that densely populated regions colonized by European
powers received fewer European settlers bringing democratic institutions with them from their
home country. However, the estimated coe¢ cient on population density is mainly driven by
Europe and countries that were never colonized by Europeans.
Table 5. D emocracy on irrigation potentia l contro lling for developm ent and colon ization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -5 .672*** -6 .344*** -4 .798** -5 .723*** -4 .831*** -5 .680*** -5 .750*** -5 .839*** -4 .128* -5 .627**
(1.855) (1 .985) (2 .214) (2 .009) (1 .819) (1 .820) (1 .858) (1 .862) (2 .389) (2 .238)
(log) Real GDP/cap, 2000 1.095** 0.759 0.521
(0 .442) (0 .478) (0 .445)
Years since Neolith ic -0 .406 -0 .488 -0 .531
(0.382) (0 .381) (0 .374)
State Antiqu ity Index 0.000 -0 .001
(0.001) (0 .001)
Pop density, 1500 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.142***
(0.044) (0 .053) (0 .050)
Colony dummy -0.043 -0 .863 -2 .088
(1.691) (1 .663) (1 .524)
Europ ean language (% ) 2.874*** 0.752 0.958
(0.890) (0 .872) (0 .916)
Europ ean descendants (% ) 2.911*** 0.234 0.385
(0.997) (1 .072) (1 .105)
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 148
R -squared 0.472 0.502 0.481 0.473 0.502 0.472 0.485 0.484 0.538 0.559
Continent dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
40These variables are obtained from, respectively, Putterman and Trainor (2006), and Bocksette and Put-
terman (2007). Using the Putterman (2008) migration-adjusted years since the Neolithic Revolution produces
similar results as the ones reported in Table 5.
41E.g., Diamond (1997), Bockstette et al. (2002), Hibbs and Olsson (2004) and Hariri (2012). Olsson and
Paik (2013) also suggest that within Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, an early agricultural transition
is associated with autocratic institutions today.
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irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Years since Neolithic measures
the years passed since agriculture was rst introduced in a society within the modern-day borders of the country.
The State Antiquity Index is a cumulative measure of how many years the country or any society within the
country has been governed by a centralized state. Population density, 1500 is the population in year 1500 as a
share of total area. log real GDP per capita is measured in PPP in 2000. The colony dummy equals 1 if the country
was ever colonized and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
A growing body of research documents the importance of colonization for current institu-
tions.42 If irrigation potential is correlated with colonization, our estimate of interest might be
biased. Column (6) of Table 5 includes a dummy equal to one if the country was ever colonized.
Colonization does not appear to explain variation in present-day democracy in addition to the
variation explained by irrigation potential. Columns (7) and (8) include measures of the extent
of European inuence: the fraction of the population that speaks a European language and the
fraction of the population with European descendants (descendants from Belgium, Germany,
Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, France, and Portugal). The impact of irrigation
potential is unaltered.
All variables are included simultaneously in Column (9). The estimate of interest is reduced
somewhat compared to column (1), albeit not signicantly. The State Antiquity Index has
fewer observations than the other variables. It is also insignicant, and we therefore exclude
it in column (10) to increase the number of observations. As a result, both the size and the
signicance of the irrigation potential coe¢ cient increases.
We now turn to a more thorough investigation of whether the link between irrigation and
autocracy is caused by colonization. Table 6 splits the sample in two: a sample of the 64
countries that were never a colony (columns 1-2) and a sample of the 96 countries that were
colonized at some point in time (columns 3-5).
Table 6 shows that the coe¢ cient on irrigation potential retains its sign and signicance
in both subsamples. However, the impact and explanatory power of irrigation is stronger
in the sample of countries that were never a colony. One interpretation of this nding is
that European colonialism diluted the e¤ect of irrigation. This would be consistent the large
literature arguing that colonization shaped institutions.
42E.g., Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2000), Iyer and Banerjee (2005), Nunn (2007),
Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009), Olsson (2009), Dell (2010), and Hariri (2012).
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Table 6. D emocracy on irrigation potentia l in non-co lon ies vs colon ies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample Non-colon ies Form er colon ies
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -15.436*** -11.364*** -6 .051*** -3 .441** -3 .352*
(2.859) (3 .549) (1 .576) (1 .508) (1 .716)
Malaria ecology index 0.012
(0.080)
Observations 64 64 96 96 96
R -squared 0.485 0.560 0.109 0.423 0.423
Continent dumm ies No Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Columns (1) and (2) include
only countries that were never colonized, while columns (3)-(5) include only countries that were once a colony.
Malaria ecology measures the contribution of vectors to the force of malaria transmission. ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
In the last column of Table 6, we include malaria ecology in order to test the notion that the
disease environment was crucial for the institutions set up by the colonial powers.43 We do not
nd evidence for that hypothesis when accounting for irrigation. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient
on irrigation stays unchanged.
4.4 Culture
Our last set of control variables measure religion and cultural fractionalization. People with
the same religious beliefs often share cultural values and these values could a¤ect political
institutions and development. For instance, Weber (1930) famously linked the rise of capital-
ism to Protestantism. More recently, Bruce (2004) describes how Protestant culture can be
conducive to democracy. It has also been debated whether Islamic culture and democracy is
incompatible.44 To address these debates, we include the fraction of Muslims and Protestants
in the population in the regressions in column (2) and (3) of Table 7. The signs of their respec-
tive coe¢ cients are as expected: Muslims are associated with less democracy, and Protestants
with more. Only the coe¢ cent for Protestants is signicant at the 10-percent level, however.
While insignicant, including the share of Muslims in the regressions reduces the coe¢ cient of
43Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). use settler mortality and not malaria ecology as a measure of the disease
environment. It is admittedly a more direct measure, but only available for a small sample of colonies. Moreover,
settler mortality is insignicant in a regression based on the smaller sample where data is available.
44See e.g., Bellin (2004), Huntington (1993), Kedourie (1992).
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irrigation potential somewhat. This is hardly surprising, since most Muslim countries are arid
and heavily dependent on irrigation.
It should be noted that cultural values and habits in many ways reect the economic
realities societies have faced throughout history. The religious control variables may thus be
endogenous, and the results should be treated with caution.
Cultural heterogeneity may also be a barrier to inclusive democracy. Alesina et al. (2003)
construct three measures of cultural heterogeneity based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious
fractionalization, and nd that all three are negatively correlated with institutional quality.
The e¤ect of irrigation potential is, as shown in columns 4-6 of Table 7, robust to adding the
Alesina et al. (2003) measures of cultural heterogeneity to the regression.45
In the nal column we add all cultural control variables simultaneously. The coe¢ cient for
irrigation potential is the only signicant coe¢ cient.
Table 7. D emocracy on irrigation potentia l contro lling for cu ltural values and fractionalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -5 .816*** -3 .720* -5 .579*** -5 .767*** -5 .846*** -5 .795*** -3 .524*
(1.586) (2 .133) (1 .618) (1 .565) (1 .670) (1 .653) (2 .077)
Muslim s (% ) -3 .337 -3 .287
(2.076) (2 .294)
Protestants (% ) 3.165* 2.208
(1.701) (1 .660)
Ethnic fractionalization -2 .789 -3 .853
(1.907) (2 .549)
L inguistic fractionalization -0 .182 2.349
(1.726) (2 .393)
Relig ious fractionalization 0.091 -1 .707
(1.629) (2 .076)
Observations 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
R -squared 0.517 0.534 0.523 0.526 0.517 0.517 0.549
Continent dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Muslims is the share of
Muslims in the population in year 2000. Likewise for Protestants. Ethnic fractionalization measures the probability
that two randomly drawn individuals are not from the same ethnic group. Likewise for linguistic and religious
fractionalization. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include
a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
45The simple correlation between polity2 and ethnic and language fractionalization is negative and signicant,
while both relations turn insignicant as continent dummies are included. The relation between religious
fractionalization and polity2 is insignicant throughout.
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4.5 IV estimates
So far, our regressions have been in reduced form, where actual historical irrigation was proxied
by irrigation potential. As argued earlier, accurate historical irrigation data is not available,
and present-day irrigation may not capture the e¤ect we are interested in. We therefore regard
the reduced form regressions as our main empirical results. But in this section we report the
results of instrumental variable regressions as a robustness check. Irrigation potential is used
as an instrument for actual irrigation.
Freydank and Siebert (2008) provide estimates for the total area equipped for irrigation
in years 1900-2003. We face a tradeo¤ between using historical, but inaccurate data and
using contemporary more accurate data. As stressed in Section 4, less than 15 percent of the
observations in 1900 are based on actual data, compared to 95 percent of the observations in
2000. Either measure, though, is an imprecise measure of actual historic irrigation, which is
what we are interested in. We show results for 1900 and 2000 for which we have calculated
area equipped for irrigation as a share of arable land.
Table 8 shows the OLS results from regressing polity2 on area equipped for irrigation in
1900 (panel A) and 2000 (panel B). The table uses the same basic geographical control variables
as Table 3. Irrigation is negatively related to polity2 across all columns, although not always
signicantly so. As expected, the correlation is lower in year 2000.46 This corresponds well to
the fact that irrigation in year 2000 does not have the same features of a point-source resource
and thus cannot be expected to be as detrimental to institutions.
46The di¤erence between the 1900 and 2000 estimates is larger than what is visible from the table, as irrigation
1900 ranges from 0 to 0.58, while irrigation 2000 ranges from 0 to 1.
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Table 8. OLS estim ates of democracy on area equipp ed for irrigation 1900 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A . Irrigation m easured in year 1900
Area equipp ed for irrigation 1900 (% ) -18.626*** -7 .354* -8 .219* -3 .884 -8 .718** -7 .660* -4 .695
(4.767) (4 .384) (4 .465) (4 .767) (4 .156) (4 .362) (4 .340)
Absolute latitude 0.031 0.093
(0.035) (0 .064)
Precip itation 1.658** 3.079***
(0.728) (0 .882)
Temperature -0 .120* -0 .074
(0.065) (0 .102)
Soil constra ints (% ) -3 .796 -4 .119
(4.910) (4 .685)
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
R -squared 0.046 0.417 0.419 0.438 0.431 0.419 0.474
Panel B . Irrigation m easured in year 2000
Area equipp ed for irrigation 2000 (% ) -6 .385** -2 .821 -3 .104 -1 .469 -3 .260 -2 .935 -1 .612
(2.626) (2 .154) (2 .191) (2 .063) (2 .117) (2 .141) (1 .922)
Absolute latitude 0.029 0.092
(0.034) (0 .064)
Precip itation 1.653** 3.068***
(0.690) (0 .861)
Temperature -0 .118* -0 .072
(0.065) (0 .102)
Soil constra ints (% ) -3 .736 -4 .142
(5.030) (4 .766)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
R -squared 0.041 0.420 0.422 0.441 0.433 0.422 0.477
Continent dumm ies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). The irrigation measure in panel A is area equipped for irrigation as a share of arable
land in year 1900, while the corresponding irrigation variable in panel B is measured in year 2000. All geographical
variables are computed by averaging over the modern-day borders of the country. Temperature is average daily
temperature over the period 1961-1990 in degrees Celsius. Precipitation is the average daily precipitation over the
period 1961-1990 in meters. Soil constraints is the fraction of land with more than few soil and terrain constraints
to crop growth. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include
a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The relation between actual irrigation and polity2 is potentially biased by endogeneity.
For instance, richer countries have better means to undertake irrigation projects and may,
according to the modernization hypothesis, also be more democratic. This would create a
spurious positive relation between irrigation and democracy. Indeed, once we instrument actual
irrigation with our irrigation potential measure in Table 9, the estimate on irrigation increases
in absolute terms. As expected, irrigation potential is a weak instrument in most specications
(the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is below 10).47 Estimated area equipped for irrigation is a
47The instrument would have been judged stronger had we instead used the Cragg-Donald F-statistic, which
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noisy measure of historical irrigation, which by construction generates a weak relation with
irrigation potential. The instrument is somewhat stronger when year 2000 is used, which
corresponds well to the fact that more actual data is used to calculate this year. In all columns,
the Anderson Rubin p-value shows that the estimate on irrigation is signicantly di¤erent from
zero.
Again, irrigation exerts a smaller impact on polity2 in year 2000 than in year 1900.
Table 9. IV estim ates of democracy on area equipp ed for irrigation 1900 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A . Irrigation m easured in year 1900
Area equipp ed for irrigation 1900 (% ) -107.933** -79.487* -100.302 -109.622 -76.805* -83.499 -70.420
(43.853) (47.208) (64.179) (101.900) (43.751) (51.099) (55.649)
Absolute latitude 0.141* 0.087
(0.076) (0 .089)
Precip itation -1 .554 1.181
(2.417) (1 .674)
Temperature -0 .215* -0 .114
(0.120) (0 .168)
Soil constra ints (% ) -8 .503 -5 .072
(6.594) (5 .077)
Observations 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
K leib ergen Paap F-statistic 6 .404 3.224 2.576 1.172 3.363 2.944 1.697
Anderson Rubin p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.033
Panel B . Irrigation m easured in year 2000
Area equipp ed for irrigation 2000 (% ) -38.508*** -30.846** -37.856** -40.792 -29.896** -32.352** -27.589
(11.921) (14.458) (18.832) (29.584) (13.302) (15.265) (18.461)
Absolute latitude 0.122* 0.074
(0.069) (0 .087)
Precip itation -1 .320 1.049
(2.350) (1 .871)
Temperature -0 .196* -0 .111
(0.113) (0 .161)
Soil constra ints (% ) -8 .210 -5 .107
(6.167) (5 .136)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
K leib ergen Paap F-statistic 11.95 6.114 4.647 2.080 6.493 5.558 3.003
Anderson Rubin p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.031
Continent dumm ies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Second stage IV estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least
democratic) to 10 (most democratic). The irrigation measure in panel A is area equipped for irrigation as a share of
arable land in year 1900, while the corresponding irrigation variable in panel B is measured in year 2000. Both are
instrumented with irrigation potential. All geographical variables are computed by averaging over the modern-day
borders of the country. Temperature is average daily temperature over the period 1961-1990 in degrees Celsius.
Precipitation is the average daily precipitation over the period 1961-1990 in meters. Soil constraints is the fraction
of land with more than few soil and terrain constraints to crop growth. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the
1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
is, however, not robust to heteroskedasticity.
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5 Subnational evidence
We now turn to subnational evidence on the link between irrigation and autocracy. The main
challenge is to nd suitable outcome variables, as many democratic institutions are established
at the national level. However, it is possible to obtain subnational data on individualsattitudes
towards democracy and we use this as our rst outcome variable. Our second outcome variable
is a historical indicator of whether a society was governed by an elite who obtained its power
from natural resources. We get this measure from a data set of ethnographic societies surveyed
before contact with Europeans.
5.1 Attitudes towards democracy
The World Values Survey and the European Values Study provide information on individuals
views on a broad range of issues, including democracy. We cannot say whether more favorable
views of democracy is a cause of local democracy, or whether the causality goes in the other
direction. But in both cases attitudes towards democracy should be linked to the actual quality
of local institutions.
The surveys divide countries into multiple subnational regions, and we match the survey
results in each region with irrigation potential in that region.48 This enables us to estimate
regressions of the form:
democracyidct = 0 + 1irrigationdc + ac + t +X
0
idct +W
0
dct + uidct (3)
for individual i interviewed in subnational district d in country c at time t. democracy
measures individuals expressed values for democracy, irrigation measures either irrigation
potential or irrigation in year 2000 measured at the subnational district level.49 ac is country-
xed e¤ects, t is time xed-e¤ects. Xidct is a vector of individual controls, and Wdct a vector
of geographical controls at the district level. As the dependent variable varies at the individual
level and the independent variable varies only at the district level, we cluster the standard errors
at the district level. One concern is that individualsvalues for democracy are inuenced by
country-wide institutions. We therefore always include country xed e¤ects, ac.
48The methodology of matching the individuals to the geographic shapeles is described in more detail in
Bentzen (2013) in a di¤erent context.
49Unfortunately, area equipped for irrigation in year 1900 is not available at the grid level, so we cannot
calculate district-level averages for this measure.
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We pool all currently available waves (1981-2009) of the World Values Survey and European
Values Study.50 We use two measures of democracy in our analysis. The rst is based on
respondentsexpressed opinion (on a scale from 1 to 4) about whether a democratic political
system is very good (4), fairly good (3), fairly bad (2) or very bad (1).51 This variable enters
in columns (1)-(2) in Table 10 and is labelled demo_good. The second measure is based on
a question that asked whether respondents agreed with the following statement: Democracy
may have problems but it is better than any other form of government. Respondents answered
strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3), and strongly agree (4).52 This variable enters in
columns (3)-(4) in Table 10 and is labelled demo_better.
Panel A of Table 10 shows the impact of irrigation potential on demo_good and demo_better.
All columns control for country and time xed e¤ects, age, age squared, gender, marital status,
agricultural occupation, and income- and educational attainment xed e¤ects. Columns (2)
and (4) add the basic geographical controls at the subnational district level: absolute latitude,
precipitation, temperature, and soil constraints.
The results in all columns of Table 10 show that individuals value democracy less when
residing in subnational districts with higher irrigation potential.
50The individual years in which an interview took place are 1981, 1984, 1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.
51This is variable e117 from the pooled WVS / EVS.
52This is variable e123 from the pooled WVS / EVS.
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Table 10. OLS and IV estim ates of democratic values on area equipp ed for irrigation 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep endent variab le demo_good demo_good demo_better demo_better
Panel A . Reduced form OLS estim ates
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -0 .069** -0 .056* -0 .054* -0 .060*
(0.030) (0 .032) (0 .031) (0 .031)
R -squared 0.108 0.110 0.099 0.101
Panel B . Second stage IV estim ates
Area equipp ed for irrigation 2000, % of arab le land -0 .179** -0 .280* -0 .132* -0 .279**
(0.084) (0 .152) (0 .072) (0 .132)
K leib ergen-Paap F-statistic 32.19 12.80 29.83 9.383
Anderson Rubin p-value 0.0213 0.0226 0.0780 0.0267
Observations 95,956 95,031 62,245 61,578
Baseline contro ls Y Y Y Y
Geo controls N Y N Y
Countries 70 70 52 52
Regions 747 740 485 481
Notes. The unit of analysis is individuals. The dependent variable is answers to whether the respondent thinks
that a democratic system is very bad (scores 1), fairly bad (2), fairly good (3), or very good (4) in col (1)-(2)
and whether the respondent disagrees strongly (scores 1), disagrees (2), agrees (3), or strongly agrees (4) with the
claim that democracy may have problems, but is the best political system in col (3)-(4). Irrigation potential ranges
from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where agricultural yields can be at least doubled by engaging
in irrigation compared to rainfed agriculture. Panel A shows reduced form OLS estimates of democratic values
on irrigation potential, while panel B shows IV estimates of democratic values on area equipped for irrigation
instrumented with irrigation potential. All regressions include country and year of interview xed e¤ects, age, age
squared, a male dummy, a married dummy, a dummy for agriculture worker, and 10 income and 8 education xed
e¤ects (Baseline controls). Geo controls refers to whether district level controls for absolute latitude, precipitation,
temperature, and soil constraints are included. Standard errors, clustered at the subnational district level, are
reported in parentheses. Asterisks ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level.
The panel A results can be regarded as reduced form results corresponding to the cross-
country results in Section 4. Panel B of Table 10 shows the corresponding second stage IV
results, where irrigation in equation 3 is instead measured by actual area equipped for irrigation
in year 2000, instrumented with irrigation potential. The Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic indicates
that irrigation potential is a strong instrument across all columns. Again, the IV estimates
are larger in absolute value than the OLS estimates, most likely because the IV strategy
removes the spurious positive relation between irrigation and democracy caused by omitting
development levels.
The IV-estimates conrm the link between irrigation and negative views of democracy. The
subnational evidence thus conrms the nding that areas that have engaged more in irrigation
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have been more likely to develop values that oppose democracy. The relation is not caused by
country-level variation in institutions or geography or any other variation at the country level.
Whether this local e¤ect stems from the historical distribution of power cannot be judged from
this exercise. This question motivates the analysis in the next section.
5.2 The Ethnographic Atlas
We now move back in history using data from the Ethnographic Atlas to measure democratic
institutions at the indigenous societal level (Murdock (1967)). The Atlas is based on ethno-
graphic evidence from traditional societies scattered around the globe, mostly from the 19th
and early 20th century. The data set includes latitude and longitude for each society centre,
and it is therefore possible to calculate our geographical variables at the local level.
There is no direct measure of autocracy or democracy in the Ethnographic Atlas.53 Instead
we use social stratication as an indicator of the distribution of power in the society. The
ethnographic societies are classied into ve di¤erent groups based on the social stratication
prevalent: complex stratication, hereditary aristocracy, elite stratication, wealth distinc-
tions, and no stratication.54 A society with elite stratication is, according to the denition
given in the Ethnographic Atlas, a society "...in which an elite class derives its superior sta-
tus from, and perpetuates it through, control over scarce resources, particularly land, and is
thereby di¤erentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class."55 We use elite stratication
as our dependent variable as it directly captures the sort of power distribution we are interested
in.56
We construct a variable called elite, which equals 1 if the society has elite stratication
and 0 if it is placed in one of the other categories.57 With this denition, 45 societies out
53There are some democracy indicators in the related Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS). Unfortu-
nately, there are too few observations for our purpose, and mostly from societies of hunters and gatherers
where irrigation is not relevant to the distribution of power.
54These are variables V66 (Class stratication) and V67 (Class stratication, secondary features) in the
Ethnographic Atlas.
55Another variable from the Ethnographic Atlas that could potentially be used to grasp the degree of local
democracy is based on the classication of election rules involved with the succession of the local headman.
However, this is not as direct a measure of what we are after and, in fact, in line with the reasoning by Wittfogel
(1957), we nd no impact of irrigation potential on this variable. A strong landed elite can exist side by side
with an elected local headman.
56Admittedly, power may be centralized in societies with hereditary aristocracy. Yet, without control of
resources, an aristocracy is likely to have faced more constraints on their execution of power than a resource
controlling elite.
57In some cases there are two classication systems prevailing at the same time. Here, we set elite equal to
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of a total of 826 societies where data is available are coded as elite = 1.58 Before running
regressions at the disaggregated level, we check whether the elite variable is indeed a good
indicator of subsequent autocratic institutions. To this end, we average our elite variable across
ethnographic societies within each country and compare the results to the present-day polity2
index. The correlation, depicted in Table is -0.23 and signicant, indicating that areas with
elite stratication historically are more likely to have turned into autocratic states today.59 We
also check that elite is a better measure than the other stratication categories. Table shows
the simple correlation between the polity2 index and the 5 stratication categories. Elite
stratication has the numerically highest correlation coe¢ cient with the polity2 index among
all 5 categories. The only other signicant coe¢ cient is the one for complex stratication. This
coe¢ cient has the opposite sign; societies with a complex stratication are more likely to end
up with democratic institutions today. Since complex stratication is vaguely dened, no clear
conclusions can be drawn from this correlation. We thus proceed to use elite stratication as
measure of historical local institutions that lead to autocracy.
Table 11. S imple correlations b etween polity2 and stratication
polity2
Stratication based on:
- Absence among free m en 0.08
- Wealth d istinctions -0 .13
- E lite contro l o f resources -0 .23**
- Dual (hered itary aristo cracy) -0 .11
- Complex (so cia l c lasses) 0 .19**
Observations 115
Notes: Simple correlations between the polity2 index and the ve stratication groups across 115 countries.
The stratication measures are aggregated up to the country level using present-day borders. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
We run regressions of the form:
elitesl = 0 + 1irrigation potentials + al +X
0
s + usl (4)
where s = 1; :::; 770 indexes ethnographic societies.60 We expect that 1 > 0; meaning that
irrigation increased elite stratication. irrigation potential and all the geographical control
one if one of the systems are elite stratication.
58We restrict the sample to include only societies using agriculture since irrigation does not matter for
stratication in a society without it. Moreover, there are no non-agricultural societies with elite stratication.
59There are in total 115 present day countries with one or more observations of ethnographic societies that
we can match with the polity2 measure. 27 of the countries have elite based societies.
60Of the 826 societies with data on agriculture and elite stratication, 770 also have data on irrigation
potential. The societies lacking irrigation potential data are primarily located at sea.
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variables are calculated within a 200 km radius of the society centre. In addition to continent
xed e¤ects, we include 55 language group xed e¤ects, al, since a shared language likely
indicates a shared cultural and historical background. We thereby remove variation in the
elite variable caused by a shared culture and history.
The simple regression coe¢ cient between irrigation potential and elite is shown in Table
12, column (1). It is 0.168 and highly signicant. When language - and continent xed e¤ects
are introduced in column (2), the estimated coe¢ cient doubles. The e¤ect of irrigation on elite
stratication therefore seems to have happened within cultural groups rather than between
them.61
Table 12. E lite stratication on irrigation potentia l contro lling for geographical factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estim ation m ethod OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS prob it
Irrigation potentia l (% ) 0.168*** 0.325*** 0.328*** 0.319*** 0.322*** 0.316*** 0.327*** 0.297*** 1.250***
(0.041) (0 .104) (0 .108) (0 .103) (0 .105) (0 .101) (0 .105) (0 .096) (0 .192)
Year 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Absolute latitude 0.079 0.252* 1.564
(0.077) (0 .138) (1 .411)
Precip itation -0 .000 0.000 -0 .003
(0.000) (0 .000) (0 .002)
Temperature 0.004 0.006 0.052
(0 .002) (0 .004) (0 .036)
Soil constra ints (% ) 0.050 0.016 -1 .050
(0.112) (0 .086) (0 .796)
Observations 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770 770
R -squared 0.057 0.221 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.224 0.221 0.228 .
Continent and 55 language dumm ies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates of elite on irrigation potential across ethnographic societies. OLS estimation is used in
columns (1)-(8) and probit estimation is used in column (9). The dependent variable, elite, is a dummy variable
equal to one if the society is socially stratied and ruled by an elite which bases its power on control of a natural
resource, and zero otherwise. All geographical variables are computed using the grid cells within 200 km of the
society centre. Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where irrigation
can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Year is the year of observation of the
ethnographic society. Precipitation is the average daily precipitation in meters. Temperature is average daily
temperature in degrees Celsius. Soil constraints is the fraction of land with more than few soil and terrain
constraints to crop growth. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All
regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors clustered at the language-group level in parentheses.
61Both the introduction of continent - and language group xed e¤ects increases the estimate on irrigation
potential. However, the latter is responsible for the largest part of the increase.
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Column (3) of Table 12 includes the year a given society was observed with no consequence
for the results. Columns (4)-(8) show that absolute latitude is the only geographical control
that obtains signicance, but only when all geographical variables are included jointly. Column
(9) reports the results from a probit estimation. The estimate of irrigation potential remains
positive and signicant at the 1% level.
It could be that elite stratication requires a certain level of economic development absent
in primitive societies. If that is the case, the estimated e¤ect of irrigation potential could run
through development, and not through the channels outlined in this paper. We control for
settlement complexity and agricultural intensity in Table 13, but none of these variable exert
a signicant e¤ect on polity2.
Table 13. E lite stratication on irrigation potentia l contro lling for development factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estim ation m ethod OLS OLS OLS OLS probit
Irrigation potentia l (% ) 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 1.665***
(0.108) (0 .109) (0 .083) (0 .083) (0 .234)
Agricu ltural intensity 0.000 0.002 0.019
(0 .009) (0 .010) 0.090)
Settlem ent complex ity -0 .006 -0 .006 -0 .034
(0.015) (0 .015) (0 .101)
Observations 770 770 770 770 770
R -squared 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.223 .
Continent and 55 language dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Estimates of elite on irrigation potential for ethnographic societies, columns (1)-(4) estimated with
OLS, column (5) estimated with probit. The dependent variable, elite, is a dummy variable equal to one if the
society is socially stratied and ruled by an elite which bases its power on control of a natural resource, and
zero otherwise. All geographical variables are computed using the grid cells within 200 km of the society centre.
Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where irrigation can more than
double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Settlement complexity measures, on a scale from 1 to
8, the permanency and density of settlements. Agricultural intensity runs from 1 to 4, where 1 is casual agriculture
and 4 is intensive agriculture. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All
regressions include a constant and a control for the year of observation. Robust standard errors clustered at the
language-group level in parentheses.
The evidence across ethnographic societies therefore supports the theory. The coe¢ cient
on irrigation potential is positive and highly signicant throughout all specications. Ethno-
graphic societies in areas where irrigation was worthwhile are more likely to have been domi-
nated by a resource controlling elite that, in turn, might have inhibited democratization later
on.
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For the ethnographic societies, a variable exists that measures whether or not the society
relied on irrigation at the time of observation. Unlike the historical data across countries,
this is not based on estimates. From the variable measuring the intensity of agriculture we
construct an irrigation dummy variable which is equal to 1 if intensive agriculture is based on
irrigation, and 0 if intensive agriculture is not based on irrigation. The variable is missing for
lower degrees of agriculture. Table 14 shows the IV results from instrumenting the irrigation
dummy with irrigation potential including the basic geographical controls. The instrument
is strong throughout (the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is larger than 10), and the estimate on
irrigation is signicant at the 1% level, though only at the 10% level when probit estimation
is used in column (9).
Table 14. IV of elite stratication on irrigation potentia l contro lling for developm ent factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Estim ation m ethod IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IVprobit
Irrigation dummy 0.475*** 0.686*** 0.694*** 0.731*** 0.648*** 0.632*** 0.695*** 0.495*** 1.487*
(0.170) (0 .217) (0 .182) (0 .198) (0 .217) (0 .167) (0 .181) (0 .185) (0 .871)
Absolute latitude -0 .272 -0 .026 -0 .134
(0.314) (0 .321) (2 .356)
Precip itation -0 .000 -0 .001 -0 .011
(0.001) (0 .001) (0 .008)
Temperature 0.010** 0.010** 0.082**
(0.005) (0 .005) (0 .040)
Soil constra ints (% ) 0.235 0.069 -1 .057
(0.222) (0 .197) (1 .349)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280
Continent dumm ies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Language dumm ies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
K leib ergen Paap F 27.86 19.56 30.76 24.81 17.78 33.63 30.18 21.57 .
Notes: IV estimates of elite on actual historical irrigation, where actual irrigation is instrumented with irriga-
tion potential. The dependent variable, elite, is a dummy variable equal to one if the society is socially stratied
and ruled by an elite which bases its power on control of a natural resource, and zero otherwise. Irrigation equals
one if the society engages in intensive irrigated agriculture and zero if the society engages in intensive agriculture
without irrigation. All geographical variables are computed using the grid cells within 200 km of the society centre.
Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where irrigation can more than
double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. Year is the year of observation of the ethnographic
society. Precipitation is the average daily precipitation in meters. Temperature is average daily temperature in
degrees Celsius. Soil constraints is the fraction of land where there are few or little soil constraints which inhibit
crop growth. Arable land is the fraction of land where the climate, soil quality, and water sources permit crop
growth. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a
constant and a control for the year of observation. Robust standard errors clustered at the language-group level
in parentheses.
Note that of all the three IV exercises done throughout (in the cross-country sample, the
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WVS, and the ethnographic sample), irrigation potential is the strongest instrument for irriga-
tion in the sample of ethnographic societies. This corresponds well with the fact that historical
irrigation is measured with highest precision in the ethnographic sample.
6 Conclusion
We have tested the theory that societies with a history of irrigation-based agriculture have
developed more autocratic institutions compared to societies with a history of rain-fed agri-
culture. Such a link has been hypothesized by many prominent scholars throughout history,
including Marx (1853) and Wittfogel (1957), but it can best be understood through the lens
of more recent resource curse theories. Dams and canals that provide water for irrigation are
easy to control, scarcity in arid areas makes it valuable. Ease of control and high value classify
irrigated agriculture as a point-source resource, a class of natural resources shown to inhibit
democratization if found in abundance. On the other hand, rainfed agriculture resembles more
a di¤use resource, which is not expected to deter democracy.
Since adoption of irrigation may be inuenced by existing institutions and the degree of
economic development, we use an exogenous measure of irrigation potential to estimate a
causal e¤ect of historical irrigation on autocracy. The measure is correlated with actual use of
irrigation, both today and historically.
We nd that countries in areas with a high potential for irrigation are more autocratic
today as measured by the polity2 index from the Polity IV database. Our results are robust
to a wide range of geographical, climatic, cultural, and historical control variables. According
to our estimates, the di¤erence between a country with no irrigation potential and a country
with full irrigation potential is about six points on the 21 point polity2 scale. By implication,
the di¤erence in irrigation potential can account for the gap in institutional quality between
Turkey and Algeria. At a more disaggregated level, we document that individuals in regions
with a high irrigation potential have less favorable views on democracy. Moreover, premodern
societies were more likely to be ruled by a natural resource-controlling elite if their agriculture
was based on irrigation.
As the example with Turkey and Algeria shows, the magnitudes involved are quite large.
Contemporary e¤ects of irrigation on institutions are unlikely to generate such di¤erences,
and they should be seen as the outcome of a long historical process. Irrigation fostered a
concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite. The elite entrenched itself
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through non-democratic institutions, and both the elite and the institutions were consequently
able to survive even when the economic importance of agriculture declined.
The results of this paper contribute to the literature on the origins of institutions. Much
attention has been paid to economic development and to historical contingencies related to, for
example, colonization. However important these determinants might be, a signicant fraction
of global variation in institutional quality can still be traced to deeply rooted geographical
factors. The supply of water is one, as we show in this paper.
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A Appendix
Table A1. Democracy on irrigation potentia l contro lling for geography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Irrigation potentia l (% ) -5 .79*** -5 .75*** -5 .78*** -5 .99*** -5 .72*** -7 .38*** -5 .90*** -5 .17*** -8 .16*** -8 .32***
(1.54) (1 .51) (1 .56) (1 .69) (1 .52) (1 .96) (1 .53) (1 .94) (1 .92) (2 .66)
Terra in ruggedness, 100 m . 0.03 -0 .48
(0.34) (0 .44)
Landlo cked -0 .79 -0 .28
(0.99) (1 .22)
Malaria ecology index -0 .04 0.03
(0.08) (0 .07)
Land w ith in 100km of coast/river (% ) 0.53 0.84
(1.29) (1 .70)
Land w ith in trop ics (% ) -0 .02* -0 .03*
(0.01) (0 .02)
Total area 0.00* 0.00
(0.00) (0 .00)
Std .dev yearly precip itation 1961-1990 0.00 0.01*
(0 .01) (0 .01)
Arable land (% ) -3.20** -3 .51
(1.45) (2 .21)
Observations 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158
R -squared 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.52
Continent dumm ies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the polity2 index which ranges from -10 (least democratic)
to 10 (most democratic). Irrigation potential ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the fraction of arable land where
irrigation can more than double agricultural yields compared to rainfed agriculture. All geographical variables
are computed by averaging over the modern-day borders of the country. Ruggedness measures the variability of
altitude. Landlocked is a dummy equal to one if the country is landlocked and zero otherwise. The malaria ecology
index measures the contribution of vectors to the force of malaria transmission. Arable land is the fraction of land
where the climate, soil quality, and water sources permit crop growth, calculated by adding across impact classes
1-5. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include a constant.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Structural transformation in the 20th century:
Additional data documentation
Asger Moll Wingender
1 Introduction
This document provides further details on the sources and methodology used to compile the
agricultural employment database presented in my paper Structural transformation in the 20th
century: A new database on agricultural employment around the world.1 Users of the database
are advised to read that paper before reading this document.
The database contains the following variables:
 country
 iso (three-letter country code)
 year
 aes (the agricultural employment share)
 aes_source (the data source for aes)
 pop (the population of the country)
The population data are included to make it possible to calculate population weighted
regional aggregates of the agricultural employment shares.
1Wingender (2014).
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2 Data sources: Employment
The variable aes_source contains the data source for agricultural employment shares in a given
country in a given year. The main data sources are listed below, with the name in aes_source
in bold:
 Deldycke et al. Data set compiled by Deldycke et al. (1968).
 Easterly and Fischer. Data from Easterly and Fischer (1995).
 GGDC. Data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, i.e., from EU-
KLEMS, the Africa Sector Database [Vries et al. (2013)] and the 10-Sector Database
[Timmer and de Vries (2009)].
 Good. Census data from the Habsburg empire kindly provided by David Good. The
data are used in Good (1994) and Good and Ma (1998).
 IHS. International Historical Statistics from Mitchell (1993, 1998a,b))
 ILO. Data from the KLIM database (from 1980 and onwards) and the LABORSTAT
database (before 1980). Both databases are maintained by The International Labor
Organization
 IPUMS. Integrated public use micro data from national censuses made available online
by Sobek et al. (2013).
 League of Nations. Various issues of the Yearbook of the League of Nations.
 Myers and Campbell. Historical data for the seven ex-Yugoslavian republics from
Myers and Campbell (1954).
 NAPP. Micro level census data from the North Atlantic Population Project made avail-
able online by the Minnesota Population Center (2008).
 OECD. Data downloaded from http://stats.oecd.org/.
 OLA. Oxford Latin America Economic History Database.
A number of additional data sources, often specic to a single observation, are used and listed
in Table 1.
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The variable aes_source also states if an observation in the database is based on inter-
polation, or estimated from urbanization data. Some countries have interpolated agricultural
employment shares in the year 1900. In these cases, the data source prior to the year 1900
used in the interpolation is stated in parenthesis. Countries with interpolated observations in
2010 are handled in the same way. There are eight countries where the earliest observation
of aes (actual or estimated) is above 0.95. It is assumed that these countries were not more
developed in earlier periods, and aes is consequently set to 0.95 in all prior years. These cases
are denoted Pre-development in aes_source.
3 Data sources: Urban and total populations
Urbanization rates and total population data for all countries 1950-2010 are from United
Nations (2012). Urban population data prior to 1950 are from Lewis et al. (1976) for USSR,
and from Eggimann (1999) for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Data for Bulgaria are from
Lampe (1975).
Total population data prior to 1950 are mostly from International Historical Statistics.
Major exceptions are the USSR, where data are from Lewis et al. (1976), and Africa, where I
rely on Manning (2010).
In a few cases, where the whole period 1900-2010 is not coverd by the International
Historical Statistics, I supplement the population data with the following sources:
 McGee (1964):Malaysia.
 Karpat (1985): Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.
 McEvedy et al. (1978): Indonesia and the countries on the Indian subcontinent.
4 General notes on methodology
The most important aspects of the methodology I use to merge the data sets, and to estimate
agricultural employment shares are described in Wingender (2014). A few methodological
details not covered by the paper are discussed in this section.
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4.1 Classifying agricultural employment in micro data
I use micro level census data from two sources. Census data from the past decades for a
number of countries can be found in Sobek et al. (2013). Minnesota Population Center (2008)
contains census data from the 19th and early 20th century for a small number of countries
in the North Atlantic regions. In both data sets, the International Standard Classication of
Occupations (ISCO) is used. I remove all individuals from the sample whith no occupation,
or where occupation is listed as unknown/missing. The remaining observations constitute the
employed labor force.
In the Sobek et al. (2013) data set, only the major ISCO group is reported for each
individual, but agricultural workers can in principle fall in both the "skilled agricultural and
shery workers" group and the "elementary occupations" group. Fortunately, most countries
seems to classify agricultural workers in the former category no matter their skill levels There
are exceptions, such as Sierra Leone, where a large portion of agricultural workers are classied
as being employed in elementary occupations together with persons working as, e.g., street
vendors, cleaners, and unskilled factory workers. I remove such countries from the sample.
Occupations in the historical census data from Minnesota Population Center (2008) are
reported at a more disaggregated level. But many of the groups in the data are servants,
maids, relatives helping at home, and similar sounding occupations that are likely to have
a substantial agricultural component. Fortunately, in the case of Sweden, most individuals
have their occupations transcribed directly from the original census records, and these give
an indication of whether an ISCO-group is primarily engaged in agriculture. I assume that
Swedish pattern applies to the other countries. The resulting agricultural employment shares
are similar to the ones obtained from other sources in years where other sources are available.
For example, Canada had 42.6 percent of its labor force employed in agriculture in 1901
according to International Historical Statistics, compared to 41.9 percent in my calculations.
4.2 Level adjustments
Population data from two sources do not always agree in years where they overlap. For instance,
I use population data from United Nations (2012) from 1950-2010, and other data in earlier
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periods. The other data sources sometimes report a slightly di¤erent number of inhabitants
in a given country in 1950 than the United Nations does. To merge the data series, I rescale
the non-UN data to be consistent with the level of the United Nations (2012) data in 1950
(or equivalently, I use the growth rates from the other series to extend the UN data back in
time). The same strategy is used in a few cases where agricultural employment shares from two
data sources do not match completely, but only for countries where the di¤erence is neglegible.
These observations, all of them from ILO, are listed as ILO, adjusted in aes_source.
4.3 Interpolation prior to 1950
The urban populations in Eggimann (1999) are only reported in years divisible by 10, and I
have for that reason only collected population data for those years. Both series are interpolated
in the remaining years based on the average annual growth rate between observations.
4.4 Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
Employment data for the seven ex-yugoslavian republics are available from various sources in
the past decade, from Myers and Campbell (1954) in 1948. Additional data are available for
the parts of Yugoslavia that was a part of the Habsburg Empire prior to World War I. In
the intermediate years, I use the aggregate data for Yugoslavia to derive the growth path of
agricultural employment in the republics between the actual data points. A similar strategy is
followed in the two Czechoslovak Republics.
5 Country notes
Albania: Urbanization data prior to 1950 are from United Nations (1969).
Austria: IHS data are adjusted in 1920 and 1934 to take undercounting of females in agri-
culture into account. The missing women are in the 1920 census counted as employed, but
without a specic occupation. They are not enumerated in the 1934 census. To adjust the
numbers, it is assumed that the ratio of womento men in agriculture is the same as in the
1939 census.
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Brunei Darussalam: The Statistical Yearbook do not report occupations for self-employed.
I assume that they are evenly distributed across all sectors, except for the government sector.
Czech Republic: Employment growth from Czechoslovakia is used to calculate agricultural
employment shares in the period 1921-1991 using the same approach as for the Yugoslavian
republics (see Section 4.4). Women in agriculture are in the Czechoslovak employment data
from 1921 undercounted. The data are adjusted by assuming that the ratio of males-to-females
in agriculture is the same as in 1930.
Germany: Population weighted average of East Germany and West Germany during the
partition.
Hungary: Employment data from 1900 and 1910 are corrected for undercounted women in
agriculture using the method suggested by Schulze (2007).
Ireland: Present day borders prior to 1920. Population growth is assumed to be identical in
the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland before 1920.
Korea, Rep. of: The agricultural employment share within the borders of present day South
Korea is in the colonial era assumed to be the same as on the entire Korean Peninsula.
Kosovo: Employment rates of 50 percent are assumed when agricultural employment shares
are derived from Statistical O¢ ce of Kosovo (2006, 2009). Population data are from the website
of the Statistical O¢ ce of Kosovo.
Lebanon: Population data for 1914 are obtained from Karpat (1985) by adding the innhabi-
tants from the Tripoli and Beirut census areas.
Malaysia: Population growth in Sarawak is assumed to be equal that of Sabah before 1940
Philippines: The population in 1900 is extrapolated from 1903 using average population
growth 1903-1910.
Poland: Agricultural employment is adjusted for family workers in 1897. The number of
family workers in agriculture is reported in a footnote to the employment table in Deldycke
et al. (1968).
Romania: Population data are adjusted for boundary changes by the author prior to 1920.
Data from 1910 and 1900 cover only the regions part of the Hungarian Kingdom. Employment
data from 1900 and 1910 are corrected for undercounted women in agriculture using the method
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suggested by Schulze (2007)
Serbia: Data for 1900 and 1910 are only available for Voivodina (roughly one third of Serbia
in terms of population). I calculate agricultural employment shares in Serbia as a whole by
assuming that the ratio of agricultural employment in Voivodina to agricultural employment
Serbia Proper was the same in 1900 and 1910 as it was in 1948, where data are available in
Myers and Campbell (1954).
Slovakia: Employment growth from Czechoslovakia is used to calculate agricultural employ-
ment shares 1921-1991 (see Section 4.4). Women in agriculture are in the Czechoslovak em-
ployment data from 1921 undercounted. The data are adjusted by assuming that the ratio of
males-to-females in agriculture is the same as in 1930. Employment data from 1900 and 1910
are corrected for undercounted women in agriculture using the method suggested by Schulze
(2007).
Syrian Arab Republic: The population before World War I is calculated from census data
reported by Karpat (1985). The census regions Hama, Halep, Lazkiye and Damaskus approx-
imate present day Syria.
Turkey: he population before World War I is calculated from census data reported by Karpat
(1985). The census regions Aydin, Erzurum, Adana, Ankara, ·Izmit, Bitlis, Biga, Çatalca,
Hüdavendigar, Diyarbekir, Zor, Sivas, S¸ehremaneti, Mülhakati,Trabzon, Kastamonu, Konya,
Kudüs, Elaziz, Van, and Dersaadet ve Bilad-i Selase approximate present day Turkey.
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